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Abstract

ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE FOR WHOM? EXAMINING THE POLITICAL,
INSTITUTIONAL, FISCAL, AND LEGAL DETERMINANTS OF STATE
ENVIRONMENTAL AGENCY BUDGET POLICY IN THE US

By Andrew R. Duggan, Ph.D.
A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of
Philosophy at Virginia Commonwealth University
Committee Chair: Wenli Yan, Ph.D., Associate Professor
L. Douglas Wilder School of Government and Public Affairs

Budgets are a prospective tool of governance, and appropriations are a planning vehicle
reflecting: bureaucracies’ values, complex interactions, collective preferences, political
influences, and available resources. Research spanning 30 years finds that environmental
pollution is a key determinant of environmental budgets in the US, though myriad factors, actors,
and subsystems are important to consider. Due to federalism and devolution of responsibilities
and authorities, environmental governance falls largely to the states. While the dynamics that
shape state environmental budget policy have received scholarly interest, theoretically-driven
examinations of environmental appropriations remain limited within the public budgeting and
environmental policy literature.
Using panel data from 2010 to 2015, this dissertation examines the legal, political,
institutional, and fiscal factors that influence state own-source environmental funding drawing
from several theories. Given the key relationship between environmental pollution and
environmental budgets—as stressed by previous scholarship—findings reveal the effects are
ix

conditioned on business interests from polluting sectors. While the interaction effect holds
across funding sources, the negative budgetary influence depends on the type of air pollution
modeled. Fiscal capacity is found to increase appropriations from state general funds but not
appropriations from fees and other sources. Mandatory climate policies have a positive influence
on budgets, though the evidence is inconsistent between models. Given cuts to federal
environmental funding, flat trends in state funding, what factors influence the financing of
environmental protection are of critical importance for civil society, practitioners, and public
officials; therefore, this dissertation concludes with policy implications and avenues for future
research.

x

Chapter 1: Introduction
1.1. Background and Purpose
State environmental agencies play a substantial role in US environmental governance—
tasked with environmental protection responsibilities and faced with challenging budgetary
conditions (Environmental Council of the States [ECOS], 2010; 2017a; 2018; Rabe, 2007;
Scheberle, 1997; Smith, Corvalán, & Kjellström, 1999). Setting agency appropriations involves
contextual factors, elected officials, public agency managers, interest groups, and the public at
large, each of whom “have marked preferences about what government should and should not
spend money on” (Rubin, 2010, p. 183). This dissertation examines those budgetary
determinants posited to influence appropriations to environmental agencies across the states.
Despite over 40 years of research into myriad predictors of governments’ fiscal commitment to
environmental protection, considerable gaps remain in state-level environmental public
budgeting analysis hindering understanding of this complex public policy output (Aidt, 1998;
Bacot & Dawes, 1996; Balint & Conant, 2013; Clark & Whitford, 2011; Lester & Bowman,
1989; Lowry, 1992; Newmark & Witko, 2007; Sacco & Leduc, 1969). As the spending
instrument for environmental decision-making, state environmental budgets offer a portal into
the contemporary health of environmental governance in the US—a governance that seeks to
reconnect with citizens during the formulation, implementation, and evaluation of environmental
policy through configurations of institutions, organizations, and laws (Durant, 2017; Kettl, 2000;
Lee, Johnson, & Joyce, 2013).
This study rests on a normative ideal—that increasing appropriations in response to
pollution problems ought to be a core principle of environmental governance—however
aspirational that may be in practice. Rooted in this perspective and drawing from several

1

theoretical traditions, I will investigate whether state environmental agency budget policy is:
responsive to environmental pollution; inured to business interests in polluting sectors and
political partisanship; and positively influenced by: civic environmentalism, climate policies,
fiscal capacity, and professionalism across state legislatures. Despite mounting environmental
problems, underfunding of environmental protection in the US is not a new phenomenon.
Historically, environmental agency budgets have failed to keep pace with expanded
responsibilities and ever-increasing state-level expectations particularly with respect to air
quality (Scheberle, 1997; Woods & Potoski, 2010). Examining the linkages between budgetary
determinants and appropriations is salient given environmental budget reductions such as those
proposed by the Trump administration while environmental protection responsibilities continue
to accrue on state governments (Congressional Research Service, 2019; ECOS, 2012).
Air pollution is the cause of nearly seven million deaths per year worldwide and is
forecasted to increase due to proliferating megacities and further expansion of industrialization
(Wang et al., 2016). In the US alone, emissions from a single criteria air pollutant—particulate
matter—account for over 100,000 to 200,000 premature deaths each year (Caiazzo, Ashok,
Waitz, Yim, & Barrett, 2013; Goodkind, Tessum, Coggins, Hill, & Marshall, 2019). Basu and
Devaraj (2014) noted citizens are particularly “proactive about cleaning up the air they breathe”
(p. 936) and air quality policy—in one form or another—has remained a fixture for governments
and civil society (Chen, Shofer, Gokhale, & Kuschner, 2007).
Air quality policy in the US involves a multitude of functions—(e.g. standard setting,
monitoring, compliance and enforcement) (Rosenbaum, 2017), and of the environmental agency
programs—(e.g. waste, water, remediation)—states play an outsized role in carrying out the
requirements of the Clean Air Act. Thus, the focal independent variables of this dissertation are

2

from criteria air pollution—comprised of pollutants that provided the impetus for the Clean Air
Act and greenhouse gas emissions, namely of carbon dioxide (CO 2), that contribute to global
climate change (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2018; Ringquist, 1993).
This dissertation asks two questions:
Research Question 1: Does the influence of air pollution on state environmental appropriations
vary according to the magnitude of polluting business interests?
Research Question 2: What are the effects of political, institutional, fiscal, and legal factors on
state own-source appropriations to state environmental agencies and do the effects vary based on
the funding source or air pollutant type?
How this dissertation addresses each research question involves both theory and
methodology. Pertaining to theory, despite previous contributions of environmental budgets and
spending—(e.g. Agthe, Billings, & Marchand, 1996; Clark & Whitford, 2011; Davis & Feiock,
1992; Stanton & Whitehead, 1994)—much of the literature to-date has been atheoretical, and this
gap in the academic literature is addressed in two ways. First, I apply a theoretical framework to
summarize factors that explain state environmental policy from a broad perspective (Schneider,
2006). Second, three individual theories are drawn upon to depict and establish the logical
associations between the independent variables—(i.e. budgetary determinants)—and agency
appropriations—(i.e. budgetary outputs)—in the empirical models (Jaccard & Turrisi, 2003;
Konisky & Woods, 2012; Lester, 1995). Pertaining to methodology, I will examine the
interaction of business interests and two types of air pollution on environmental agency budgets
and the direct effects between the remaining political, institutional, fiscal, and legal factors on
two separate sources of state own-source appropriations. Thus, the empirical analysis will
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employ multiple methodological approaches to further extend this strand of public budgeting and
environmental policy scholarship.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. First, I provide a summary of the
theoretical framework and theories and how they are specifically applied. Second, the
conceptual model and research design and methodology is introduced followed by key variables
and hypotheses. To add context and underscore the importance of this study, historical state
environmental budget trends and performance lapses are reviewed along with the terms and state
agencies examined. Lastly, several contributions are then summarized.
1.2. Theoretical Foundations
The integrated theory of state policymaking—(integrated theory)—is drawn upon to
provide thematic coherence to the conceptual model by summarizing and isolating factors that
influence state environmental public policy (Ringquist, 1994). The integrated theory is rooted in
three traditional theories of public policymaking: the economic model—socioeconomic factors
are the primary drivers of state policy outputs; the political model—political variables drive state
policymaking; and the group influence model—industrial groups or pluralist competition among
groups drive state policymaking. These original three sets of factors do not place emphasis on
budgetary outcomes, thus required a minor digression to emphasize characteristics anticipated to
be explanatory of fiscal policy outputs vice programmatic outputs—with the latter being
Ringquist’s original focus. Other differences in my framework include an emphasis on legal
factors; focus on air quality; and inclusion of a political factor represented by partisan ideology.
Synthesizing the integrated theory with literature from the public budgeting and
environmental policy literature results in a framework with the four sets of factors depicted in
Figure 1. As shown in Figure 1, the following conditions influence budgetary decision-making
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based on the logic of representative governance: political—(e.g. citizen and partisan involvement
and performance); institutional—(e.g. professionalization); fiscal—(e.g. fiscal health); and
legal—(e.g. regulations and policies) (Bland, 2007; Lester & Lombard, 1990; Mikesell, 2018;
Stanton & Whitehead, 1994). Characteristics within these preceding contexts are viewed as
determinants to budget policy—offering a perspective differing from budget policy analysis
perceived through a stochastic lens (Rubin, 1989) given the latter’s limited utility in explicating
public budgeting behavior (Smith & Bertozzi, 1998; Willoughby & Finn, 1996).
Figure 1.
Theoretical Framework of Dissertation

Note. Inspired by Ringquist (1994)

While the integrated theory serves as the framework, the three theories drawn upon to
further specify the conceptual and empirical models include: technocracy theory, rational selfinterest theory, and ecological citizenship theory. First, technocracy theory underscores a
prominent function of environmental agency personnel in informing appropriations requests
given their role in measuring, monitoring, and characterizing the magnitude and extent of
pollution (Gunnel, 1982). The theory explicates the motivation of technocratic personnel to be
responsive to environmental pollutants given a heritage in US public administration that values
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technical competence and instrumental rationality over partisan political influence and lobbying
pressures from particularized—(e.g. business)—interests (Goodsell, 2014; Wilson, 1989).
Technocracy theory focuses this analysis on the norms and values of contemporary
regulatory environmental governance in the US—particularly how they are shaped by technical
rationality applied to help translate “political issues into technically defined ends that can be
pursued through administrative means” (Fischer & Forester, 1993, p. 22). Though characterized
as either a bureaupathology (Adams & Balfour, 2014; Arendt, 1971; Thompson, 1961), or a
prerequisite necessary to achieve a “utopian social vision” (Goodsell, 2015; Gunnell, 1982, p.
392; Taylor, 1967), technical rationality serves a prominent role in US bureaucracies. I posit that
environmental agencies function as technocracies attuned to environmental metrics, such as air
pollution. While critiques of scientific rationality in the context of environmental pollution are
covered elsewhere—(e.g. Beck, 1992; Steinemann, 2000)—a responsive bureaucracy applies
technical rationality to ensure fiscal resources requested are commensurate with pollution
problems. Technocracy theory informs the decision, for example, to evaluate the role of
environmental pollution—and climate policies—as expected legal factors and budgetary
determinants.
Second, firm-level expenditures for environmental regulatory compliance are made by
businesses, particularly in the polluting industrial sectors—(e.g. utilities, manufacturing, and
mining) (Anderson, 2011; Falke, 2011). Closely related to group theory (Dahl, 1961), rational
self-interest theory (Olson, 1965) suggests that over time these “regulatory cost bearers” are
cognizant of regulatory actions that impact their business operations and expenditures
(Ringquist, 1993, p. 27). In response, polluting business interests act to reduce environmental
agency budgets through the political process, or more directly, by lobbying against specific
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regulations that would create additional firm-level costs, particularly at the state level (Cline,
2003; Williams & Matheny, 1984).
Following Olson’s (1969) theoretical perspective, rational self-interest theory explains
why business interests have influence in the public policy process. In a study of environmental
policy which drew on rational self-interest theory, Lyons (1999) found the “balance of group
power will be relatively favorable to resource users and to industry” (p. 281). This association is
attributable to the political self-interest of elected public officials to respond favorably to specific
business group constituencies who are themselves acting rationally by applying political
pressure. Rational self-interest theory is useful in explaining why the relationship between
environmental pollution and environmental appropriations may be conditional upon business
interests among the states. Since the interaction of business interests and pollution on
appropriations is a central focus of this dissertation, greater detail will be provided on this theory,
and how it informs the hypothesized relationships, in the sections that follow.
Lastly, ecological citizenship theory (Dobson, 2007) informs the linkage between citizen
involvement through political participation—(i.e. civic environmentalism); inclusion of CO 2
emissions, and consideration of climate policies which require funding to implement (Abel &
Stephan, 2000). Ecological citizenship theory derives from the political science field and
explains political activity through civic duties related to the environment that are incumbent
upon individuals to achieve social equity (Jagers, Martinsson, & Matti, 2016). Ecological
citizenship theory includes an expansive spatial extent for environmental awareness and
responsibility; it suggests that pro-environmental behavior is influenced not only by pollutants
that are more spatially-delimited—(e.g. ground-level ozone, particulate matter)—but also
global—(e.g. greenhouse gases)—in order to promote the common good (Dobson, 2007). This
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feature of the theory supports the decision to include multiple indicators taking into account not
only pollutants typically associated with more local and regional effects—(e.g. criteria air
pollutants)—but also those categories of pollution that have profound impacts on the global
community as well—CO2 emissions. Ecological citizenship theory informs also the decision to
evaluate civic environmentalism and climate policies as budgetary determinants.
1.3. Conceptual Model
The conceptual model in Figure 2 is consistent with previous perspectives of budget
models (Bland, 2007; Mikesell, 2018; Schick, 1966) that recognize “states operate within
political, economic, fiscal, and organizational contexts that, in turn, influence…[the] budget
management exhibited” (Willoughby, 2008, p. 432). The conceptual model that follows includes
the following independent variables:


environmental pollution;



business interests (of polluting sectors);



civic environmentalism;



climate policies;



partisan ideology;



legislative professionalization;



fiscal capacity;



federal-source funds; and



population.
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Figure 2.
Conceptual Model of Dissertation

As depicted in the model, the dissertation conceptualizes annual appropriations to state
environmental agencies as policy outputs, thus the empirical focus is on the policy attribute
exogenous to the policy outcome following a policy stages heuristic (Lasswell, 1956; Lee et al.,
2013). That is, this dissertation is not a study about environmental policy outcomes, agency
performance, or the innovation and effectiveness of environmental bureaucracies or pollution
control programs in the US—all topics addressed in previous scholarship and certain to garner
on-going attention (Grant, Bergstrand, & Running, 2014; Heckman, 2012; Ringquist & Clark,
2002; Sapat, 2004; Woods, Konisky, & Bowman, 2008). Instead, the dependent variables
consist of environmental agency budget policy. This financial measure is drawn from the
environmental policy and public budgeting literature and reflect what bureaucracies plan to do,
or not do, based on past and current conditions. Figure 3 represents the provision of government
services that reflects a policy stages heuristic specific to this dissertation.
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Figure 3.
Provision of Government Services

Note. Adapted from Mikesell (2018).

Though the linear diagram in Figure 3 represents a reality that is, in practice, more iterative and
complex, it is offered at the outset to situate and convey the public policy output focus of this
study.
1.4. Research Design and Methodology
This study uses a quantitative non-experimental research design to provide an exploratory
empirical analysis of secondary data. The hypotheses—provided below—are derived from the
theoretical foundations—that is, this study uses a deductive rather than an inductive approach.
As noted above, the analysis will include exploring the differential influence of criteria pollutant
emissions and CO2 emissions on environmental budgets. More specifically, while both air
pollutant types are hypothesized to increase environmental appropriations, their influence could
be unequal given the more recent regulation of CO2 emissions relative to those of criteria
pollutants, and this will be empirically tested. Additionally, the first dependent, or budgetary
outcome variable, is appropriations derived from fees and other sources—(e.g. permitting and
10

compliance user charges)—while the second consists of states’ general funds. Despite these two
components of state-level environmental appropriations, research attention has remained focused
on either federal, or total state agency appropriations or on combined natural resource and
environmental spending representing a gap in the scholarship.
From a methodological perspective, the conceptual model provided in Figure 2 is
analyzed, as detailed in Chapter 4, using a panel—(i.e. longitudinal)—structure with data for the
nine variables—listed in the previous section—from 2010 to 2014, and those data are lagged one
year and matched with state environmental agency appropriations from 2011 to 2015. This
methodological approach assesses the effects of factors in a given year on the environmental
agency budget policy in the subsequent year for a national sample of states. The analysis plan
and research design includes econometric models specified by the environmental agency budget
dependent variables and budgetary determinant independent variables in Table 1.
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Table 1.
Study Variables
Name

Conceptualization

Type of Variable

Environmental (Air)
Pollution

Emissions to the ambient atmosphere from pollutants known to
have local, regional, and global impacts (i.e. emissions of
criteria pollutants and greenhouse gases—CO2).

Legal

Business Interests

Prevalence of business collectivities (i.e. pressure groups /
pressure participants) within the state as represented by major
polluting sectors of the states’ economies.

Civic
Environmentalism

Construct that represents environmentally-focused concerns of
the polis expressed by environmental constituencies and
subconstituencies through electoral preferences.

Climate Policies

Represents the extent to which states have implemented
mandatory policies to mitigate CO2 emissions.

Legal

Partisan Ideology

The ideology of a state legislature based on partisan
identification as reflected by the major political parties’
relative control over state government.

Political

Legislative
Professionalization

Concept that represents the institutional capacity of the state
legislature.

Fiscal Capacity

The capacity of a state to raise revenue to pay for governmental
programs that implement public policies.

Fiscal

Environmental Agency
Budget-Fees & Other

State Source Budgeted Funding (Fees & Other)-Fiscal Year
2011 through Fiscal Year 2015

Fiscal

Environmental Agency
Budget-General Fund

State Source Budgeted Funding (General Fund)-Fiscal Year
2011 through Fiscal Year 2015

Fiscal

Political
Political

Institutional

Dependent Variables

Table 1 indicates also into what set of factors the variable fits within the conceptual model
provided above in Figure 2. While the classification of the majority of variables is intuitive,
environmental pollution is viewed as a legal factor given that regulations and applicable legal
requirements underpin air pollution abatement policy in the US. The US Code, specifically set
forth within 40 C.F.R. 64, Protection of the Environment, contains a multitude of legal
requirements regulating the operating, monitoring, recordkeeping, reporting, notification, and
testing of facilities that emit air pollutants.
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Numerous studies indicate that state population and the flow of intergovernmental
revenue sources (e.g. federal-source funding) can influence agency appropriations (e.g. Bacot &
Dawes, 1996; Clark & Whitford, 2011; Gamkhar & Oates, 1996). Thus, these two additional
control variables—population and federal-source funding—are included within the models. The
two research questions and six hypotheses are provided in Table 2 as a prelude to Chapter 2
which reviews the supporting academic literature.
Table 2
Research Questions and Hypotheses
Research Questions

Hypotheses

Does the influence of air pollution on
state environmental appropriations vary
according to the magnitude of polluting
business interests?

H1: Air pollution severity will increase environmental
agency budgets, if levels of polluting business interests of
states are sufficiently low.

What are the effects of political,
institutional, fiscal, and legal factors on
state own-source appropriations to state
environmental agencies and do the effects
vary based on the funding source or air
pollutant type?

H2: Civic environmentalism will have a positive influence on
environmental agency budgets.
H3: Mandatory climate policies will have a positive influence
on environmental agency budgets.
H4: Legislative professionalization will have a positive
influence on environmental agency budgets.
H5: Liberal ideology will have a positive influence on
environmental agency budgets.
H6: State fiscal capacity will have a positive influence on
environmental agency budgets.

Additional design and methodological details regarding limitations of this design for assessing
causality as well as interpretation of coefficients; assessing heteroscedasticity; and serial—(i.e.
autocorrelation)—are discussed within the statistical analysis plan in Chapter 3.
1.5. State Environmental Budget Trends and Proportions
Enhanced knowledge of environmental agency budgets can help public managers, and
researchers, ascertain to what extent this policy output is: a “mechanism for setting goals and
objectives” (Lee et al., 2013, p. 3); “responsive to the citizenry” (Mikesell, 2018, p. 45); or
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reflects public policymaking ideals (Nice, 2002). While the preceding excerpts lay-out
commonly held views from the public budgeting literature, they all give rise to a fundamental
question. Is it logical to propose agency administrators, legislators, and chief executives
consider environmental pollution, business interests, and climate policies, for example, when
legitimating appropriations bills? To the extent that agency budget cost estimation involves
attention to fulfilling a functional and coherent plan to address current and future environmental
challenges, the answer ought to be a resounding yes! Normatively, elected, and unelected public
officials, observe the conditions including the perceived needs of their clientele; determine the
intentions and required resources to deliver on those needs; and estimate the costs to supply what
is believed to be necessary to meet organizational objectives (Mikesell, 2018).
Despite the potential benefits of sufficiently-funded environmental agencies, state
environmental budgets in the US have not kept pace with the challenges—not unlike budgetary
trends besetting international environmental organizations and institutions (Axelrod &
VanDeveer, 2017). Therefore, importance for this study derives from the view that fiscal
resources for environmental agencies in the US have long been inadequate (Lowry, 1992).
Securing sufficient environmental budgets in competitive budgetary environments is a challenge
particularly when considering the drastic cuts that beleaguer these agencies (Rabe, 2007) and for
which the current federal executive branch administration has perennially proposed drastic cuts
and historic reductions (LaRoss, 2017; Office of Management and Budget, 2018; 2019; 2020).
Underscoring these challenges are the negligible proportions of total state expenditures
dedicated to environmental protection. For example, in 2015, environmental spending as a
percent of the entire state budget hovered around 0.5% for Michigan and Virginia (Michigan,
2015; Virginia Department of Planning and Budget, 2015). A similar picture emerges at the
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federal-level. The following figure displays the enacted budget appropriations of USEPA;
Department of Energy (DOE); Department of Education; the Department of Homeland Security
(USDHS); and the Federal Highways Administration (FHWA) to illustrate the USEPA budgets
between 2008 and 2015 relative to other federal agencies and departments.
Figure 4.
Budget Trends in Federal Agencies and Departments, 2008 - 2015

Note. Compiled by author from FHWA (2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015); USDHS (2009, 2010, 2011,
2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016); U.S. Department of Education (2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015);
USDOE (2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017); & USEPA (2017).

The USEPA budgets depicted in Figure 4 are consistent with changes to the USEPA
workforce resulting from an “EPA operating budget [that] was not much higher in the early years
of the twenty-first century than it was in the 1980s” (Durant, 2017, p. 358). An analysis of
environmental budget data collected from the mid-2000s reveal that short-term trends in both
federal and state-source funding to state environmental agencies have been either flat, or
declining; however, reliable data for environmental agency budgets are difficult to obtain on a
recurring annual basis.
15

The Environmental Council of the States (ECOS) is a national non-profit organization
that represents environmental agencies of states and territories of the US on matters ranging from
coordination among the branches of state and federal governments to data collection efforts such
as the projects ECOS funded to collect budget data to be used in this study (ECOS, 2017b). As
displayed in Figure 5, during the period from fiscal years 2009 extending through 2011, total
budgets and environmental budgets derived from state-source revenues declined. The federalsource revenues, among the 25 states analyzed during the survey, remained flat. This decline
may be partially-attributable to either the financial crisis, which began in 2007, or it could be
indicative of a prolonged downward trend (ECOS, 2010; Federal Reserve, 2016). More
specifically, these declining trends may have resulted from a neoliberal economic agenda that
have “[hived] off their functions to private and nonprofit actors who presumably have the will
and capacity” to protect the environment (Durant, 2017, p. 359). Further, what little federalsource dollars do flow to states are not for discretionary use but are either dedicated clean-up
funds, or intended to resource specific grant programs (USEPA, 2018a). Less than 40 percent of
federal-source funds to state environmental agencies are unobligated (LaRoss, 2017). Though
informative, the 2010 ECOS survey analyzed to develop Figure 5 is nearly two decades old, and
was limited to only a subset of states.
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Figure 5.
State Environmental Agency Budgets, 2009 - 2011

Note. Compiled by author from ECOS (2010) data.

Figure 5 provides the state environmental agency budgets for the years reported
separately as the: state-source; federal-source; and total—(i.e. combination of the state-source
and federal-source) budgets. These budget trends over this timeframe are brought into further
focus when considered in the context of state spending on other government functions. Figure 6
provides the state environmental agency budget—broken-up by federal and state-source funding;
percentage of funds spent on elementary and secondary education; percentage of funds spent on
higher education; percentage spent on Medicaid; percentage spent on corrections; and percentage
spent on transportation. As the following figure reveals, state environmental budgets reflect a
smaller proportion relative to other budgeted functions.
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Figure 6.
State Environmental Budgets as Proportions of Total State Expenditures, 2015

Note. Compiled by author from ECOS (2017b); National Association of State Budget Officers (2016). Federalsource funding of state environmental budgets is not discernable given its miniscule share of the total.

1.6. State Environmental Budgets and Environmental Performance
While the vigor of state environmental agency programs can be measured by policy
outputs other than budgets—(e.g. enforcement actions, pollution reduction)—examples of
inadequate environmental program strength and performance are often braided with observations
of inadequate financing for environmental protection. “Environmental program quality is
directly related to spending” (Agthe et al., 1996, p. 29). That is, environmental budgets shape
the performance of state environmental agencies, thus identifying what factors determine
appropriations can be revelatory of state governments’ focus on environmental issues (Bacot &
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Dawes, 1996; Konisky & Woods, 2012; Lombard, 1993). Furthermore, while previous studies—
(e.g. Lester, Franke, Bowman, & Kramer, 1983; Ringquist, 1993; Williams & Metheny, 1984)—
have analyzed the performance of specific environmental programs—(e.g. waste and water
programs)—this dissertation diverges from these previous analyses by examining agency
appropriations versus individual program budgets.
The connection between budget policy antecedents and fiscal responsiveness holds is an
important one given the challenges created by inadequate budgets, such as USEPA audits that
revealed underperforming state agency performance outcomes in air quality (USEPA, 2016a).
Though related to water quality not air quality, a salient example highlighting the connection
between insufficient appropriations and environmental agency performance is the Flint,
Michigan water crisis (Mettler, 2017). As the Flint Water Advisory Task Force observed:
Budgets for public health activities at federal, state, and local levels [are needed]
to ensure that highly skilled personnel and adequate resources are available. The
consequences of underfunding include insufficient and inefficient responses to
public health concerns, which have been evident in the Flint water crisis
(Michigan, 2016, p. 4).
Along a similar vein, Wood (1991) found that after the 1982 federal budget cuts,
enforcement actions by the USEPA against Clean Air Act (CAA) violators abruptly decreased
and once these funds were restored, enforcement activity rebounded with the states executing
five times more enforcement actions than the USEPA. In another study analyzing the effects of
state environmental spending and enforcement, Konisky (2009) found that states which increased
spending on the environment experienced higher rates of enforcement of their environmental
laws. Yet another analysis found that in response to drastic cuts in federal grants, some state
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environmental agencies were so adversely impacted, they did not execute the functions delegated
by the USEPA (Lester, 1986).
The findings demonstrate that when state environmental agencies encounter downward
fiscal pressures, the capacity to perform their delegated duties is hollowed-out; this leads to
lapses such as inadequate compliance oversight. For example, 81 percent fewer environmental
enforcement cases were brought in Florida in 2015 than in 2010, with the lowest fines since 1988
(Public Employees for Environmental Responsibility, 2015). A review of USEPA’s compliance
and enforcement tracking system suggests this decline in enforcement is not attributable to a
more compliant regulated community. USEPA’s on-line enforcement and compliance history
reporting website recently listed 8,400 facilities with significant violations which includes 2,000
instances of significant violations of the CAA (USEPA, 2016b). These facilities have air
emissions that cause injury and premature death particularly in states that have grown
increasingly dependent upon petrochemical and oil and gas industries—(e.g. Texas,
Pennsylvania, Illinois, and Louisiana). Notably, these are all states identified as having slashed
their environmental budgets in recent years (Environmental Integrity Project, 2019).
1.7. Definitions of Terms
Most terms are included throughout the dissertation in the context of their operational
definitions; therefore, this section includes only a brief background of three terms used
frequently throughout. While this section provides definitions, operationalization is included in
Chapter 3, methodology.
Civic environmentalism represents the environmentally-focused concerns expressed by
environmental constituencies and subconstituencies as reflected by their voting preferences of
states’ delegations to the U.S. Congress. Individual citizens and environmentally-minded firms,
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coordinate to enhance environmental outcomes, such as improving air quality or planning and
building sustainable communities (Agyeman & Angus, 2003; Knopman, Susman, & Landy,
1999). It has historically been the case that civil society expresses environmental demands
through electoral preferences. For example, environmental group membership has been found to
positively influence pro-environmental voting behavior of members of Congress (Anderson,
2011).
Polluting business interests can be defined in several ways. Fundamental to the notion of
business interests, however, is the idea of a collectivity—(i.e. “a pressure group”)—whose
existence is rooted in a commonality of purpose and the wherewithal to promote and advance
efforts, through the political process, that materially affect policy outputs and outcomes that
maximize their utility (Buchanan & Tullock, 1999, p. 204). Though there is ambiguity in the
conceptualization of this term in the social sciences, for the purposes of this study, business
interests—which will be the shorthand oftentimes applied for this variable throughout—refers to
larger non-formal organizations rather than individual membership bodies. Business interests act
with uniformity, through collective action and determine ways to effectively lobby policy
makers, or bureaucracies, so as to benefit their constituent members (Olson, 1965). In this
dissertation, business interests refer to the prevalence of business collectivities within the state as
represented by major polluting sectors of states’ economies—(e.g. utilities, manufacturing, and
mining) (Anderson, 2011; Falke, 2011).
Lastly, environmental agency budget policy refers to the overall purposive courses of
action that groups of policy makers and stakeholders make, or choose not to make, on some
consistent and reliable recurring basis, to be responsive to an environmental public problem or
issue—air pollution in the context of this study—as reflected by fiscal measures. This
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conceptualization is drawn from Heclo’s (1972) definition of public policy and is synthesized
from previous scholars (Dye, 2006; Friedrich, 1963; Lasswell & Kaplan, 1950). The term,
environmental agency budget policy is used in this dissertation to concurrently reflect the
multiple fiscal components that exist in the ECOS (2017b) dataset which will be used for this
study. This terminology derives also from the theoretical framework which is focused on state
policy outputs, hence addition of the term “policy” to the phrase “environmental agency budget.”
This manner of describing of environmental budgets as a policy output is useful for theoretical
and narrative purposes and extends from previous research that employs similar terminology
(Bacot & Dawes, 1996).
1.8. State Environmental Agencies
Analyzing policy at the state agency level derives from the enormous roles these
bureaucracies serve in US environmental governance and the need to reconceptualize their
purpose and impact on public policy in addressing domestic and global pollution challenges
(Durant et al., 2017). The unit of analysis for this study is the state environmental agency
budget, and this section provides an overview of the agency structure and functions.
Many state environmental agencies are organized similar to the USEPA—by
environmental media (e.g. air, water); function (e.g. compliance, enforcement, research &
development); and geography (e.g. regions, regional offices) (Sinclair & Whitford, 2012). State
environmental funds support compliance and enforcement efforts; air quality monitoring;
research and development; projects to safeguard clean water and clean-up bays and estuaries,
environmental justice and education; and compliance support to the regulated community
including environmental restoration of contaminated sites for redevelopment. While some state
environmental agencies fall under a state’s Department of Health (e.g. Colorado and Hawaii),
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many are stand-alone organizations situated within the state’s secretariat of natural resources or
the equivalent (e.g., Virginia). Most states have interrelated functions that pertain to human
health and the environment split between several agency types which may include a department
of health; department of natural resources; department of conservation; game and fish
department; and a department of environmental quality or management. Due to the various
institutional organizational structures and core missions, research in this area of public policy
requires the identification of the agency whose budget is being analyzed. The following table
provides a list of those agencies.
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Table 3
State Environmental Agencies
State

Agency Name

State

Agency Name

Alabama

Montana

DEQ

Nebraska

DEQ

Nevada

DEP

New Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico

Department of Environmental Services
DEP
Environment Department

New York

DEC

North Carolina

Florida

Department of Environmental
Management (DEM)
Department of Environmental
Conservation (DEC)
Department of Environmental Quality
(DEQ)
DEQ
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
Department of Public Health and
Environment
Department of Environmental Protection
(DEP)
Department of Natural Resources and
Environmental Control
DEP

Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa

Environmental Protection Division
Department of Health
DEQ
EPA
DEM
Department of Health

Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina

Kansas

Department of Health and Environment

South Dakota

Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri

DEP
DEQ
DEP
Department of the Environment
DEP
DEQ
Department of Natural Resources (DNR)
DEQ
DNR

Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming
D.C.

Department of Environment and Natural
Resources
Department of Health-Environmental
Health Section
EPA
DEQ
DEQ
DEP
DEM
Department of Health and
Environmental Control
Department of Environment and Natural
Resources
DEC
Commission on Environmental Quality
DEQ
DEC
DEQ
Department of Ecology
DEP
DNR
DEQ
Department of Energy and Environment

Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware

North Dakota

Though ultimately environmental agencies develop media—(e.g. water, air, land)—based
programs to address environmental pollution (Sapat, 2004), differentiations in their structures are
driven by the extent to which the state decides to combine, or separate, public health and
environmental functions. Within this literature regarding the structure of state environmental
agencies, there is broad consensus that the organizational structural designs can fit into three
groups: 1) a health department model including expenditures on healthcare unrelated to
environmental protection (Rabe, 1988); 2) a super agency model that incorporates natural
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resource oversight and management functions (Gale, 1986); and 3) mini-USEPA structures that
“emulate their federal counterpart”—(i.e. organized by environmental media and function).
(Bacot & Dawes, 1997, p. 358; Burke, Tran, & Shalauta, 1995).
Previous literature reveals that roughly 90% of environmental protection efforts are
executed within the environmental agencies versus health departments (Gordon, 1998) with
public health expenditures representing a negligible percentage of spending to promote
environmental health (Burke et al., 1995; Sinclair & Whitford, 2012). In a comprehensive study
of various determinants of state environmental performance rankings, organizational structure of
the agency (i.e. mini-USEPA versus superagency), the structure was not found to be a
statistically significant factor in the analysis (Bacot & Dawes, 1997). The extant research on
environmental agency structure, functions, and expenditures was drawn upon to inform the
decision to focus the analysis on the budgets of agencies listed in Table 3.
1.9. Contributions of this Dissertation
This dissertation offers four contributions. First, this study contributes to the theoretical
foundations with the integrated theory of state policymaking as the theoretical framework and
drawing upon technocracy theory, rational self-interest theory, and ecological citizenship theory
to further specify the conceptual and empirical models. Despite previous research contributions
(e.g. Stanton & Whitehead, 1994), there is a need for expanding the application of theory in
agency budgeting scholarship related to environmental policy (Rubin, 1989; Ryu, Bowling, Cho
& Wright, 2008). This observation is shared by state environmental policy scholars (Lester &
Lombard, 1990)—that research on environmental policy outputs requires consideration of more
than a single theoretical perspective and ought to move beyond a systems framework as the
dominant metatheoretical approach. While conceptual models derived from the integrated
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theory of state policymaking framework have been used to examine environmental policies (e.g.
Kim & Verweij, 2016; Ringquist & Clark, 2002; Vachon & Menz, 2006), this dissertation marks
its first application to environmental agency budgets.
Second, in the case of state environmental agencies, intergovernmental financing occurs
via two sources: the main one, originating from the state government (i.e. state-source), and
another from the national government (i.e. federal-source). By disaggregating total state
environmental appropriations into the two sources of state own-source funding, I contribute to
the literature by exploring the differential effects of the same set of determinants on two separate
sources of appropriations while controlling for the effects of federal-source funding. More
specifically, while examining general fund appropriations can reveal the influence of budgetary
determinants on the overall budgeting process, separately modeling fees and other sources allows
for an investigation into the contributing factors of this growing revenue structure. Despite prior
research suggesting federal and state policy, within the same functional areas of governance,
have different antecedents (Clark & Whitford, 2011), the environmental budget policy measure
with resonance in the literature consists of the total fiscal resources appropriated to state
environmental agencies (Bacot & Dawes, 1996; Konisky & Woods, 2012). This focus persists
despite state governments increasingly relying upon general funds and user charges drawn from
the regulated community—the two sources of state own-source funding. In the face of
continuing cuts to federal revenues, state-source funding now exceeds three-quarters of state
agency budgets making it the focus of this dissertation (ECOS, 2018).
Third, this dissertation contributes by focusing on whether the effect of environmental
pollution on environmental appropriations is conditioned by—i.e. interacts with—business
interests. This statistical approach addresses concerns of state environmental policy scholars to
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move beyond analyzing bivariate relationships and regression coefficients interpreted as only
direct effects (Lester & Lombard, 1990). As observed by Willoughby and Finn (1996), the
public budgeting process involves the “interaction of numerous players”, and these stakeholders
have varying allegiances and values that can condition this complex process (p. 524).
Fourth, this dissertation offers a methodological contribution to increase the construct
validity by examining the effects of air pollutant emissions in two ways. First, I examine the
influence of six criteria pollutants to move beyond single indicator measures (Bacot & Dawes,
1996, 1997) which, while useful, do not include the broad array of pollutants regulated under the
Clean Air Act (CAA). Second, the effect of CO2 emissions on environmental agency budgets is
separately assessed given the evolving focus of environmental governance in the US on climate
policy (Martin & Saikawa, 2017).
1.10. Outline of the Dissertation
Chapter 2 begins with an overview of the theoretical foundations, prior environmental
policy and budgeting research supporting each hypothesis before moving onto describe the
essential role of federalism in US environmental governance. Chapter 3 picks-up with the
research design and methodology and includes the statistical analysis plan before turning to the
empirical findings—and limitations—in Chapter 4. Chapter 5 includes the summary and
discussion of results, contributions, and avenues for future research.
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Chapter 2: Theory & Literature Review
Chapter 2 is organized as follows. The preliminary sections of this chapter provide an
expanded discussion of the theoretical framework and perspectives. This is followed by the
literature supporting environmental budget analysis including the six strands of scholarship
organized by each hypotheses and the supporting academic literature. Existing knowledge gaps
are then discussed. The last section of the chapter describes the essential role of federalism in
US environmental governance to further establish the level, and unit, of analysis.
2.1. Theoretical Framework
Environmental policy efforts reflect “divergent social, political, economic, and
environmental conditions across the country” (Durant et al., 2017, p. xi). To achieve
environmental outcomes citizens demands of civil society, such as clean air, Abramson, Breul,
and Kamensky (2007) observed policy implementation requires governmental institutions to add
legitimacy; provide the regulatory authority; and to allocate the necessary resources. That is,
environmental governance involves “actors from a variety of public and private organizations
who are actively concerned with a policy problem or issue such as air pollution control”
(Fishkin, 1991; Hajer, 1993; Sabatier, 1988, p.131). Budget policy preparation, especially on
technical issues such as air pollution, involve collaboration between legislators, agency officials,
special interest groups, and other actors involved in policy formulation and implementation
similar to the perspectives in collaborative governance theory (Ansell & Gash, 2008) and the
advocacy coalition framework (Sabatier, 1988).
Theoretical frameworks in the social sciences often help produce conceptual models to
help identify factors thought to explain a social phenomenon from a broad perspective
(Schneider, 2006). As noted in Chapter 1, this dissertation applies the integrated theory to
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summarize and isolate the factors to explain environmental agency budgetary phenomenon from
a broad perspective (Schneider, 2006).
While acknowledging the progression of theoretical advancements in state policy theory
(e.g. Dye, 1966; Erikson, Wright, & McIver, 1989), Ringquist (1994) advanced the integrated
theory in response to previous critiques over state policymaking theories which fell short of
offering a comprehensive view of political and fiscal influences. The framework, rooted in
environmental public policy, was developed to validate theories across several policy domains
and proposes that state policy strength (i.e. responsiveness) can be explicated by actors and
institutions within the political system. The resulting framework holds that responsiveness of
state governments can be explained by political, institutional, legal, and fiscal factors. The
theory was used by Ringquist and Clark (2002) to guide their study on environmental justice
which assessed state policymaking based on external and internal factors drawing on “consistent
findings from thirty years of state politics research” (p. 363). While conceptual models derived
from the integrated theory have been used to explain policy matters in other environmental
policy research (e.g. Kim & Verweij, 2016; Ringquist & Clark, 2002; Vachon & Menz, 2006),
this is the first study to apply it to environmental agency budgeting.
The framework is based on varying sociological conceptions including that of the
outcome variable—environmental agency budget policy—at the organizational level (i.e. mesolevel) (Neuman, 2009). Since the level of analysis—“the unit to which the data are assigned for
hypothesis testing and statistical analysis” (Rousseau, 1985, p. 4)—is at the state-level, the
theoretical perspective is focused at the macro level—aimed at analyzing state environmental
policy from a largely institutional perspective. In addition to its application to environmental
policy research over many years, the integrated theory includes the factors scholars have
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declared essential to public policy and administration analyses. In particular, Roberts (2008)
argued that frameworks drawn upon to help explain macro-level policy outputs ought to include
a broad range of factors including economic, political, and social.
Before turning to the individual theories, there are four details regarding the framework
that merit attention. First, the integrated theory is rooted in political science and based on three
sets of factors—economic-ideological; organized interests-pressures; and political systems
characteristics—my framework provides a thematic inventory including four sets of factors
drawing upon multiple disciplines particularly public budgeting. The original three sets of
factors do not place emphasis on fiscal factors and required a minor digression to emphasize
characteristics anticipated to be explanatory of fiscal policy outputs. Second, the original
framework focused on environmental policy in the context of water quality and hazardous waste
management whereas my study focuses on air quality. Therefore, a minor rework included a
legal factor to provide a logical inventory for two variables—climate policies and environmental
pollution from CO2 emissions.
Third, where the original model described environmental pollution as an organized
interest / pressure variable based on single measures of environmental pollution, this dissertation
includes this variable as a legal factor using a composite measure—for criteria pollutant
emissions and an individual indicator—CO2—for GHG emissions. Lastly, while the original
model included a variable—state opinion liberalism, as a type of economic-ideological variable,
the adapted framework includes state partisan ideology as a political factor as it relates to elected
officials in state legislatures.
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2.2. Theories
While the extant literature offers methodological contributions relevant to environmental
budgets, it offers comparatively less in theory application and testing specific to environmental
policy—representing a wide gap in the literature recognized by previous academic scholarship
(Lester & Lombard, 1990). As mentioned in Chapter 1, three additional theories are drawn upon
to help establish the hypothesized associations between specific independent variables—
budgetary determinants—and environmental budget policy. Further, as noted by Stanton &
Whitehead (1994), this approach helps address model misspecification on account of omitted
variables. Thus, Gunnell’s (1982) technocracy theory, Olson’s (1969) theoretical perspective on
rational self-interest, and Dobson’s (2007) ecological citizenship theory are drawn from to
analyze, explicate, and provide a logical accounting of the relationships between key study
variables, thus helping to establish hypotheses tested by the empirical models (Jaccard & Turrisi,
2003). The following sections describe each theory before turning to a summary of the
theoretical, empirical, and methodological details justifying examination of each variable and
hypothesis.
2.2.1. Technocracy theory.
The term, technocracy, was used in the US first within the engineering field in the early1900s; however, it can be traced back to the 1800s to early theorists of rational planning and
social order including Henri de Saint-Simon (Gunnell, 1982). The theory refers to the influence
that technical personnel (e.g. scientists, engineers) have on society, and it is defined as the “the
exercise of political authority by virtue of technical competence and expertise in the application
of knowledge” (Gunnell, 1982, p. 392). Technocracy theory is a variant of the conflict theory
paradigm advanced by C. Wright Mills who describe the roles of the power elite writing in the
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context of the hegemony that bureaucratic elites demonstrated throughout World War II (Barratt,
2011) and beyond (Goodsell, 2015; Sunstein, 2015).
Dye and Zeigler (1970) observed that elites play a prominent role in public policy
through a mutual-benefit association that regards the public’s concerns. A technocratic tenor in
public policy making is also evidenced in the writings of Key (1967) who observed that mature
democracies translate the needs of the governed into policies that address these needs.
Technocracy in the US plays a meaningful role in public policy given the complexity of the
society and relative lack of domain knowledge civil society has compared to the bureaucracy
across a wide range of technically intricate government functions. Fiorina observed that “as
ordinary citizens we do not know the proper rate of growth of the money supply, the appropriate
level of the federal deficit, the advantages of the [missile eXperimental] MX over alternative
missile systems, and so forth” arguing that the role of understanding and making policy sense out
of sometimes disparate information is delegated to policymakers—both elected and as nonelected bureaucrats (1980, p. 26).
In addition to the inherent complexity of governance, the move towards professionalized
bureaucracies was to answer the challenge in public administration in the nineteenth century.
These agencies were needed to “replace partisan patronage and machine politics” (Goodsell,
2015, p.182). Environmental agencies function as technocracies—structured with programs that
have specific goals and performance standards which are based on environmental metrics, such
as pollution severity. As Stone (2014) observes, “Policy makers need clear thresholds to set
program goals, define eligibility, and measure performance…[they] emphasize the measurable”
(p. 94). This observation is similar to Wilson’s who noted how government agencies often focus
their efforts on those activities that can be discretely observed and counted (1989).
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Technocracy theory suggests that environmental agency personnel characterize the
magnitude, and type, of pollution which is conveyed to the appropriate members of their
organization who pass the budgetary requests to their funding sources as either a nudge, or
technocratic requests for more funding based on the magnitude of pollution severity. A
normative premise of this dissertation is that increased funding results from environmental
agencies’ empirical knowledge of air pollution—facilitated by their collection and analysis of
pollutant data—and consequent brokering of that information during the budget process. As
applied to my study, technocracy theory holds that states increase environmental appropriations
in response to air pollution to fund the necessary permitting, compliance, and enforcement
programs requested by the environmental agency to address pollution.
This theory also holds that climate policy adoption will have a positive influence on
budgets, since additional technical personnel are needed to develop and implement the necessary
programs to achieve the policy goals of CO2 mitigation. This anticipated relationship between
pollution and climate policies to environmental appropriations is rooted in a theory of social
science that reinforces “public officials who can use scientific information, design optimal
policies and achieve planned outcomes” to justify demanding responsiveness in the form of
appropriations (Agyeman & Angus, 2003, p. 351).
While the environmental technocracy applies technical means to make the rationales and
repercussions on inaction more detailed and better explained during the budget process, their
input is necessary but not sufficient to address wicked problems. Rittel and Webber (1973)
called into question the ability for so-called experts or political elites to solve certain societal
problems. Fiscally responding to environmental problems involves institutions, competing
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interests, and multiple stakeholders including the ecological concerns articulated by civil society
(Weible, Sabatier, & Lubell, 2004).
2.2.2. Rational self-interest theory.
Rational self-interest theory goes to the core of addressing the so-called “second
question” relevant to public policy and administration—for whom is environmental governance
working (i.e. civil society or business interests?) (Frederickson, 2005). Following Olson’s
(1965) seminal work, Lyons (1999) explicated the behavior and motivations of business interest
groups through rational self-interest theory derived from the economics literature and closely
related to the market-based social choice by collectives—or public choice—theoretical
perspective (Buchanan, 1954). Following this theory, where other interests may essentially fail
at achieving unity, cohesive messaging, and ultimate impact on policies, business interests
demonstrate aptitude particularly when the group’s focus is trained at policies that have localized
and specific interests. Lyons (1999) adds that that the “balance of group power will be relatively
favorable to resource users and to industry” (p. 281). This, in-turn, engenders a responsive
legislative, and bureaucratic, orientation that attends to the demands of business interests which
ultimately impedes what would otherwise be increasing budgets in response to pollution.
Rational self-interest theory informs my decision to examine the interaction effect
between business interests and environmental pollution on environmental agency appropriations
rather than analyzing for unconditional effects. Drawing from rational self-interest theory,
business and industrial communities maintain awareness of environmental policy developments
which could impact their business operations. Such developments might include a state
proposed rulemaking for more stringent air pollution control technologies or a general policy to
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bolster compliance and enforcement efforts, either of which could impact (i.e. increase) firmlevel capital and operating expenses.
It follows, logically, and has been examined empirically (e.g. Newmark & Witko, 2007)
that as levels of specialized interests are greater in a state, the more intense is the filtering of
pollution severity information throughout the budgetary process. With business interests, this
process involves pressure to stymie appropriations for environmental protection. Taken together,
per technocracy theory, state governments ought to appropriate more in response to pollution;
however, per rational self-interest theory, fiscal responsiveness may be evident only when
business interests conditions are sufficiently accommodative (i.e. low).
2.2.3. Ecological citizenship theory.
Ecological citizenship theory suggests civic environmentalism is not limited to individual
environmentally-friendly behaviors though these have clear importance (e.g. recycling behavior
or “green” transportation preferences), but the concept extends to the political arena where civil
society has an opportunity to positively influence environmental policy outputs (Jagers et al.,
2016). Thus, ecological citizenship acts at the level of political institutions. Accordingly,
environmental citizenship can be conceptualized as an interest in domestic legislative efforts to
address domestic and global environmental challenges of which there has been an increased
tempo in the US. One example is the rise in legislation since the Supreme Court’s ruling in
Massachusetts v. United States Environmental Protection Agency (2007) which “accelerated a
cascade of climate-warming bills, resolutions, and amendments already emerging from
Congress” with proposals doubling between 2007 and 2008, alone (Rosenbaum, 2017, p. 370).
Though there is ambiguity over the term environmental citizenship, Dobson (2007)
suggests that the theory includes sustainable lifestyle behaviors and practices extending to the
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democratic and decision-making structures (e.g. elected bodies) that may be reproducing
environmental injustices pointing-towards an underlying connection between environmental
citizenship and political—electoral—preferences. Stern (2000) differentiated this type of
electoral-based environmental citizenship from environmental behavior expressed through
environmental organization participation (i.e. environmental activism) noting empirical evidence
that the former may lead to comparatively larger societal effects, because “public policies can
change the behaviors of many people and organizations at once” (p. 410). While Stern, Dietz,
Abel, Guagnano, and Kalof (1999) were advancing a separate theory termed the value-beliefnorm theory, that contemplates a more expansive consideration of related concepts such as
personal norms and belief systems, ecological citizenship theory can be thought of as a
derivation of the value-belief-norm theory.
Ecological citizenship theory emerged from the political science literature explaining
political activity through the relationship between citizens and the state and posits that civic
duties are incumbent upon individuals, related to the environment, and these obligations must be
fulfilled in order to promote social justice and equity (Jagers et al., 2016). Ecological citizenship
thus enables the hypothetical expectation of an empirical linkage between civic
environmentalism—and climate policies—and environmental agency budgets.
This theory also suggests that pro-environmental behavior is influenced not only by
criteria pollutant emissions to ambient air, but also by GHGs (i.e. those pollutants that have both
local and global impacts) (Dobson, 2007). Accordingly, the civil ecological perspective informs
a methodological decision to conceptualize and operationalize pollution severity based upon
indicators that encompass several classes of pollutants thus addressing a gap in environmental
budgeting research noted by others (e.g. Lombard, 1990).
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2.3. Literature Review
A review of the environmental policy literature reveals the shifting of environmental
protection responsibilities from the national government to the states which helped stoke
research interest in state environmental agency policy particularly in the 1980s—(Crotty, 1987;
Davis & Lester, 1987; Lester et al., 1983; Lester & Bowman, 1989; Williams & Metheny, 1984;
Rabe, 2007). Subsequent to this shift, the study of environmental budgets and spending
proliferated in the public policy and environmental literature throughout the 1990s—(Agthe et
al., 1996; Bacot & Dawes, 1996; 1997; Davis & Feiock, 1992; Hays, Esler, & Hays, 1996;
Lester, 1995; Lester & Lombard, 1990; Ringquist, 1993; 1994; 1995). A more recent strand of
scholarship focuses on the impacts of Clean Air Act pollutants on local jurisdiction revenues
(Carr, 2011a); expenditure patterns in response to increased federal regulations (Carr, 2011b);
and the impact of environmental regulations on subnational governments’ economic performance
(Yan & Carr, 2013). These preceding studies hi-light the theoretical and empirical linkages
between environmental (e.g. air pollution) and subnational public budgeting providing a
foundation upon which this study builds.
Many of the early environmental agency scholarship focused on either national and
subnational government dynamics in particular (e.g. environmental federalism) (Crotty, 1987), or
on specific programs within environmental agencies, such as air and water quality (Lombard,
1993; Stanton & Whitehead, 1994) or hazardous waste (Lester et al., 1983). While there was
heightened academic literature on environmental budget policy, the literature was followed-up
by only a dearth of related scholarship at the state-level (e.g. Clark & Whitford, 2011; Konisky
& Woods, 2012; Newmark & Witko, 2008). Table 4 summarizes key literature along with the
theoretical, empirical, and methodological details of each variable and hypothesis.
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Table 4
Key Literature, Study Variables, and Basis for Investigating
Variable Name
Environmental
Pollution

Business Interests

Civic
Environmentalism

Climate Policies

Legislative
Professionalization

Partisan Ideology

State Fiscal
Capacity

Type of
Variable

Basis / Justification for Investigating

Hypotheses

Theoretical: Technocracy Theory
Empirical: Previous Findings Support Inclusion
Key Literature: Agthe et al. (1996); Bacot & Dawes (1996); Martin &
Saikawa (2017)

Environmental pollution is the focal
independent variable—see H6 for hypotheses
involving the interaction effects.

Political

Theoretical: Rational Self Interest Theory
Empirical: Unstudied with Interaction of Pollution on State Own-source
Environmental Budgets
Key Literature: Buchanan & Tullock (1999); Jordan, Halpin, & Maloney
(2004); Newmark & Witko, (2007)

H1: Air pollution severity will increase state
environmental agency budgets, if levels of
polluting business interests of states are
sufficiently low.

Political

Theoretical: Ecological Citizenship Theory
Empirical: Understudied Despite Previous Findings Suggesting Related
Constructs are a Determinant
Key Literature: Dewitt (2006); Knopman et al. (1999); Konisky &
Woods (2012)

H2: Civic environmentalism will have a
positive influence on state environmental
agency budgets.

Theoretical: Technocracy Theory & Ecological Citizenship Theory
Empirical: Unstudied in Context of State Environmental Agency Budgets
Key Literature: Grant et al. (2014); Rabe (2007)

H3: Mandatory climate policies will result in
higher state environmental agency budgets.

Empirical Findings: Previous Findings Support Inclusion
Key Literature: Mooney (1995); Konisky & Woods (2012); Squire
(2012; 2017)

H4: Legislative professionalization will have
a positive influence on state environmental
budgets.

Empirical: Previous Findings Support Inclusion
Key Literature: Alt & Lowry (2000); Anderson (2011); Clark &
Whitford (2011); Fowler & Breen (2013)

H5: Liberal ideology will have a positive
influence on environmental agency budgets.

Empirical: Unstudied in Context of State Environmental Agency Budgets
with Indicator Used (TTR)
Key Literature: Agthe et al. (1996); Bacot & Dawes (1996); Hays et al.
(1996)

H6: State fiscal capacity will have a positive
influence on environmental agency budgets.

Legal

Legal

Institutional

Political

Fiscal

2.3.1. Literature emphasizing environmental budgets.
While several approaches are available to assess the strength of environmental public
policy at the state level (e.g. pollution outcomes, enforcement actions, quantity of delegated
programs from USEPA), a branch of scholarship emphasizes budgetary output analysis over
alternative metrics (Agthe et al., 1996; Bacot & Dawes, 1996; Kraft & Vig, 2013). For example,
Balint and Conant (2013) conceptualized agency operating budgets as the “principal indicator of
the agency’s vitality and influence” (p. 23). In explaining the linkage between environmental
pollution and budgets, Patten (1998) suggested environmental problems inevitably lead to
deliberation on increasing expenditure levels.
While Lester and Lombard (1990) cautioned researchers against interpreting budgets as
interchangeable with state environmental agency performance, analysis of environmental agency
financial indicators has resonance in state environmental policy research. These economic-based
measures provide a way to capture “a state’s commitment to environmental protection” (Clark &
Whitford, 2011; Konisky & Woods, 2012, p. 545). Bacot and Dawes (1997) observed “since
legislative and programmatic goals are only as effective as their funding levels permit them to
be, it appears that the expenditure approach may be the most suitable method for estimating
states’ environmental efforts” versus empirically assessing related concepts (p. 366). Previous
research reveals that investigating agency budget policy versus state political and administrative
rankings offers a robust approach and reflects environmental agency effort (Bacot & Dawes,
1997; Woods et al., 2008). “We can be confident that a state's real environmental effort is being
approximated with this [fiscal] type of dependent variable” (Bacot & Dawes, 1996).
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2.3.2. Factors that influence environmental agency budget policy.
Throughout the years, studies find associations between the factors within the integrated
theory (i.e. political, institutional, legal, and fiscal) and environmental financial measures (e.g.
appropriations and expenditures). The next sections provide brief reviews of six strands of
literature; identification of gaps in the scholarship that this dissertation helps fill; and expands
upon the hypotheses. This chapter concludes with a discussion of environmental federalism that
situates the state-level of analysis in this dissertation.
2.3.2.1. Air pollution and business interests influencing budgets.
Air pollution is an externality—that is, it “arises when a person [or firm] engages in an
activity that influences the well-being of a bystander but neither pays nor receives compensation
for that effect”, since it remains outside—or external to—the underlying transaction (Mankiw,
2015, p. 196). Negative externalities, such as air pollution, involve legal instruments (e.g.
regulations) aimed at reducing (i.e. mitigating) emissions which is the case with air pollution
abatement in the US, and these programs carry production and governance costs. Further, state
environmental agencies have exercised ever-increasing autonomy and efforts to curb air
pollution over the past several decades (Chubb, 1985; Crotty, 1987; Goulder & Stavins, 2011).
As Basu and Devaraj (2014, p. 936) noted, society is “more proactive about cleaning up the air
they breathe” due to the disproportionate negative impacts on children and elderly populations
and transboundary nature of air pollution spillover effects (Woods & Potoski, 2010).
Environmental governance in the US has traditionally been achieved through the
promulgation of regulations based on quantitative standards derived from toxicity and risk
assessment information. In the US “the best example is the National Ambient Air Quality
Standards set under the Clean Air Act (CAA), which must protect the most sensitive parts of the
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population with an adequate margin of safety” (Fiorino, 2017, p. 316; Johnson & Graham, 2005).
The USEPA establishes these national ambient air quality standards (NAAQs) for the following
six air pollutants termed criteria air pollutants, since the NAAQS are established on healthbased criteria (Al-Kohlani & Campbell, 2016; Martineau & Novello, 2004; Simon, Reff, Wells,
Xing, & Frank (2015); 40 CFR, Part 50: Nitrogen Oxides (NOx); Sulfur Oxides (SOx); Carbon
Monoxide (CO); Particulate Matter (PM) as PM 10 and PM2.5; Ozone (O3); and Lead (Pb).
Table 5 provides a summary of the known, and suspected, human health effects due to exposure
to criteria pollutants. Although it is a highly toxic heavy metal—especially to children—lead is
excluded from Table 5, since lead emissions will not be empirically assessed within this study
due to its comparatively minute contribution to overall criteria pollutant emissions after its
required phase-out from gasoline mandated by the USEPA in 1974 (USEPA, 1998).
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Table 5
Criteria Air Pollutants and Known Human Health Effects
Pollutant

Description

Health Effects

Nitrogen
Oxides (NOx)

NOx are gaseous pollutants emitted as NO
and react in the atmosphere to form nitrogen
dioxide (NO2); the primary source of NOx
are combustion sources (e.g. power plants
and automobiles). NOx are ozone precursors.

Exposure to NOx has been associated with
bronchoconstriction and respiratory infections
especially in people with asthma via systemic
inflammation oxidative stress pathways
(Chauhan, Krishna, Frew, & Holgate, 1998;
Kagawa, 1985; Kampa & Castanas, 2008;
Peel, Haeuber, Garcia, Russell, Neas, 2013)

Sulfur Oxides
(SOx)

SOx are gaseous pollutants for which the
primary anthropogenic source is also
combustion of fossil fuels.

SOx exposure has been associated with
reduced fetal growth; bronchospasms; acute
myocardial infarctions (Hansen, Barnett, &
Pritchard, 2008; Kermani, Jokandan, Aghaei,
Asl, Karimzadeh, & Dowlati, 2016)

Carbon
Monoxide (CO)

CO is a gaseous pollutant that is formed as a
byproduct of incomplete combustion.

CO exposure has been linked to
cardiovascular effects including impaired
mental activity; impaired neural development
in children (Badman & Jaffe, 1996; Levy,
2016).

Particulate
Matter (PM) as
PM10 and PM2.5

PM is a mixture of particles that are
suspended in ambient air produced by a
variety of activities including combustion of
fuel and construction activity. PM10 has an
aerodynamic diameter of ≤ 10 microns, and
is also known as particulate matter. PM2.5
has an aerodynamic diameter of ≤ 2.5
microns, and is also known as fine
particulate matter.

PM2.5 has been associated with heart and lung
diseases at the lower respiratory regions
including asthma (Brook, Franklin, Cascio,
Hong, Howard, & Lipsett, 2004; Pope, 2000).
PM10 has been associated with lung damage
especially in the upper-respiratory regions,
heart disease, cancer, and myocardial
infarctions (Al-Kohlani & Campbell, 2016;
Mustafic, Jabre, Caussin, Murad, Escolano, &
Tafflet, 2012).

Ozone (O3)

Rather than being directly emitted, it is
formed through sunlight that reacts with
photoreactive chemicals—called
precursors— of which NOx and VOC are the
dominant precursor pollutants and will be
used to calculate the composite measure.

Ozone exposure in humans has been
associated with cardiopulmonary effects
including inflammation of the respiratory
system and decreased lung capacity as well as
reduced fetal growth (Hansen et al., 2008;
USEPA, 2013; Uysal & Schapira, 2003).

The legal mechanism Congress established to meet the NAAQS—the state
implementation plans (SIP)—are developed by each state; reviewed; and approved by the
USEPA. Though these SIPs are set forth in the code of federal regulations, state environmental
agencies “have spent many resources redoing and revising their SIPs ever since” and share
responsibility with the USEPA for ensuring attainment and maintenance once the NAAQs are
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established (Martineau & Novello, 2004, pp. 6, 13). The SIPs establish the states’ legal
responsibility to ensure each air quality control region of the state achieves, or maintains, the
NAAQS. A large part of the state-level oversight of the NAAQS program is the network of
ambient air monitoring stations that states operate to assess compliance with USEPA standards
(Johnson & Graham, 2005). Despite meaningful reductions, emissions from fine particulate
matter accounts for over 100,000 to 200,000 premature deaths per year (Caiazzo et al., 2013;
Goodkind et al., 2019). Therefore, the monitoring of criteria pollutant emissions remains a key
focus, and cost, for state environmental agencies.
To keep track of the air pollution severity among the states, the USEPA compiles the
Green Book (USEPA, 2018b). Figure 7 provides a map of the counties that are currently
designated as in non-attainment or maintenance with the NAAQs as of June, 2018 (USEPA,
2018b). As Figure 7 depicts, nearly every state has an air quality control region that is either in
nonattainment or maintenance with the NAAQs and many regions are in nonattainment, or
maintenance, for more than one pollutant. As Durant (2017) observed, “nearly two-thirds of US
citizens still live in nonattainment areas for dangerous ozone and particulate matter” (p. 18).
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Figure 7.
Counties Designated as Nonattainment or Maintenance with Clean Air Act’s NAAQs

Note. Figure from USEPA (2018c).

The persistent prevalence of NAAQS nonattainment across the US and the regulatory-based
approach—implemented at the state level—to reduce criteria pollutant emissions, supports
thematically categorizing environmental pollution as a legal factor in the conceptual model
(Souza, Davis, & Shire, 2011, p. 62).
Despite the previous academic literature on criteria pollutants, there is an extant gap in
research on the influence of CO2 emissions and environmental budgets while “GHG emissions
have increased roughly 61 percent since 1990 and the amount of CO 2 in the atmosphere has
doubled” (Durant, 2017, p. 5). Through the seminal case of Massachusetts v. United States
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Environmental Protection Agency (2007), the Supreme Court facilitated a reshaping of the
contours of environmental governance in the US ascribing legitimacy to the nation’s attempts to
address GHG emissions. Leading up to Massachusetts, USEPA had not issued an endangerment
finding for GHGs; therefore, the agency had not promulgated emissions standards to mitigate
CO2 emissions—the primary cause of GCC (Hansen, Sato, Kharecha, & von Schuckmann,
2011). CO2 is the most prevalent GHG pollutant accounting for 75% of global GHG emissions
and 82% of domestic GHG emissions (USEPA, 2018d). Figure 8 demonstrates the increases in
global CO2 which are projected to double by 2020 and double again by 2050 (Nejat, Jomehzadeh,
Taheri, Gohari, Majid, 2015).
Figure 8.
Growth in Global CO2 Emissions, 1971 - 2011

Note. From Martin & Saikawa (2017).

Further, data from the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), provided in Figure 9,
show the ambient atmospheric concentrations of CO2 are well above the highest historical levels.
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Figure 9.
Growth in Concentrations of CO2, 2006 – 2019

Note. From NASA (2019).

Nearly all air pollutant data in USEPA databases are collected by states; most of the
financial requirements for enforcement are funded by the states; and more than three-quarters of
resources needed to address air quality are derived from state-source revenues (Heckman, 2012;
Potoski & Woods, 2002; Rabe, 2007). Thus, the underlying driver for appropriations to grow in
response to air pollution is due to public sector costs to implement programs necessary to carryout statutory requirements and policy initiatives (e.g. NAAQS air monitoring, writing permits,
managing programs, conducting inspections, and pursuing enforcement actions). From the
literature, we learn that “states tailor the vigor of their enforcement programs [thus costs] to fit
the scope of the pollution problem” (Potoski & Woods, 2002, p. 213). Evidence from the
academic literature supports this proposition revealing that states tend to enact more stringent
pollution control regulations based on the pollution severity within the state (Lester et al., 1983;
Lester & Lombard, 1990; Ringquist, 1994). The increased regulations and increased personnel
costs represent approximately 70 percent of subnational government expenditures across state
government functions (Globerman & Vining, 1996; Mikesell, 2018).
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A fundamental argument in this dissertation is that the fiscal responsiveness of
environmental agencies ought to be increasing in response to the persistence of elevated criteria
pollutant emissions and exorbitant ambient concentrations of CO 2 (NASA, 2019). However, as
O’Hare (2006) pointed-out, it is up to the public agency to make their case for increased
appropriations; as one legislator observed “we can’t justify giving them more money, when
there’s no analytic basis for that justification” (p. 529). Along a similar vein, it is argued the
political pressure created by environmental problems are matched by governmental responses
but only when conditions are conducive (Bacot & Dawes, 1997; Hays et al., 1996; Konisky &
Woods, 2012; Lowry, 1992; Newmark & Witko, 2007; Potoski & Woods, 2002).
Studies of the connection between pollution and environmental budgets proliferated in
the 1990s (Agthe et al., 1996; Davis & Feiock, 1992; Lester, 1995; Lester & Lombard, 1990;
Ringquist, 1993; 1994; 1995). One study found pollution “to be the most substantial
determinant” of environmental expenditures among the states analyzed out of the ten variables
assessed (Bacot & Dawes, 1997, p. 129). Though informative, these studies were followed by
only a few studies (e.g. Clark & Whitford, 2011; Konisky & Woods, 2012; Newmark & Witko,
2008). Based on a review of the literature, there is a research consensus on the relationship
between pollution and environmental spending which supports pollution severity as a key focal
variable. However, a review of the literature reveals a lack of research on the influence of
business interests and budgets despite our understanding of the polluting sectors’ overwhelming
impact on US environmental policy.
Rosenbaum (2017) observed “no interest has exploited the right to take part in the
governmental process more pervasively or successfully than has business” (p. 45). In the early
literature on private firms and environmental policy, the disproportionate role of business
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interests in policymaking was hi-lighted (Buchanan & Tullock, 1975). Olson (1965) attributed
the aptitude of business interests to impact public policy to their capacity to unify and share
resources to achieve specific policy objectives. This perspective was reinforced by Baumgartner
and Leech (2001) who found business interests were the most politically active; had the largest
membership across all interest group categories; and spent roughly 85% of their funds on
lobbying efforts. Moreover, special interests are often concentrated at the state-level, thus are
expected to apply pressure on state governments in particular (Lee et al., 2013; Ringquist, 1994).
Supporting an emphasis at the state-level, Rabe (2017) observed business interests
composed of heavily-polluting activities were very active, and largely successful, in lobbying
state legislators for reduced industry taxes. This reduced tax revenue has a consequent effect on
the states’ general funds, thus resources available for environmental agency budgets. In another
study of business interests and public policy, O’Hare (2006) found that business groups lobby for
reduced user fees for permits which consequently reduces agency funds. This study argued
when business interests are active, governments’ fiscal responsiveness to pollution severity is
undermined due to politically-motivated, and connected, interests seeking to minimize their
share of the fixed and variable costs associated with environmental compliance. Thus, rational
self-interested member firms join business interest groups to achieve material benefits despite
their individual firm-level costs of joining which, Olson observed, would generally be a
dissuasive force to joining (Lyons, 1999).
The costs businesses seek to reduce with this lobbying activity include regulatory
compliance costs estimated at over $200 billion per year—60 percent of which “are borne by
corporations seeking to meet their statutory obligations” (Kraft, 2017, p. 78). As it relates to
pollution abatement regulations, it has been found that worsening air quality and nonattainment
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status leads to increased firm-level costs for regulatory compliance (Becker, 2005; Carr, 2011b).
For example, these increased industrial sector costs are partly attributable to the technologybased regulations set forth under the Clean Air Act (e.g. New Source Performance Standards and
National Emissions Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants).
Durant (2017) noted that environmental agency’s authority to promulgate pollution
abatement regulations is impeded by business interests via lawsuits that either delay rulemaking;
perpetuate the status quo; or result in carve-outs for politically powerful industries. Along a
similar vein, business interests have an effect on budget policy through their efforts, and success,
at blocking these environmental regulations—particularly those aimed at reducing greenhouse
gas emissions (Baumgartner & Leech, 2001; Falke, 2011). To the extent lobbying by business
interests prevents rule promulgation, this places downward pressure on environmental budgets
given a reduced need for additional personnel for implementation.
Given these influences, the impacts of business interests on environmental public policy
has been the focus of research for several decades (Davies & Davies, 1975; Dell, 2009; Hays et
al., 1996; Moore & Giovinazzo, 2011). While Bacot and Dawes (1997) found no meaningful
direct influence between business interests and environmental policy, other research found
business interests had a negative influence on state agency funding, spending, and effort (Clark
& Whitford, 2011; Konisky & Woods, 2012). Despite the theoretical and practical justifications
for examining the interaction effects of business interests and environmental pollution on
appropriations, business interests have mostly been hypothesized to exert only “simple main
effects” on appropriations (Bacot & Dawes, 1997; Clark & Whitford, 2011; Jaccard & Turrisi,
2003, p. 4; Konisky & Woods, 2012). Of these studies, all coefficients were in the expected

49

direction—(i.e. negative)—with the coefficient on the regression term statistically significant in
two of the three studies.
Though this previous literature revealed the importance of business interests as an
important political factor, only one study examined the interaction of business interests and
pollution on environmental appropriations. In that study, Newmark and Witko (2007) did not
find evidence environmental problems led to greater expenditures directly though their analysis
did highlight the interaction between special interests and pollution, thus marking a key scholarly
contribution regarding the conditional nature of the relationship between pollution and funding.
More specifically, the authors found the coefficient on the interaction term was not significant
thus concluded no interaction which differs from the statistical analysis interpretation and
approach used in this dissertation. It deserves mentioning that Newmark and Witko’s (2007)
study was based on only one year of data; used a different fiscal measure; and relied upon
business registrants versus business interest measures with greater representation in the academic
literature (Bacot & Dawes, 1996; 1997; Clark & Whitford, 2011; Konisky & Woods, 2012).
To review, this dissertation does not examine the direct effect of pollution on
appropriations, since environmental agencies are but one actor in budget proposal formulation.
After all, public budgeting involves the “interaction of numerous players”, and stakeholders have
varying values and objectives that indirectly condition this complex process (Lindblom, 1982;
Willoughby & Finn, 1996, p. 524). While environmental public managers have a sense of the
pollution severity in their state and, presumably, broker that knowledge to public budgeters for
the funding that would otherwise be appropriated to another agency (O’Hare, 2006), I posit that
business interests conditions must be sufficiently low so as not to undermine fiscal
responsiveness.
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Rational self-interest theory, together with the academic literature, informs my decision
to posit the relationship between environmental pollution and environmental appropriations is
moderated—depending on the prevalence of polluting business interests among the states. That
is, I expect agency appropriations in response to air pollution will vary across the continuum of
business interests. Providing theoretical support for an interactive effect is Lyons (1999) who
pointed-out the influence of industrial interest groups as explicated through rational self-interest
theory drawing from Olson’s seminal work.
Again, from the academic literature, Bromley-Trujillo (2016) posited, and found, that
states with a higher concentration of business interests, such as in the mining sector, would be
less likely to support environmentally proactive policies. It follows that business interests
condition the relationship between pollution and budgets given that public-sector remedies for
negative externalities involve imposing firm-level expenditures “equal to the marginal cost of
pollution” to achieve socially desirable outcomes (Stiglitz, 1986, p. 185). Thus, the effect of
pollution on environmental budgets is such that as business interest levels increase so too does
lobbying pressure to stymie legislative and regulatory efforts to curb pollution. After all, these
pollution abatement regulations increase costs for those industrial sectors that contribute the most
to air pollution (e.g. utilities, manufacturing, and mining sources) which include increased capital
expenditures for pollution control equipment. This increased lobbying by business interests is
hypothesized to undermine what would otherwise be a more responsive association between
pollution and agency budget policy reflective of an aspirational principle of fiscally responsive
environmental governance. That is, state environmental agencies appropriate more in response
to pollution severity but only when business interest conditions are sufficient to accommodate
this fiscal responsiveness.
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H1: Air pollution severity will increase environmental agency budgets, if levels
of polluting business interests of states are sufficiently low.
2.3.2.2. Civic environmentalism influencing budgets.
Linking the allegiances that emerge in civil society (Wapner & Kantel, 2017) to
environmental concerns, John (2004) conceptualized civic environmentalism as a participatory
embodiment of environmental governance focused on environmental protection. Including this
variable does not require that citizens are particularly focused on pollution and environmental
budgets. After all, “for many agencies, many citizens will not have very clear ideas regarding
the agency’s current level of funding or what funding would be suitable for next year” (Nice,
2002, p. 59). However, as Basu and Devaraj (2014) noted, citizens are notably “proactive about
cleaning up the air they breathe”, thus establishing a logical connection between civil society and
environmental budget policy (p. 936). It has been argued that this civil support is needed by
“decisionmakers– who may be less able to steer society in a hierarchical way” in setting
environmental agency budget policy (Glucker, Driessen, Kolhoff, & Runhaar, 2013).
Also referred to as decision-making “environmentalism” (Clark & Whitford, 2011), or
“legislative greenness” (Konisky & Woods, 2012), civic environmentalism is represented by the
voting records on environmental legislation and is indicative of how favorable a states’ citizenry
is to environmental protection policy (Clark & Whitford, 2011; Fowler, 2016). Civic
environmentalism relates to the environmental political climate existing during the budget
deliberation phase (Willoughby & Finn, 1996). In this dissertation, the concept reflects the
extent to which the federal legislative delegation for a state is formulating and legitimating
environmentally proactive policy.
From the public budgeting literature, it is offered “decisions must be made by the
populace and their elected leaders to provide these resources” (Lee et al., 2013, p. 618).
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Academic research shows when civil society demands specific environmental outcomes, for
example, enhanced air quality or stricter regulations on lead in drinking water, civic
environmentalism influences public policy (Fukuyama, 2001; Hays, 2000; Li & Reuveny, 2006;
List & Sturm, 2006). Previous researchers observed citizens exert control over environmental
conditions through their voting preferences for “political candidates with strong environmental
agendas” underscoring the importance of empirically assessing this variable (Takahashi, Tandoc,
Duan, Van Witsen, 2017). Butler and Nickerson (2011) explained this linkage between
constituents and voting behavior as a function of the elected officials’ attempts to avoid, or at
least minimize, electoral retribution, or backlash which finds support in the political science
literature (Arnold, 1992; Kim & Urpelainen, 2017).
Findings from previous research on the association between civic environmentalism and
state environmental agency budgets are limited and mixed. While some studies observe that
citizen greenness (i.e. civic environmentalism) and involvement had limited, or even negative,
impacts on governmental policy-making (Fiorino, 1989; Steinemann, 2000; Ventriss & Kuentzel,
2005), other scholarship revealed the positive influence of citizen involvement (Bingham,
Nabatchi, & O’Leary, 2005; Neshkova & Guo, 2012). For example, while Clark and Whitford
(2011) found legislative greenness increased funding, research by Konisky and Woods (2012)
revealed an inverse relationship. The latter study offers a particularly interesting finding, since it
implies states with citizens who elect a “greener” federal legislative delegation fund their
environmental agencies less than states with environmentally-laggard federal legislators. Basu
and Devaraj (2014) analyzed the association between civil greenness and environmental policy
stringency through the preferences voiced by a similar concept—termed the ‘green voter’—
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finding that, on the whole, this variable had the largest positive impact on air pollution abatement
spending compared to other programs.
While a related concept of pro-environmental behavior of citizens has been evaluated in
previous research (Bacot & Dawes, 1996; Clark & Whitford, 2011; Davis & Feiock, 1992; Hall
& Kerr, 1991), the operationalization often involves datasets that are either not continuously
updated, or are unavailable for empirical analysis—(e.g. current environmental group
membership data are often not shared by the groups) (Anderson, 2011). In addition to the
practical obstacles (e.g. data availability and reliability), the concept civic environmentalism is
used to provide an electoral-based linkage of similar attributes that environmental interest group
membership captures. For example, Anderson (2011) noted the congruence between League of
Conservation Voter (LCV) scores—used to operationalize the concept in this dissertation—and
environmental groups, supporting the notion that these concepts, though different, are capturing
overlapping, similar, dimensions.
Previous research finds state-level environmental and natural resource spending is
positively influenced by state environmental group activism, and states’ congressional delegation
positions on environmental issues corresponded to increased funds (Clark & Whitford, 2011).
That study, however, focused on natural resource spending combined with environmental
protection spending and analyzed civic environmentalism through a surrogate measure that
relied upon the per capita membership in environmental groups (e.g. Sierra Club membership).
Alternatively, this dissertation applies a concept that affords examination of the linkages between
states’ civic-legislative environmental demands with state-source funding (Agyeman & Angus,
2003; Knopman, et al., 1999) leading to the hypothesis that follows.
H2: Civic environmentalism will have a positive influence on environmental
agency budgets.
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2.3.2.3. Climate policies influencing budgets.
Fiack and Kamieniecki (2015) observed in response to federal government inaction,
states have taken the lead at formulating and implementing climate change policies. States often
compensate for a lack of federal climate change policy “by developing, replicating, and
collaboratively implementing climate change policies” (Bromley-Trujillo et al., 2016, p. 544).
Despite these trends, “while research on the policy and politics of state-level climate change
policymaking has grown in recent years, the amount and scope of research has not kept pace
with growth in the saliency and urgency of the climate change issue” (Rabe, 2010, p. 264).
Since there has been no prior literature on the influence of climate policies on environmental
agency budgets, this section will summarize efforts taken to mitigate CO 2 emissions; will
provide justification for the measure of state-level policies used; and will conclude with the
hypothesis.
Global climate change is caused by anthropogenic GHG emissions, and the impacts are
extensive involving: increasing mean sea levels; increasing ambient temperatures; increasing
frequency and severity of storms; changes in biodiversity; species migration; changing of climate
patterns; and increased foodborne pathogens and illnesses (Axelrod & VanDeveer, 2017; Lake &
Barker, 2018; Lesnikowski et al., 2013; Neumann et al., 2015). These endpoints, the United
Nations Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) points out, “have significant
implications for extreme weather events, development, economic stability, and population and
economic health” (IPCC, 2000; IPCC, 2007; Lesnikowski et al., 2013).
Despite the advent of meaningful federal regulations to reduce GHG emissions, in
November, 2015 the US Senate blocked the Clean Power Plan—the rule promulgated under the
Obama-era USEPA which mandated CO2 emissions reductions to address global climate change
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in West Virginia et al. USEPA et al. (2016). The Supreme Court went on to issue a stay of the
Clean Power Plan in 2016 marking the first issuance of a Supreme Court stay to block
implementation of a USEPA rule in the Court’s history. The torpid pace by which the national
government has legitimated policies aimed at curbing GHG emissions contrasts with an
increased tempo in mandatory climate policy legitimation at the subnational levels of
government to address these emissions—predominately of CO 2 (Nelson, Rose, Wei, Peterson, &
Wennberg, 2015; Posner, 2010). As Figure 10 depicts, the CO 2 emissions vary by state.
Figure 10.
CO2 State-Level Emissions from Power Generation Sector, 2014

Note: From Martin & Saikawa (2017).

With an Executive Order signed on March 28, 2017, the Trump (2017) administration
directed the recension and revocation of several Obama administration environmental policies
aimed at curbing emissions and building greater understanding about the impacts of GHGs.
These steps, and steps like them at the federal level leave a policy-vacuum that states continue to
fill. The cascade of state energy and GHG reduction policies that ramped-up just after the case
of Massachusetts was decided underscores the role that compensatory federalism plays in US
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environmental governance. For example, within a few years after the ruling in Massachusetts,
35 states had climate action plans with mandatory emissions reduction targets (Randolph, 2012).
The Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) gained relevance as one of a few
market-based cap-and trade emissions reduction programs. The current structure of RGGI sets a
mandatory cap for participating states and requires a 2.5% decrease in CO 2 emissions, each year,
from 2015 to 2020 (RGGI, 2017). If Virginia joins the current group of participating states,
there will be 11 member states participating in RGGI. A similar GHG reduction program is
underway in the western US (Western Climate Initiative, 2018). “All told, a total of 20 states
have adopted explicit emissions reduction targets, 34 have adopted climate action plans to guide
future initiatives and meet goals, and 30 states have binding [Renewable Performance Standard]
RPS targets to increase the share of renewables in their energy grids” (Cyrs, 2018, p. 2).
Subnational governments have largely taken the lead in GHG mitigation policies postMassachusetts (Martin & Saikawa, 2017; Yi & Feiock, 2015). Cyrs (2018) observes, state
governments continue to set policies “on-par with that of the most ambitious EU countries” (p.
1). The trend of state governments filling ever-expanding roles will require a commensurate
level of financial commitment to formulate and implement the necessary environmental policies.
Accordingly, this dissertation focuses on the category of policies state policymakers have
advanced to mitigate GHG emissions—that is, the climate policies that will “change the energy
landscape in ways that have implications for GHG emissions and climate change” and that have
been “easier to garner bipartisan support” (Martin & Saikawa, 2017, p. 912).
Within the conceptual model, this variable is a legal factor that represents the extent to
which states have adopted mandatory policies to mitigate CO 2 emissions. As noted, the lack of
national government policies to curb these emissions has been partially-offset by an increase in
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climate action through subnational policies due to compensatory federalism (Posner, 2010;
Nelson et al., 2015). “States are likely to have primary implementation authority for most
economy-wide and sector-level federal climate policies, such as power plant combustion
efficiency standards” (Nelson et al., 2015, p. 98). Given the extent to which states have taken
great strides in recent years to mitigate GHG emissions through regulatory programs which
require government revenues to administer, I hypothesize a positive influence of these policies
on environmental appropriations.
H3: Mandatory climate policies will result in higher environmental agency budgets.
2.3.2.4. Legislative professionalization influencing budgets.
The uncertainties in the scientific understanding of environmental pollution and the risks
it poses (Steinemann, 2000), create tensions that make setting an appropriate level of
environmental appropriations as much a political as a scientific endeavor (Stone, 2014). As
Rosenbaum observed, resolving these issues within the political process that “arise in making
scientific and political judgements compatible are two of the most troublesome characteristics of
environmental politics” (2016, p. 133). Legislative professionalization reflects the “institutional
capacity within state legislatures and legislators” (Squire, 2017, p. 1). This political factor
represents the capacity of state legislatures to analyze and process information related to
formulating and legitimating public policy (Squire, 2012; 2017).
Mooney (1995) observed that increased professionalism of legislators enhances their
ability to broker information; facilitates engagement with other actors in the budgeting process;
and results in greater control and influence over the budget. Previous research (e.g. Hays et al.,
1996) found states with more professionalized legislatures have more protective environmental
policies; however, this variable remains under-examined with only a single study investigating
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the influence on environmental agency funding. In that study, Konisky and Woods (2012) found
no statistically significant association between professionalization and state environmental
spending and revealed an unanticipated inverse relationship between professionalism and the
stringency of state environmental agencies. This is a somewhat surprising result given that one
might expect more professionalized state legislatures to increase appropriations in response to
pollution problems to avoid preemption by USEPA (Heckman, 2012; Wood, 1991). Preemption
is taken by USEPA when “subnational government performance is unsatisfactory” (Wood, 1991,
p. 852), and is avoided by states given the resulting consolidation of power at the national level
(i.e. loss of agency autonomy) (Nelson et al., 2015).
While scientific uncertainty can make the process of identifying adequate appropriations
levels more difficult, higher levels of organizational capacity should “theoretically yield more
effective program management” and, consequently, increasingly responsive budget policy (Bacot
& Dawes, 1996, p. 125). Also, a positive association between professionalism and
environmental budgets reflects an assertiveness by state legislators to champion budget policy
that pursues constituent benefits related to environmental protection (Abney & Lauth, 1998; Ryu
et al., 2008). Taken together, professionalism of the legislature reflects the institutional capacity
across the states to interpret the complex demands from the political process in response to
environmental pollution, thus is hypothesized to have a positive influence on appropriations
(Cline, 2003).
H4: Legislative professionalization will have a positive influence on
environmental agency budgets.
2.3.2.5. Partisan ideology and environmental budgets.
The public budgeting scholar Robert Bland (2007) described the effect of partisan, or
political, ideology on public budget policy succinctly—“budgets are political” (p. 6). Politics in
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public budgeting operate along a continuum—ranging from an intrusion on what ought to be a
wholly technical process—to a necessary feature needed to attenuate conflict between groups
and bring about resolution (Rubin, 2010). As it relates to this section, politics refer to the
ideology of state legislatures reflected by each party’s relative control over state government
following a two-party model (i.e. Republican or Democrat).
Numerous academic studies suggest liberal and Democrat-identifying individuals tend to
express greater support for environmental programs and policies than Republicans (Davis &
Fisk, 2014; Dunlap, Xiao, & McCright, 2001; Fowler & Breen, 2013; Konisky, Milyo, &
Richardson, 2008). That is, while environmental protection had been a relatively “politically
consensual” issue area for elected officials for many decades, Democrats have become more
supportive of environmentally proactive policies compared to Republicans particularly with
regard to public policies aimed at addressing air pollutants (Bromley-Trujillo, Butler, Poe, &
Davis, 2016; Davis & Fisk, 2014; Dunlap & Gale, 1974; Jacques, Dunlap, & Freeman, 2008;
McCright, Xiao, & Dunlap, 2014, p. 251). A growing body of research underscores the direct
role that partisan identification has on public policy (Cragg, Zhou, Gurney, & Kahn, 2013;
Elazar, 1984; Kraft & Furlong, 2015). In their analysis of the effects of partisan ideology on
USEPA budgets, Balint and Conant (2013) advanced a conceptual model that included a
prominent role for partisan political factors. Other research, however, suggests the influence of
partisan identification on environmental policy is inconsistent at best (Bacot & Dawes, 1997;
Ringquist, 1993).
Considered a political factor in the conceptual model for this dissertation, political
ideological orientations impact public budgeting along several points in the policy process. For
example, at the budget deliberation stage, political ideology informs how elected leaders might
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spend increased revenues forecasted by their budget offices (Bland, 2007). More specifically,
cutting taxes is often sought by conservatives, or Republicans, while increasing spending for
government programs is typically associated with Democrat control of government (Lee et al.,
2013). Supporting assertions of these direct effects from the public budgeting literature, are
empirical findings that reveal an inverse relationship between Republican-control and state
agency appropriations (Ryu et al., 2008).
McCright et al. (2014) observed that political preferences have become one of the most
powerful predictors of environmental policy based on their review of survey data from the
general public and their canvassing of previous research. Adding to the studies that show overall
liberal and Democrat-identifying individuals express greater support for environmental programs
and policies, Wan, Shen, and Choi (2017) found similar linkages between partisan ideology and
environmental support observed in their cross-national study of European countries. Instead of
being a “politically consensual” issue as it was in the late 1980s and early 1990s, McCright et al.
(2014) found the percentage of respondents who perceived the government spends too little on
the environment decreased substantially for Republicans between 1974 and 2012 while such a
downward trend was not observable among Democrat respondents (p. 251). Notably, the
responses between the survey participants who self-identified as liberal rather than conservative
highly corresponded to the Democrat versus Republican self-identification. The survey
responses in Figure 11 depict the percentages of self-identified Republicans and Democrats
reporting on their perception that national government spending on the environment is “too
little” from 1974 - 2012 (McCright et al., 2014).
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Figure 11.
Perceptions of Environmental Spending by Party-Affiliation

Note. From McCright et al., 2014.

While some literature found no empirical evidence of ideology impacting environmental
policy based on the partisan-control of state government (Anderson, 2011; Balint & Conant,
2013) other scholarship revealed an important influence (e.g. Clark & Whitford, 2011; Konisky
& Woods, 2012; Woods et al., 2008). More specifically, Clark and Whitford (2011) found that
“the demand for environmental spending is met with resistance by republican unified control of
state legislative and executive branches” (p. 149). Similarly, Konisky and Woods (2012) found
states under Democrat control realized higher environmental spending and more environmental
enforcement, ceteris paribus. Overall, despite the literature highlighting the influence of partisan
ideology on state environmental policy (Dunlap & Gale, 1974; Hays et al., 1996; Lombard,
1990), there are only a few studies that examine to what extent partisan ideology of the state
legislatures influences appropriations. For example, Clark and Whitford (2011) found that under
Democrat control of the state legislature, environmental and natural resource spending was
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higher—an increase of $10.8 million—than under Republican control—a decrease of $24.1
million at the state-level. This effect was observable only at the state-level of funding (i.e. there
was no significant relationship at the federal-level)—a finding that provides further support for
the following hypothesis.
H5: Liberal ideology will have a positive influence on environmental agency
budgets.
The role of political partisanship on public budgeting decisions is particularly distinctive
in democracies due to the comparative openness of the budgetary decisions allowing the process
to be shaped by external factors including by political parties (Nice, 2002; Rubin, 2010). How
precisely political ideology influences appropriations, however, is less clear. For example, it has
been argued that “[environmental] problem severity does not directly influence spending, but
instead, the severity of environmental problems is filtered through the political process”
suggesting an interaction, or conditional, effect of political ideology on appropriations versus a
main effect (Newmark & Witko, 2007, p. 303). Further complicating the picture, is another
possibility.
Partisan ideology could act as a mediator in the relationship between pollution and
appropriations—representing a discernable process that helps explain the causal relationship
between pollution and budgets. Hypothesis 5 has been developed with sufficient attention to
these ambiguities (e.g. viewing partisan ideology as a moderator, or mediator) and with
deference to the academic literature where examining the main effect has resonance. While I do
not deny either of these alternatives (e.g. moderation or mediation) are appropriate ways in
which to view the role of partisan ideology in the context of air pollution and appropriations, it is
also defensible to test for the existence of a relatively straightforward direct relationship (i.e.
that, across the states, Democrats tend to appropriate more to environmental agencies than
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Republicans). Nevertheless, future avenues for research, discussed in Chapter 5, includes an
alternative to examining the direct effects of political ideology on appropriations.
2.3.2.6. Fiscal capacity influencing budgets.
State fiscal capacity is defined as the “ability of a state to raise revenues to meet its
spending requirements”, and it is categorized as a fiscal factor in the conceptual model for this
dissertation (Lee et al., 2013, p. 553). Environmental regulations require compliance and
enforcement efforts at the state-level which cost money, so a state’s wealth can determine the
resources regulators have to implement policy. In public budgeting, revenues are a driving force
behind expenditures, thus policymakers, particularly chief executives, can be expected to a “set
broad budget ceiling for overall spending and revenues based on…the overall availability and
certainty of…expected resources” particularly for state-source funding (Ryu et al., 2008).
Long-term economic forces, such as the wealth of a state’s economy can have enduring
effects on spending for public programs—that is, patterns suggest that, ceteris paribus, a rich
state will often spend more than a poorer state (Nice, 2002). “Fiscal and economic climates of
the state and nation perhaps most overtly influence state budget management capacity; a poor
economy generates fewer revenues and greater expenditure needs of governments” (Willoughby,
2008, p. 433). Similarly, in a seminal work on state agency budgets, Sharkansky (1968) found
high levels of expenditures and debt among the states caused appropriations committees to
provide less funds to the acquisitive agencies.
Kraft and Furlong (2015) observed that though states have achieved greater economic
capacity for environmental policy over the past four decades, there remain large variations in
funding. Considered together, these observations justify consideration of whether states can be
fiscally responsive to pollution when analyzing whether they will be. As observed by Bacot and
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Dawes (1996), the financial resources a state has speaks to the capacity of that state to implement
policies and programs that ensure compliance with the regulations promulgated under the
enabling legislation (e.g. Clean Air Act).
Based on a closer examination of the environmental policy literature, it has been
suggested, and sometimes demonstrated, the capacity to raise revenue can either enable, or
constrain environmental spending and protection efforts (Agthe et al., 1996; Bacot & Dawes,
1997; Newmark & Wiko, 2007; Ringquist, 1993). That is, even though environmental agency
public managers are quantifying and conveying the pollution problem and presuming legislators
are grasping what these agencies require, oftentimes “there’s [just] not enough to go around”
(O’Hare, 2006, p. 529). In other words, public budgets are sensitive to the certainty and
availability of expected revenues (Ryu et al., 2008). Also from the environmental policy
literature, we have learned the demand for public goods—like environmental protection—tends
to rise with state wealth (Bacot & Dawes, 1997; Hays et al., 1996; Konisky & Woods, 2012;
Lowry, 1992; Potoski & Woods, 2002). Relatedly, “regulation costs money”; therefore, I
hypothesize as fiscal capacity is higher across the states, so too will be appropriations for
environmental protection (Ringquist, 1993, p. 88).
H6: Fiscal capacity will have a positive influence on environmental agency budgets.
The next section will begin by describing the role of fiscal federalism as it relates to the level of
analysis in this dissertation.
2.4. Literature Emphasizing State-Level of Analysis
Fiscal federalism informs the focus on state own-source funding in my study. This
“subfield of public finance” involves fiscal decentralization based on a belief that state
governments, “being closer to the people”, will be more responsive, since it is macroeconomic
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policy functions (e.g. growth, unemployment, inflation) for which federal government control is
preferred (Oates, 1999, p. 1120). Oates (1999) is further instructive in relating fiscal federalism
to environmental governance noting that the system enabled states to experiment and innovate on
air pollution control where there was “serious doubt” such actions would have been taken at the
national level (p. 1132). As Greer and Denison (2016) observed, fiscal federalism involves
decentralization and devolution of authorities and is driven in “large part by political institutions
and fiscal traditions that change slowly over time” and for which a preference grows by civil
society to demand greater responsiveness from subnational levels of government (p. 126).
The dynamics and factors that influence state and federal-source funding of state agencies
are not identical with states acting much more as “fiscal free agents” having more discretion over
their fiscal policy than the central government (Endersby & Towle, 1997; Mikesell, 2018, p. 215;
Sharkansky, 1968). Similarly, Nice (2002) observed, “most states permit agencies to submit
their original budget requests to the state legislature, along with the governor’s budget
recommendation. That practice probably gives [state] agency personnel more opportunities to be
advocates for their programs, in contrast to the national government’s use of central clearance”
(p. 65). When considered together, the research suggests that while state-source and federalsource environmental budget policy are related, they are not identical (Clark & Whitford, 2011);
therefore, should not be aggregated in empirical analyses. A closer look at federal-source
environmental funding reinforces this latter point.
Two decades ago, 70 percent of the budgetary requirements of state environmental
agencies was provided by the federal government; by the early 2000s, this level shrank to only
30 percent (Woods et al., 2008), and continues to decrease (ECOS, 2017a). Moreover, between
1981 and 2005, federal government contributions to state governments for education and health
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increased 415% and 980%, respectively, while transfer funding to environmental agencies
decreased 12% (Gormley, 2006). In addition, historically states have had to either spend more of
their own general funds, or to raise revenue through additional industry fees to meet federal
pollution laws (Davis and Lester, 1987). Moreover, what little federal-source dollars do flow to
the environmental agencies are not for discretionary use but are either dedicated clean-up funds,
or to resource specific grant programs (USEPA, 2018a). Overall, state funding sources
contribute nearly 80% of state environmental budgets (ECOS, 2017b) and most of the
discretionary environmental funding.
Lester and Lombard (1990) observed, state environmental policy research continues to
specify models on the assumption federal-level variables will not affect state policy outputs, or
vice versa. Offering several examples that dispel this conventional wisdom, they concluded that
future state environmental policy research would be improved by considering the national and
subnational levels of government in explaining state policy outputs. Thus, federal-source
funding, along with state population, is included within the conceptual model revisited in Figure
12, to control for its effects on state own-source funding.
Figure 12. Conceptual Model of Dissertation

Further supporting the state-level of analysis are two additional concepts—federalism,
which refers to the “division of jurisdictions to decentralize government” (Wills, 2001, p. 169),
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and devolution—“the shift in functions or responsibilities from one jurisdiction to another”
(Woods & Potoski, 2010, p. 722). While the USEPA develops policy through rulemakings to
implement the environmental laws enacted by Congress, many USEPA authorities are delegated
to the states. Given that the majority of states are Dillon’s Rule states and major environmental
regulations are codified in federal and state statues, the devolution of power to local governments
is limited across a range of environmental protection functions (Stenberg, 1985). For example,
while there is an array of networks and initiatives at the local jurisdictional level, no official
authorities are granted to localities through the Clean Air Act (Bacot & Dawes, 1996; Bardach &
Patashnik, 2016; Fowler, 2016).
The CAA confers authority to the USEPA to establish mandatory air emissions standards;
directs the USEPA to establish programs to control and reduce air emissions from stationary (e.g.
factories and power plants) and mobile (e.g. cars and trucks) sources; and grants certain limited
discretionary authorities to the USEPA regarding when it must, and when it may refrain from,
regulating specific air pollutants (Reitze, 2005). Implementing the CAA at the federal and state
level has come to involve a multi-layered environmental governance that derives from the US
government’s federalist structure. This structure accommodates a continuum of national versus
state-level control over environmental policy (e.g. contested federalism, cooperative federalism,
and compensatory federalism) having implications for designing research of state environmental
policy (Durant et al., 2017).
For example, though emissions standards for air pollutants are almost exclusively
established through rules promulgated by the USEPA, the authority to formulate and implement
environmental public policy, including compliance and enforcement activities, is shared with
state environmental agencies (Grant et al., 2014; Wood, 1991). This arrangement—also referred
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to as cooperative federalism—requires state governments to be active participants that request
authorization from USEPA to administer their own environmental agencies. Over the past 45
years, there has been an overarching period of cooperative federalism which started with the
federal government exercising its authority to set various national performance standards that all
states must meet—minimum standards, or federal floors, that promote alignment with national
environmental policy goals (ECOS, 2017a; Nelson et al., 2015). Cooperative federalism
involves an active role for states that request authorization from USEPA to address
environmental pollution. All 50 American states have received USEPA authorization to operate
environmental agencies structured to achieve the national pollution standards, or state-specific
pollution standards should the latter be equally, or more, protective (Konisky & Woods, 2016;
Woods, 2006).
Despite a period during the George W. Bush Administration in the 2000s where conflict
between the federal and state environmental agencies over centralized authorities was the highest
in the previous two decades (i.e. contested federalism) the decentralization of responsibilities
from the central government to the states has been the general trend (Rabe, 2007). Particularly
noteworthy was the accelerated delegation of decisions regarding permitting and enforcement
authority, responsibility, and accountability during the George H.W. Bush and Clinton
administrations (Rabe, 2007). This acceleration of devolution was aided by the National
Academy of Public Administration (1995) that found increasing the role of state environmental
agencies, in partnership with the federal government, would be crucial for effective, flexible, and
accountable environmental governance. Though there have been “ebbs and flows”, this
devolution began in the late-1970s and continues despite efforts by the Trump-era USEPA at
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redirecting environmental policy by contesting state air pollution control efforts (e.g. California)
(Davis & Lester, 1987; Konisky & Woods, 2012, p. 544; 2018; Rabe, 2017).
As an alternative to cooperative federalism, or the contested federalism that has recently
welled-up again in environmental governance, Derthick (2010) noted that states have
compensated for the lack of federal government action on pressing environmental issues, such as
global climate change, ushering in a period of compensatory federalism—an environmental
governance outcome facilitated by the courts, as the Supreme Court case of Massachusetts v.
United States Environmental Protection Agency (2007) laid bare. The devolution of authority,
responsibility, and accountability from the federal to the state environmental agencies has
resulted in notable policies at the state-level which establish requirements that are more stringent
than federal requirements (Chupp, 2011).
Because of this decentralization, state environmental agencies, and their frontline
workers, now execute 96 percent of the environmental workload; operate 75 percent of the
environmental programs; and “collect nearly 95 percent of the data used by the USEPA” (ECOS,
2017b; Rabe, 2007, p. 422; Rinfret & Pautz, 2013). Their role is robust in carrying out the
requirements of the CAA. Though only 25% of the revenue to state air quality programs comes
from federal-source funds, the majority of compliance and enforcement activities are executed
by the state agencies as it relates to the control and abatement of criteria air pollutant emissions
(Heckman, 2012). All 50 states have been delegated authority to implement clean air policy—
more than any other program (Fowler, 2016).

70

Chapter 3: Methodology
3.1. Research Design
This dissertation is based on a quantitative non-experimental research design using
secondary data. The following subsections provide more information on the unit of analysis, the
time dimension, and research design. These subsections are followed by the statistical analysis
plan; validity and limitations before concluding with advantages, limitations and a restatement of
the implications and contributions of this study.
3.2. Time Dimension & Unit of Analysis
The cases of research interest are the states, and the unit of analysis is the state
environmental agency budget—for which each state has only one—and are listed in Table 2.
Environmental agency budget data are either not available, or were reported as $0.00 for the
following states: Florida, Louisiana, Iowa, North Carolina, New Jersey, and New Mexico. The
sample, is consequently reduced for general funds and fees and other sources according to the
state environmental agencies that did respond with appropriations data to ECOS across the five
years—2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, and 2015—which represent the years for which the most
complete funding records are currently available (ECOS, 2012; 2017b). The unit of analysis is
each individual state environmental agency budget each year it is observed. The quantity of
entities, n = 47 (states); the time period t = 5 (2011 - 2015); and the quantity of observations T
ranges from 250 to 232 given the aforementioned lack of data for certain years for the budget
data particularly for appropriations from the general fund.
This reduced sample size —and correspondingly larger standard errors—makes goodness
of fit and detecting statistically significance more challenging which reinforces the need for
careful specification of the models. Larger standard errors essentially makes it less likely to
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detect statistical significance on the regression and interaction terms. Despite not having a large
sample size, the sample is compatible with the recommendation of Tabachnick and Fidell (2007)
who recommended N > 50 + 8m (where m = quantity of independent variables). That is, with
nine variables, the threshold of 122 is exceeded suggesting adequacy of the sample size.
This dataset structure is panel (i.e. longitudinal data); the values for the variables are for
the same units (i.e. states) over several time periods (i.e. years) which is a useful data structure
when investigating the behavior—in this case budgeting policy—of the same entities over time
(Kennedy, 2008). The preference of researchers to analyze panel data versus cross-sectional data
derives from the increased variability and less collinearity between variables as well as
opportunities to handle heterogeneity (Baltagi, 2001). Though the periods for which the variable
data are available are common to all panels (i.e. states), as noted above, each panel does not have
the same quantity of observations; therefore, the panels are unbalanced. Other than for the lack
of appropriations data for a small quantity of states, each state does have the identical quantity of
observations for the remaining variables across the five year panel.
3.3. Variables, Datasets, Indicators, Hypotheses
This study includes variables selected based on the integrated theory; inclusion of
additional theories; consideration of public budgeting literature; and previous state
environmental policy research. The regression analysis provides an examination of the effects of
independent variables on the dependent variable—environmental agency budgets. Table 6
provides data sources and variable descriptions that are relevant to the analysis—(e.g. datasets
and indicators)—further explanations for the variables, including equations, are included within
the individual variable subsections.
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Table 6
Study Variables, Units, and Operationalization
Independent Variables
Name

Conceptualization

Explanation / Units

Source

Air Pollutant
Emissions

Emissions from criteria
pollutants and CO2 emissions)

Pounds of Pollutants (ln)

Calculated from (EIA, 2018;
USEPA, 2018e; USEPA,
2018f)

Business Interests

Business lobbying interests
within the state as represented
by polluting sectors
(manufacturing, mining,
utilities)

Proportion of State GDP
Contributed by Polluting
Industrial Sectors as a
Share of Total State
GDP [0 – 1]

Calculated from Bureau of
Economic Analysis Data
(BEA, 2018a)

Civic
Environmentalism

Environmentally-focused
concerns of the state expressed
by electoral preferences.

Average LCV Score of
State Delegation to
Federal Legislature
[0 – 100]

Calculated from League of
Conservation Voters Data
(LCV, 2018)

Climate Policies

Mandatory state policies that
directly mitigate GHGs.

Raw Count
[0 or 1]

Compiled from Martin &
Saikawa (2017); National
Conference of State
Legislatures (NCSL, 2019)

Partisan Ideology

Ideology of state legislature
based on major party’s relative
control over state government.

Composite Measure
(Index) of Democrat
Control of State
Government [0 – 1]

Calculated from (NCSL,
2010; 2011; 2012; 2013;
2014); ProQuest, 2008; 2010;
2012; 2016; 2019)

Legislative
Professionalization

Institutional capacity of the
state legislature.

Composite Measure
(Index) [0 – 1]

Squire (2012; 2017)

Fiscal Capacity

Capacity to fund government
as reflected by revenue
generating potential.

Unduplicated Sum of
Gross State Product and
State Personal Income in
U.S. Dollars (TTR) (ln)

U.S. Treasury (2019)

Population

Quantity of people in state.

Millions (People)

United States Census (2019)

Environmental
Agency Budget –
Federal-Source
Funds

State environmental agency
budget derived from federalsource funding.

U.S. Dollars (ln)

ECOS (2012; 2017b)

Environmental
Agency Budget General Fund

State environmental agency
budget derived from the
general fund.

U.S. Dollars (ln)

ECOS (2012; 2017b)

Environmental
Agency Budget –
Fees & Other

State environmental agency
budget derived from fees and
other sources.

U.S. Dollars (ln)

ECOS (2012; 2017b)

Controls

Dependent Variables
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Each of the following subsections are followed by a brief overview of the literature that supports
the proposed hypothesis for each of the study variables.
3.3.1. Air pollutant emissions.
Environmental pollution is a negative externality produced by transactions between
consumers and firms. The lack of a profit motive for industries to address environmental
pollution on their own leads to a public problem, since environmental pollution contaminates
common resources (e.g. clean air and water). The need for environmental agencies to be
responsive to air pollution, in particular, is not confined to only one type of air pollutant. In
addition to criteria pollutant emissions, there has emerged a policy goal among states to mitigate
anthropogenic (i.e. human-caused) GHG emissions—principally CO 2 emissions from industrial
sectors of the economy.
Konisky and Woods (2012) concluded “that the time has come for scholars to develop
new measures whenever possible, with close consideration of how they can be used in a
theoretically informed fashion to better our understanding of the factors that shape state
environmental politics and policy” (p. 565). To answer the call from previous scholarship,
environmental pollution is measured in this study using two measures. The first measure of air
pollution is an interval-level composite index constructed from indicators comprised of six
criteria air pollutants. The second measure of air pollution is a ratio-level measure of CO 2
emissions.
The emissions from criteria pollutants are obtained from USEPA’s National Emissions
Inventory (USEPA, 2018e). Following the approach of previous researchers, only the
anthropogenic (i.e. human-caused) criteria pollutant emissions are included (Simon et al., 2015).
As Heckman (2012) observed in an investigation of Clean Air Act policy outcomes, point source
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criteria pollutant emissions versus nonpoint source emissions are commonly employed indicators
in studies involving air pollution. This methodological decision is further justified given that
criteria pollutant emissions are mostly impacted by state implementation efforts given the large
emphasis on SIPs as previously discussed. Moreover, control and abatement of mobile source
emissions—the largest contributor to nonpoint source emissions—are largely the result of federal
efficiency standards with the exception of California that has the authority to set its own vehicle
engine standards.
To take into account the large variability in the magnitudes of the six criteria pollutants, a
criteria air pollution severity index (CAPSIDX) is developed by calculating a Z-score for each
pollutant in each state-year. Standardizing the criteria pollutant emissions transforms each value
into comparable scores allowing the different pollutant emissions to be put on the same scale.
The calculation of the standardized values involves subtracting the mean emissions for each
pollutant for each state-year from each data point (i.e. emissions) following by dividing the result
by the standard deviation. The resulting Z-scores, or re-scaled, values are summed across each
state-year creating a criteria air pollution severity index. Principal components analysis—a
specific technique of factor analysis—is used to group the pollutants for which the emissions
strongly correlate. Essentially, PCA allows assessment of whether the emissions for each of the
pollutants load onto a single factor, thus provide an empirical summary of the data (Tabachnick
& Fidell, 2007). The PCA results indicate the presence of one factor. Two statistical measures
assess the adequacy of the PCA which include the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) measure of
sampling adequacy and Bartlett’s test of sphericity. The KMO index value is 0.82 above the
suggested minimum of 0.6, and the Bartlett’s test of sphericity reached statistical significance (p
< 0.001) (Tabachnick & Fiddell, 2007). The correlation matrix was also inspected with all
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correlation coefficients within the range of r = 0.45 to r = 0.89—above the recommended value
of r = 0.3 (Pallant, 2010). The composite score (i.e. reliability coefficient) of the composite
measure for criteria air pollution is also high (Cronbach’s α = 0.91) and above a recommended
cutoff of 0.7 (DeVellis, 2003; Lance, Butts, & Michels, 2006).
The following equation was used to calculate the values for this measure of air pollution
with NOx emissions as the example:

𝑍𝑁𝑂𝑥 =

(

) (
(

)

(1)

)

Where ZNOxit is the standard score for NOx of the ith state in period t,
NOx it is the quantity of NOx emissions of the ith state in period t,
μ NOx i is the mean NOx emissions of the ith state, and
σ is the standard deviation of NOx emissions of the ith state.
The following equation gives the formula used to calculate the summed Z score calculated
for each pollutant for each state-year:

𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑆𝐼𝐷𝑋

=𝑍
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+ 𝑍

+𝑍

.

+𝑍
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(2)
Where CAPSIDX it is the criteria air pollution severity index (i.e. summed standard score of
each constituent criteria pollutant Z-score of the ith state in period t),
Z NOx it is the standard score of NOx emissions from the ith state in period t,
Z CO it is the standard score of CO emissions from the ith state in period t,
Z PM-10 it is the standard score of PM-10 emissions from the ith state in period t,
Z PM-2.5 it is the standard score of PM-2.5 emissions from the ith state in period t,
Z SO2 it is the standard score of SO2 emissions from the ith state in period t, and
Z VOC it is the standard score of VOC emissions from the ith state in period t.
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GHG emissions are a composite of CO2, methane, nitrous oxide, perfluorocarbon,
hydrofluorocarbon, sulfur hexafluoride, and nitrogen trifluoride (USEPA, 2018f). Since CO 2
emissions represent the most prevalent—over 80%—of GHG emissions in the US, CO 2
emissions are assessed in this study (USEPA, 2018d). The decision to use emissions inventory
data of CO2 emissions is justified based also upon the currency of this methodological approach
in the academic literature (Grant et al., 2014; Martin & Saikawa, 2017). These data are available
for each state, and each year, from the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) (EIA,
2018).
3.3.2. Business interests.
While measurement of this variable ranges from indicators based on industry selfpolicing (Lombard, 1993) to industry group membership (Bacot & Dawes, 1997; Newmark &
Witko, 2007), studies use also macroeconomic productivity indicators. More specifically,
Konisky and Woods (2012) assessed business interests as the share of state gross domestic
product (GDP) generated by the manufacturing sector from each state based on total state-GDP.
In this dissertation, business interests are measured as the state GDP generated by polluting
industrial sectors as a share of total state GDP. The sector-specific and state-total GDP estimates
are calculated using data obtained from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) (BEA, 2018a).
BEA defines GDP as “market value of goods and services produced by the labor and
property located in a state. GDP by state is the state counterpart to the national GDP, and it is
“the Bureau's featured and most comprehensive measure of U.S. economic activity” (BEA,
2018b). These data are available for each of the states for each year. A higher score on this
variable is interpreted as a state having a greater level of business interests in the polluting
sectors. Moving beyond the single-sector measure for business interests as applied by Konisky
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and Woods (2012), Anderson (2011) observed additional sectors affected by environmental
regulations thus also exert influence on environmental policy.
Building upon Anderson’s (2011) research, the manufacturing and mining sectors were
selected, because these sectors of the economy are those that “may be disproportionately
burdened by environmental regulations”, since they have the greatest influence on state
emissions of pollutant emissions (p. 553). Additionally, given the impacts the utilities sector has
on anthropogenic emissions, particularly emissions of CO 2, that sector is added to produce a
measure comprised of three sectors (Falke, 2011). To provide a sufficiently, though not overly,
expansive proxy of business interests, the measure was devised to incorporate the sectors of the
economy with the greatest linkages to environmental pollution—in terms of emissions
magnitude thus perceived regulatory burden—and to exclude those sectors which would not have
an appreciable contribution (e.g. warehousing, publishing, professional services). Values for
business interests (BUSINT) are calculated with the following equation:

𝐵𝑈𝑆𝐼𝑁𝑇 =

(

) (
(

)

(

)

)

(3)

Where BUSINTit is the proportion of GDP contributed by manufacturing, mining, and
utilities from total GDP of the ith state in period t,
GDPMFGit is the gross domestic product from the manufacturing sector of ith state in
period t,
GDPMNGit is the gross domestic product from the mining sector of ith state in period t,
GDPUTLit is the gross domestic product from the utilities sector of ith state in period t,
and
GDPALLit is the gross domestic product from all polluting industrial sectors of ith state in
period t.
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3.3.3. Civic environmentalism.
Civic environmentalism reflects the extent to which the federal legislative delegation for
a state is legitimating environmentally proactive policy based upon electoral preferences. This
indicator provides a score developed for each state by the LCV calculated from the
environmental legislation voting records—roll call votes—of all members in Congress. These
scores “reflect the views of the environmental community in the US. Votes coded as proenvironmental by the LCV typically support “renewable energy, oppose nuclear power,
encourage pollution abatement, and call for the conservation of wildlife and habitats” (Kim &
Urpelainen, 2017). Hays (2000) observed that environmental-preferences in civil society helped
enhance the influence this voting segment had on attracting Congressional delegations of the
states; that is, the political pressure these groups applied was key to their success at attracting the
attention of, and action by, Congress.
This measure is based on a ratio level of data calculated by the LCV, and is available for
each of the years included in this study (LCV, 2018). The scores are on a scale from 0 to 100
and are calculated by dividing the total quantity of pro-environment votes cast by the total
quantity of legislation scored by LCV for a given year as to their pro-environment content.
Higher scores are interpreted as greater prevalence of civic environmentalism. The following
equation is used to calculate the values for civic environmentalism (CIVENV):

𝐶𝐼𝑉𝐸𝑁𝑉 =

(

) (

)

( )

Where CIVENVit is the civic environmentalism value of the ith state in period t,
LCV Score-House is the LCV score for the lower-chamber of the legislature of the ith
state in period t, and
LCV Score-Senate is the LCV score for the upper-chamber of the legislature of the ith
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(4)

state in period t.
The higher the value, the greater the level of civic environmentalism in a state. It is
posited that lower scores on this variable indicate there is either less awareness, and/or less
electoral interest in environmental pollution. This, in turn, results in downward pressure on
demand for environmental spending by civil society. As noted by Basu and Devaraj (2014), as
environmental activism increases, however, these connections between pollution and impacts are
recognized consequently leading to increased spending. While there is a level of subjectivity
inherent in processes such as that used by the LCV, the organization’s reliance on environmental
and legal professionals to inform the scoring; resonance in the environmental policy scholarship;
and given the transparency as to how the LCV develops their scoring, further justifies the use of
the indicator as a measure of civic environmentalism.
3.3.4. Climate policies.
The variable represents the extent to which states have implemented mandatory policies
to address climate change (i.e. climate policies) directed at reducing CO 2 emissions from power
plants—the largest single source of CO2 emissions in the US (Martin & Saikawa, 2017).
Policies that affect the energy landscape, such as providing incentives for green technologies and
voluntary policies that do not have formal compliance and enforcement mechanisms—which
require state environmental agency programmatic and personnel support, thus funding—are
excluded. Since there is no mandatory CO2 emissions mitigation policy required at the federallevel, the only mandatory requirements that are evaluated are state-level climate policies aimed
at reducing CO2 emissions. Table 7 provides a summary of the policies that will be measured
along with their description.
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Table 7
Description of Climate Policies
Name

Policy Type

Description

Greenhouse Gas Targets

Climate

Establishes targets for CO2 emission reductions within proscribed
time periods

Mandatory GHG Registry /
Reporting

Climate

Requires power plants to register and record and report (i.e.
inventory) their greenhouse gas emissions

Regional Greenhouse Gas
Initiative (RGGI)

Climate

RGGI was the first US cap-and-trade program to reduce GHG
emissions from the power sector

Emissions Performance
Standards

Climate

Performance standards designed to reduce CO2 emissions

California Global
Warming Solutions Act

Climate

Establishes mandatory requirements based on a cap-and-trade
program to reduce GHG emissions to 1990 levels by 2020

Note. From Martin & Saikawa (2017).

Since the climate policy data are based on the year the policy was signed into law, to
account for policy diffusion, the policy data, consistent with the other independent variables, are
lagged by one year. The climate policy variable, CLMTP, will be coded as follows:
0 = Absence of Climate Policy for a State-year
1 = Presence of Climate Policy for a State-year.
The presence of a climate policy, does not necessarily correspond to the year the policy
actually took effect given that environmental agencies require time between policy adoption and
final regulatory implementation. Assessing the appropriations after a one-year lag helps allow
time for the budgeting process to reflect the programmatic and personnel needs for adequate
compliance and enforcement of the climate policy. This approach offers two benefits—first, it
acknowledges previous findings that mandatory policies are more effective at reducing GHG
emissions compared to voluntary requirements and, second, coding based on before-and-after
adoption, provides “a standard that can be easily determined” (Martin & Saikawa, 2017, p. 918).
To summarize, the climate policy dummy variable indicates the presence or absence of a climate
and/or energy policy for each state for each year of the study. That is, the value for each state
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was set to 0—pre-adoption—and to 1—post-adoption per Martin & Saikawa (2017) for 2010 2014. Climate policy data for 2015 was obtained through the National Conference of State
Legislatures (NCSL, 2019), again based upon the policies described in Table 7.
3.3.5. Partisan ideology.
This variable is the identifiable ideology of a state legislature based on partisan, or party,
identification as it relates to that party’s relative control over state government. Partisan
ideology does not have a definition that is universally consistent among the states. As Heckman
(2012) observed, “Democrats in Texas are more likely to be ideologically similar to Republicans
in Massachusetts rather than Democrats [in Massachusetts]” (p. 483). However, partisan
ideology identification among elected officials may be expected to be more consistent than
across the general population which is one possibility this way of conceptualizing the
characteristic is commonly employed in the literature previously reviewed. Furthermore, as
revealed by the findings of McCright et al. (2014), notable differences in perceived national
environmental spending exist between Democrats and Republicans that are congruent with
differences between liberal and conservative respondents suggesting a similarity between
partisan identity and political ideology.
As King (1989) notes, the Ranney index is a measure of state-level partisanship. The
calculation of this variable is based on the partisan composition of the state government as a
function of the governorship and both chambers of the state legislature and for each of the 50
states in the US. Based on the operationalization provided by Bose and Brower (2018), the
indicator for this variable is based on the proportion of Democrat control of the upper and lower
chambers of the state legislature; percentage vote for Democrat’s gubernatorial candidate; and a
control variable which takes into account whether Democrats have control over all or only some
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of the branches. The scores could, hypothetically, range from 0 to 1.0 with higher scores on this
variable indicative of a state being more Democrat-leaning than Republican-leaning in their
overall partisan ideological preference for those in state elected office. The following equation
will be used to calculate the values for this measure of partisan ideology (PARTID):

𝑃𝐴𝑅𝑇𝐼𝐷 =

((

)

) (

) (

)

( )

(5)

Where PARTIDit is the partisan ideology value of the ith state in period t,
DEMGVit is the percent vote for Democrat’s Candidate for Governor of the ith state in
period t,
DEMHSit is the percentage of Democrat party seats in the lower legislative chamber of
the ith state in period t,
DEMSNit is the percentage of Democrat party seats in the upper legislative chamber of
the ith state in period t, and
Controlit: is determined as follows:
Democrats control house, senate, and governorship = 1 (i.e. 100%);
Democrats control only some branches (i.e. divided control) = 0.5 (i.e. 50%); or
Otherwise = 0 (i.e. 0%).
While the inclusion of this control dimension in the calculation of the Ranney index value
for each state-year was not part of the original Ranney (1965) methodology, as King (1989) and
Tucker (1982) describes further, it resolves multiple assumptions made in the original
methodology.
3.3.6. Legislative professionalization.
This indicator provides a composite measure based on “legislative salary, staff, and time
in session” (Konisky & Woods, 2012, p. 558). Higher values of this indicator are interpreted as
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a state having a greater level of legislative professionalization. Where data were either not
available from the NCSL—(e.g. Alabama, Connecticut, and New Mexico)—or determined based
on state-specific sources (e.g. California, Illinois) the developer of the index obtained data from
multiple other sources further described in Squire (2017).
There are three dimensions, or components, which form the basis of this index which are:
compensation (member pay); time in session (total days in session); and staff resources (staff
members per legislator). Each state legislator score for each of these attributes is calculated as a
percentage of the U.S. Congress score on the same attributes. The average score for each state is
then calculated from these three percentages which leads to a scale ranging from 0.0 to 1.0. That
is, the components, are all equally weighted. A higher score is interpreted as a state having a
greater total resemblance to the state delegation to the U.S. legislature—that is, a score closer to
0.0 would represent very little consistency (i.e. U.S. Congress is used as the baseline).
Based on Squire (2012) and Squire (2017), only values from 2009 and 2015 are actual
discrete measurements for those state-years; therefore linear interpolation was used to calculate
the values for the years in-between 2009 and 2015. The following equations provide used to
calculate the legislative professionalization (LEGISP) values for 2010 through 2014.
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+ 𝐿𝐸𝐺𝐼𝑆𝑃2009

(6)

+ 𝐿𝐸𝐺𝐼𝑆𝑃2009

(7)

+ 𝐿𝐸𝐺𝐼𝑆𝑃2009

(8)

+ 𝐿𝐸𝐺𝐼𝑆𝑃2009

(9)

+ 𝐿𝐸𝐺𝐼𝑆𝑃2009

(10)

Where LEGISPi2010 is the legislative professionalization value of the ith state in period 2010,
LEGISP2015 i is the legislative professionalization value of the ith state in 2015,
LEGISP2009 i is the legislative professionalization value of the ith state in 2009,
LEGISPi2011 is the legislative professionalization value of the ith state in period
2011,
LEGISPi2012 is the legislative professionalization value of the ith state in period
2012,
LEGISPi2013 is the legislative professionalization value of the ith state in period
2013, and
LEGISPi2014 is the legislative professionalization value of the ith state in period
2014.
3.3.7. Fiscal capacity.
Anticipated revenue availability often frames budget deliberations throughout the
preparation and legislative phases (Bland, 2007), thus revenue proxies such as state income are
often used to guide budget policy. In the academic literature, studies frequently operationalize
fiscal capacity by wealth indicators, such as household income on either a total, or per capita
basis (Hays et al., 1996; Konisky & Woods, 2012). Another way state fiscal capacity has been
evaluated with respect to environmental agency funding is related to the ability of a state to raise
revenue, for example, through taxation (Agthe et al., 1996; Lester, 1986). However, issues have
been raised with certain measures of fiscal capacity such as income tax. For example, it has been
estimated that less than 60 percent of capital gains are reported underscoring a need to explore
alternative measures for fiscal capacity (Stiglitz, 1986, p. 415).

85

While household income data has been used in public budgeting research for nearly 90
years, from a measurement standpoint, it has been criticized as not adequately capturing fully the
capacity states have to pay for services (Lee et al., 2013). To address this challenge, fiscal
capacity is measured using the total taxable resources (TTR) which provides a relative estimate
of a state’s fiscal capacity based on the states’ gross product (i.e. goods and services) and income
sources (U.S. Treasury, 2019). This approach to measuring state fiscal capacity has not been
used in prior research on state environmental appropriations.
Originating from an analysis of national and subnational fiscal relations conducted in the
late 1980s (U.S. Treasury, 1986), TTR is required to be calculated by the U.S. Treasury on an
annual basis and is used to develop federal fund allocations to government functions including
substance abuse and mental health services (U.S. Treasury, 2002). The general purpose of the
TTR is to provide an improvement over earlier related measures, such as the state personal
income (SPI) over concerns that the latter measure did not reflect the ability of state governments
to generate revenue in the provision of public services given its exclusion of: corporate retained
profits, out-of-state resident revenues (e.g. dividend income), and earned income by residents in
one state while living in another state (i.e. commuter income) (U.S. Treasury, 2002). To help
ensure that measures of revenue generating capacity took all income flows into account, the TTR
was developed to provide “the unduplicated sum of the income flows produced within a state
[Gross State Product] (GSP) and the income flows received by its residents (SPI) which a state
can potentially tax” (U.S. Treasury, 2002, p. 2) as outlined in Figure 13.
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Figure 13.
Total Taxable Resources Estimation

Note. From U.S. Treasury (2002).

3.3.8. State environmental agency budget policy.
ECOS (2010) describes their approach to collecting environmental agency budget data
from each respondent state—on a voluntary basis—as follows:
When states provide “budget” numbers (instead of “actual expenditures”), they
are listing the maximum possible expenditures for the agency. That is, such
budgets are the optimum spending plan for the agency. It is quite possible that
many states will be unable to generate enough revenue in 2011 to cover the
expenditures laid out in their budgets. If that happens, the states will cut the
general fund portion of the budgets during the fiscal year. Thus, the numbers we
have are essentially the best case scenarios for state budgets. Such a scenario is
very unlikely for EPA, as a comparison. Once Congress and the President have
agreed on an agency budget, it is rare that it is modified during the course of the

87

year. This is a major difference between states and the federal government in the
manner in which environmental agency budgets are handled (p. 3).
The functional classifications of environmental appropriations are key to selecting the
appropriate measure. For example, while natural resource spending, on its face, may appear
virtually identical to environmental spending, the two, from a functional perspective, are quite
different. This is one reason why U.S. Census data on natural resource spending, while
comprehensive and available for many years, was ultimately dismissed for use in this study.
Many agencies contribute to more than a singular function, and any single agency is likely to
contribute to a multitude of governmental functions; the data from ECOS addresses, at least
partly, this functional classification challenge.
While expenditures, or outlays, flow from an appropriations bill—both from the national
and state governments—that provides the budget authority for the agency over a given fiscal
year, agency spending is a function of appropriations made from multiple preceding years.
Again, ECOS data are helpful regarding operationalization, since they represent the budget
authority appropriated rather than expenditures for which a focus on the latter “…renders an
inaccurate view of the cost of government” (Mikesell, 2018, p. 76). The focus on appropriations,
versus final expenditures—(e.g. obtained through state comprehensive annual financial
reports)—has extensive currency in the public budgeting literature as observed by Smith and
Bertozzi (1998).
Environmental agency budgets are a combination of total revenue transfers from the
federal government and own-source (i.e. state-source) revenues (e.g. raised through regulated
community fees and transfers from the general funds). Notably, ECOS (2017b) data do not
include transfers to other subnational entities (i.e. local governments). The general trend in
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environmental appropriations is for state governments to rely more on charges and fees over
time, thus further justifying an empirical approach based on a disaggregated measure of state
own-source funding. While the benefits of regressing multiple dependent variables on identical
predictors have been discussed elsewhere (Heckman, 2012), simply stated—what factors best
explain state-source funding from fees and other sources may not necessarily explain statesource funding from the general fund.
Despite the incorporation of fiscal measures in previous research, the use of agency
budget policy data in many studies is characterized by empirical limitations. Instead of setting a
robust research agenda, these prior analyses are inherently complicated by the “… paucity of
reliably and continuously updated datasets that capture current state environmental policy efforts.
This is not surprising, “given the laborious nature of collecting such information” (Konisky &
Woods, 2012, p. 545). Data for state environmental agency funding is not systematically tracked
by the USEPA on a recurring basis, and it is only sporadically collected by private institutions
(Environmental Integrity Project, 2019). Accordingly, the datasets needed to measure the
outcome variable are neither available for all years, nor for all states. ECOS recently released
state-level environmental agency spending data in September, 2012 and, again, in April, 2017.
State environmental agency budget data represent the fiscal resources appropriated for
each year included in this study—2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, and 2015 (ECOS, 2017b).
“This amount should not include funds for parks, natural resource management
(e.g., forestry, fish and wildlife). The amount should include all delegated or
authorized (e.g., RCRA) federal programs and related state programs that address
air, water, drinking water, waste/land issues. Only include programs within your
agency. ECOS realizes this may exclude drinking water, pesticides, and other
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programs for some states agencies and thus will not be fully captured by this
budget update” (ECOS, 2017b, p. 39).
This dataset of state environmental agency budgets is complete for the majority of states. ECOS
reported that data were not provided by Louisiana, North Carolina, New Jersey, and New
Mexico.
State-Source revenues. State own-source funding of environmental agency budgets is a
function of two discrete sources—general funds appropriated by each state legislature and from
fees. Of the state-source revenues, or funds, the majority are derived from fees and other
sources with the remainder appropriated from the general operating funds of states’ treasuries—
so called general funds (ECOS, 2017b). The state-source revenues generated by fees and other
sources are categorized as either direct or indirect user fees. Direct fees refer to those costs
which are imposed through the traditional command-and-control regulatory schemes (e.g. Title
V air permit program) and market-based approaches to pollution abatement (e.g. 1990 Clean Air
Amendments which resulted in cap-and-trade for certain criteria pollutants).
Direct fees are essentially charged to the regulated community due to the pollution firms
(e.g. electric generating utilities, chemical plants) add to the environment as a result of market
failure (Kraft & Furlong, 2015). A certain portion of the direct fees are regulatory program fees
that can be proportionate to either the magnitude of pollution emitted (e.g. air emissions fees), or
to the agency’s administrative efforts to process non-recurring, or one-off, regulatory actions that
require environmental agency review and issuance (e.g. air permit fees). ECOS (2012) notes the
majority of this portion of the budget is comprised of permit fees. For example, under the Title
V air program, the fee set by, and due payable to, the state government, is $51.06 per ton of
emissions (USEPA, 2018g). The revenue generated from this fee is put back into the state
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treasury and helps fund the environmental agency’s administration of the program for current or
out-year budget cycles. That is, these fees—or user charges—are meant to cover all, or at least
some portion, of the cost of providing the regulatory services and often vary based on the nature
and complexity of the operation. For example, the fee to build and permit a new large landfill in
Oregon is $10,000 while the fee to permit a cranberry bog in Maine is $240 (Maine Department
of Environmental Protection, 2018; Oregon Department of Environmental Quality, 2019).
3.4. Statistical Analysis Plan
The initial stage of the analysis provides a brief descriptive analysis of state own-source
appropriations to environmental agencies between 2011 and 2015. In particular, state-source
funding from fees and other sources and general funds are briefly summarized. The remainder
of this section refers to the regression analyses performed and additional details regarding the
structure of the dataset that inform the various options for empirical analysis.
Unlike with cross-sectional data which provide observations on states at the same period
in time (i.e. for a particular year), a panel design—unbalanced panel specifically is used. A
panel data structure is generally preferred over cross-sectional data given the additional variation
within the values of the variables due to the temporal dimension of the longitudinal data. As
mentioned previously, the independent variable data are lagged by one-year and matched to data
on state environmental agency appropriations from 2011 to 2015. This methodological approach
allows assessment of the possible effects of factors in a given year on the environmental agency
budget policy in the subsequent year for a national sample of states.
While using a standard linear regression model with aggregate data was considered, it is
ultimately not chosen as an estimation technique across all models. Fitting such a model would
be based on an assumption that all the states are identical and can be combined, or pooled, into
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one sample population. This can be methodologically problematic given that, particularly in
panel data, there can be, and often is, both variance between the states and variance within the
states. Put another way, that type of standard OLS estimation would not take into account the
hierarchical structure of the dataset (Arceneaux & Nickerson, 2009). Alternatively, fixed effect
and random effect estimates in linear models provide estimation methods to account for:
“clustering or dependence in a dataset, and differing relationships within and between clusters”
(Bell, Fairbrother, & Jones, 2019, p. 1052). Since this interdependence characterizes panel data,
it is important to recognize there can be within effects (i.e. effects that occur within the states
themselves) and between effects (i.e. effects that occur between the states).
As previously mentioned, since not all 50 states responded to the budget survey, the
sample size—in terms of state-year observations—is reduced to (n = 171) and (n = 183) for
general funds and fees and other sources (ECOS, 2017b). The smaller sample size makes
research decisions regarding model specification particularly important given the nature of
regression analysis. Specifically, “there is a real danger of overfitting a model, building in
component that really capture random variation, rather than systematic regularities in behavior"
(Menard, 2002, p. 90). Additionally, running the models with lagged values for the independent
variables can help to alleviate the concern of endogeneity.
As Figure 14 depicts, moderation analysis (i.e. multiplicative interaction) is quite similar
to a statistical model that does not include a moderator. One of the challenges with developing a
conceptual model for a study is balancing the need to provide a representation of reality that is
not so complex so as to challenge the empirical models used to estimate the hypothesized effects
(Fisher-Owens et al., 2007). No doubt there are other conceptual models that can be proposed—
some of which I discuss in Chapter 5 as opportunities for future research. Nevertheless, the
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conceptual model that follows in Figure 14 attempts to capture the complexity of associated
relationships while acknowledging it is not representative of the full gamut of causal
relationships, contingencies, and intervening processes.
Figure 14.
Conceptual Model of Dissertation (Indicating Moderation by Business Interests)

The analysis includes four regression models given the two pollution metrics (e.g. criteria
air pollution severity index and CO2 emissions) and the two sources of state own-source funding
(e.g. fees & other sources and general funds). This approach permits an exploratory examination
of the influence of fiscal, legal, institutional, and political factors on fees and other sources or on
general funds. The following table describes the four models; identifies the two dependent
variables; and the two interaction terms.
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Table 8. Regression Models with Interaction Terms
Overall Model & Interaction Terms

Overall Model & Interaction Terms

DV

Funding
(Fees & Other Sources)

DV

Funding
(General Fund Appropriations)

Model 1

Criteria Air Pollution* Business
Interests

Model 3

Criteria Air Pollution * Business
Interests

Model 2

CO2 Emissions * Business Interests

Model 4

CO2 Emissions * Business Interests

Equation 11 provides the functional equation to estimate appropriations.
Agency Budget it = ß0 + ß1X1+ ß2X2 + ß3 (X1* X2) + ß4X4 + ß5X5 + ß6X6 + ß7X7 + ß8X8 + ß9X9 + ß10X10 + ε

(11)
Where, for each application of the model, Agency Budget it represents the environmental agency
appropriations for state i in year t, and
ß0 = [least squares estimate of] the Y-intercept or what the environmental agency budget
would be if all the scores (i.e. values) of the variables of interest were equal to 0,
ß1 = regression coefficient, or slope of regression line, of the environmental pollution
metric—the first constitutive term,
ß2 = the coefficient on the regression term of the moderator—the second constitutive
term,
ß3 = coefficient on the interaction term,
ß4, ß5, ß6, ß7, ß8, ß9, ß10 = regression coefficients, or slopes, for: fiscal capacity; partisan
ideology; civic environmentalism; climate policies; legislative professionalization;
federal-source funding; population); and
ε = Expresses difference between the value of the actual appropriations and the
appropriations estimated by the regression model.
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3.4.1. Interpreting regression coefficients.
The regression coefficient of either environmental pollution metric (i.e. criteria air
pollution or CO2 emissions), represents the first constitutive term of the subsequent interaction
term. Since this coefficient is for a constitutive term, it is not directly interpretable as a direct
effect (Brambor, Clark, & Golder, 2006; Hayes, 2018). Similarly, the coefficient on the
regression term of the moderator (i.e. the second constitutive term after ß1 also is not interpreted
as a main effect. That is, ß2 estimates the effect of business interests on budgets when pollution
is 0, and the coefficient, ß1, estimates the effect of pollution on budgets when business interests
is 0. Since a value of zero for either variable is not within the bounds of the datasets, the
aforementioned coefficients are not interpretable. The remaining regression coefficients (i.e. ß4,
ß5, ß6, ß7, ß8, ß9, ß10) reflect the magnitude environmental agency appropriations go up, or down,
(i.e. main effects) for each additional unit increase in that variable of interest (e.g. fiscal capacity;
partisan ideology; civic environmentalism; climate policies; legislative professionalization;
federal-source funding; and population).
Similar to the regression coefficient of ß1 and ß2, the coefficient on the interaction term,
ß3, is also not directly interpretable from the magnitude and statistical significance of the
coefficient. The marginal effect of pollution on agency budgets could be statistically significant
across reasonable, or practical, values of business interests even absent a statistically significant
coefficient on the interaction term (Brambor et al., 2006). Conditional marginal effects graphs
are developed to ascertain—and visualize—the relevant range of the marginal effect, if any, of
the modifying variable that is statistically significant (i.e. to visualize the reductive effect of
business interests on the relationship between pollution and agency budgets). This is exhibited
with a downward sloping line where the upper and lower bounds of the CI “are both above (or
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below) the zero line” (Brambor et al., 2006, p. 76). The results will be examined, for example, to
evaluate the range of moderator values for which the relationship between pollution and budgets
is statistically significant by constructing confidence bands around the slopes (Dawson, 2014).
Since the scores of the indicators used to operationalize the concepts may have too high a
correlation with each other to offer statistical utility in the regression analysis, multicollinearity
will be evaluated. While “high multicollinearity does not cause bias… it increases standard
errors and so can cause overlap in the estimator for highly correlated variables that have similar
coefficient magnitudes” (Al-Kohlani & Campbell, 2016, p. 482). The correlations between
variable pairs are examined prior to regression analysis. In addition, assumptions related to
autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity are evaluated to assess whether scores on the dependent
variable exhibit a fairly uniform distribution across all levels of the predictor variables scores
and between panels. Moreover, details regarding the results of data screening and data
transformations are summarized in Chapter 4.
3.4.2. Advantages & limitations of the design & statistical analysis plan.
While regression analysis provides advantages over analyzing bivariate relationships,
there are certain limitations that deserve mentioning. Though the ECOS data represent a
comprehensive source of state environmental budget data, this analysis could benefit from a
longer panel of historical data. The lack of a robust collection of time series data has been a long
standing challenge in state environmental policy research (Lester & Lombard, 1990). The panel
data structure is, however, preferred for econometric analysis when compared to either crosssectional (i.e. a data structure with multiple states over a single year), or time-series (i.e. a data
structure with a single state over multiple years).
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In terms of whether, or not, the endogenous variable—appropriations—that is regressed
onto the independent variables, comes before, or after (i.e. is the cause or effect) in the model,
there is no test that would definitively rule-out such a possibility. The causal relationship
underpinning the hypotheses is rooted in theory and from existing scholarship regarding the
expected associations between budgetary predictors and budget policy reviewed in Chapter 2.
Kennedy (2008) provides further discussion of endogenous variables and their modeling
including various types of endogeneity.
Due to the multi-dimensional nature of budgetary preferences, the key variables proposed
in this study do not capture the entirety of all determinants that may be related to state
environmental agency budgets. Since this dissertation proposes the use of indicators to
empirically assess attributes that characterize concepts, construct validity is limited to the extent
these measures fall short of measuring the concepts (Gerring, 2015). If the construct validity is
low, it would serve to limit the “real-life applicability” of the findings and to make “valid
research claims” based on any findings (Gorard, 2013, p. 159). These variables, and their
indicators, were selected based on their face validity.
Analyzing agency funding as the consequent variable is not without criticism. For
example, researchers have pointed-out that using funding as the outcome variable biases the
researcher to select input variables that are also economically-based; therefore, they appear on
both sides of the equation (Lester & Lombard, 1990); this can increase the risk of committing a
Type I error. This is a concern from both a theoretical and methodological perspective, thus to
minimize the impact from this potential weakness, no variables are proposed in this analysis,
other than one antecedent—fiscal capacity—and one control—federal-source appropriations—as
economic input measures.
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The measure of climate policies does not take into account the stringency of the policy in
terms of the expected magnitude with which it will be successful in reducing GHG emissions
(i.e. not all policies will be equivalent in their effectiveness in reducing emissions). A
dichotomous measure for this concept does not capture whether states have multiple mandatory
CO2 mitigation requirements in-place, or only one policy. Presumably, states that have more
than one policy, program in-place would be appropriating more than states with less. Moreover,
given the short timeframe of this analysis relative to public policymaking timelines, the values
for this variable are time invariant meaning they will be dropped in a fixed effects model—a
limitation which is addressed further in Chapter 4.
Lastly, and related to the above weakness, “the problem with fiscal policy is its slowness”
(Mikesell, 2018, p. 18). While the source of appropriations data for this dissertation was made
after considering data from the U.S. Census; state comprehensive annual financial reports; and
individual budget documents, it could be the short panel of data provided from ECOS does not
fully accommodate the policy diffusion process. Combined with budget data from subsequent
periods, a longer panel (e.g. over 10 years, or more) could enable analysis of the extent to which
environmental agency budgets have responded, fiscally, to the promulgation of mandatory
climate policies across the states.
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Chapter 4: Results & Findings
This chapter provides the empirical models, results, and findings. The first section
revisits the research questions and hypotheses and provides the conceptual model. The second
section provides a brief descriptive analysis of state environmental agency appropriations during
the study period followed by key details regarding data screening. The final section provides the
estimation of linear models using fixed effects (FE) and random effects (RE) techniques; the
regression results; and concludes with findings.
4.1. Research Questions, Hypotheses, and Conceptual Model
As discussed in the previous chapters, the dependent variable is state own-source
appropriations to state environmental agencies disaggregated into two measures—fees and other
sources and general funds. Table 9 reviews each hypothesis and research question to which each
hypothesis aligns.
Table 9
Research Questions and Hypotheses
Research Questions
Does the influence of air pollution on
state environmental appropriations vary
according to the magnitude of polluting
business interests?

What are the effects of political,
institutional, fiscal, and legal factors on
state own-source appropriations to state
environmental agencies and do the
effects vary based on the funding source
or air pollutant type?

Hypotheses
H1: Air pollution severity will increase environmental
agency budgets, if levels of polluting business interests of
states are sufficiently low.
H2: Civic environmentalism will have a positive influence
on environmental agency budgets.
H3: Mandatory climate policies will have a positive
influence on environmental agency budgets.
H4: Legislative professionalization will have a positive
influence on environmental agency budgets.
H5: Liberal ideology will have a positive influence on
environmental agency budgets.
H6: State fiscal capacity will have a positive influence on
environmental agency budgets.
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4.2. Environmental Agency Budget Patterns
Disaggregating the dependent variable takes into account the budgetary reality that lessand-less funds flow from the federal government to state environmental agencies and that permit
fees, emissions charges, and registration fees provide an ever-increasing component of state
own-source funding. For both this pattern analysis, and the regression analyses that follow, the
state and local government price index values were used to deflate the budget data from BEA’s
National Income and Products Account datasets; the default base year for these data is 2012
(BEA, 2019). By converting the appropriations, as well as the values for the TTR variable, from
nominal to real dollars, the influence that inflation could have on the results is removed.
Figure 15.
State Environmental Agency Budgets, 2011 - 2015

Note. Compiled by author from ECOS (2012; 2017b) data.

Between 2011 and 2015, the proportion of state environmental appropriations derived
from state own-source funding ranged from 70%, in 2011, to over 80%, by 2015 with the
majority of growth attributed to fees and other sources compared to modest increases in general
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fund appropriations. On average, of the state-source funding, fees and other sources comprise
over 60% during this period. The proportion of environmental appropriations from the federal
government declined from a high of nearly 30%, in 2011, to just above 18% in 2015—a
percentage decrease of over 10%. Figure 15 provides a line chart depicting the pattern of
increasing state-source funding and declining federal-source funding over the same period.
Overall, states are continuing to draw more from state-sources of revenue in the absence of
federal-source funding. These findings are consistent with ECOS (2017b)—the source of the
2013 through 2015 agency budget data—which noted a marked increase in fees and other
sources and the concurrent decline in federal funding due to stagnant grant funding to states from
the USEPA.
Further, the patterns apparent in the budget dataset used in this dissertation are consistent
with previous observations in the academic literature. For example, Davis and Lester (1987)
found that states augmented their budget policies (i.e. increased environmental agency funding)
when federal-source allocations were reduced. Specifically, they found that “a third to one half
of the states have replaced or will replace federal budget cuts with state-generated revenues
within the foreseeable future, although this number could easily increase as the result of well
publicized “environmental crises” (Davis & Lester, 1987, p. 563). Wood (1991) also found that
agencies sought out additional funding from their state legislators when federal source funds
declined. Thus, the findings are consistent with previous scholarship.
4.3. Preliminary Data Analysis
To begin, the panel data structure allows me to aggregate budget data from the states at
the environmental agency level and estimate coefficients on the regression and interaction terms
to examine the direct and interaction effects of all study variables. Data for all variables were
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inspected visually through the use of histograms, scatterplots, and boxplots which suggested the
presence of extreme, and missing, values requiring further examination and screening prior to
empirical analysis.
4.3.1. Extreme values.
To identify extreme values, upper and lower bounds are calculated using the interquartile
range (IQR) (i.e. the difference between the first and third quartiles) using the Tukey fences
approach (Hoaglin, 2003). The first quartile is calculated to identify the 25% of data that are
below the first quartile then the third quartile is calculated in the same manner for the 25% of
data that are above the third quartile. The IQR is calculated and used to identify extreme values
either below the first quartile, or above the third quartile. Extreme values were detected for all
variables except civic environmentalism, and the values were associated with California, New
York, and Texas—consistent with expectations given the unique features of these states (e.g.
large populations, high levels of economic activity, significant pollution). No values were
dropped from the dataset, since all outliers were found to be true values after accounting for data
entry errors. Further, logarithmic transformation helped eliminate the influence outliers could
have on estimating coefficients especially given the small sample size (Warner, 2013).
4.3.2. Missing data.
As noted in Chapter 3, there were several data points missing from the ECOS datasets as
well as some states that reported receiving no appropriations from the state general fund for
certain years. Tables 10 and 11 provide the details in the reduction of state-years as a result of
states either not reporting appropriations data, or reporting zero funds received from general fund
sources, respectively.
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Table 10: Non-Reported State-Years
State
Florida
Iowa
Louisiana
North Carolina
New Jersey
New Mexico
Total

2011
X
X

X
3

Year
2013
X
X
X
X
X
X
6

2012
X
X

X
3

Total
2014

2015

X
X
X
X
4

X
X
X
X
4

20

Table 11: State-Years with Zero Appropriations from General Fund
State
Arizona
Illinois
Louisiana
Nevada
Ohio
Total

2011

2012

X
X
X

X

3

2

Year
2013
X
X

X

X
X
4

Total
2014
X
X

2015
X
X

X

X

3

3

15

4.3.3. Correlational analysis.
A correlational analysis was performed to examine the linear association between values
of each of the independent variables which resulted in dropping population given its extremely
high correlation (above 0.9) with fiscal capacity (Berry, 1993). The correlations of civic
environmentalism and legislative professionalization were also elevated which was further
inspected with collinearity diagnostics leading to the retention of both variables as they were
well below the commonly cited variance inflation factor of 10 (Hair, Anderson, Tatham, &
Black, 1995). Regardless of their inclusion in the models, it is acknowledged that these elevated
bivariate correlations suggest the values for both civic environmentalism and legislative
professionalization could be providing redundant information about environmental agency
budgets with a consequent impact on the standard errors and estimation of coefficients. The
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correlational analyses, with CO2 emissions replacing criteria air pollution, were similar;
therefore, Table 12 reports those correlations inclusive of only the criteria air pollutant index.
Table 12. Zero-Order Correlations
Criteria Air Pollution Index (1)
Real Fiscal Capacity (2)
Population (3)
Partisan Ideology (4)
Business Interests (5)
Climate Policies (6)
Civic Environmentalism (7)
Legislative Professionalism (8)
Real Budget – Federal Source (9)

1
1.0
.60
.66
-.26
.38
-.22
-.27
.37
.27

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

1.0
.99
.19
-.11
.21
.17
.74
.61

1.0
.12
-.07
.16
.11
.72
.62

1.0
-.49
.61
.78
.35
.21

1.0
-.49
-.58
-.22
-.18

1.0
.82
.36
.20

1.0
.35
.18

1.0
.61

1.0

Notes. Population highly correlated with fiscal capacity; fiscal capacity will control for the influence of state size

4.4. Empirical Models
The analysis plan and deductive research design involves a total of four empirical models
given the two sources of state own-source funding and two measures of pollution severity. This
approach permits an examination of whether the overall influence of the fiscal, legal,
institutional, and political factors on overall state own-source appropriations is attributable to an
influence on fees and other sources or on general fund appropriations while taking into account
pollution problems caused by either criteria air pollutants, or greenhouse gases. The following
Table 13 describes the four models.
Table 13. Regression Models with Interaction Terms
Overall Model & Interaction Terms

Overall Model & Interaction Terms

DV

Funding
(Fees & Other Sources)

DV

Funding
(General Fund Appropriations)

Model 1

Criteria Air Pollution* Business
Interests

Model 3

Criteria Air Pollution * Business
Interests

Model 2

CO2 Emissions * Business Interests

Model 4

CO2 Emissions * Business Interests
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Each of the four econometric models within Table 13 follows the same regression equation to
estimate the appropriations provided per Equation 12. The variable description for each variable
label in Equation 12 is provided below in Table 14.
Agency Budget it = ß0 + ß1(Pollution) + ß2(BUSINT) + ß3(Pollution*BUSINT) +

(12)

ß4(FISCAP) + ß5(PARTID) + ß6 (CIVENV) + ß7 (CLMTP) + ß8(LEGISP) + ß9(EABF) + ε
Table 14. Variable Information for Environmental Agency Budget Policy Estimation
Variable

Description & Unit of Measure

EABFO

State-source appropriations derived from fees and other sources (US$M)

EABGF

State-source appropriations derived from general fund sources in (US$M)

CAPSIDX

Air emissions measured by the criteria air pollution severity index

CO2Em

Emissions of CO2

BUSINT

Business interests measured by proportion of GDP contributed by manufacturing,
mining, utilities of total of state GDP

PARTID

Partisan ideological preference for state elected officials measured by Ranney Index

FISCAP

Fiscal capacity measured by TTR

CIVENV

Civic environmentalism measured by LCV scores

CLMTP

Policies to address climate change through CO2 emissions mitigation

LEGISP

Institutional capacity of state legislature measured by Squire Index

EABF

State-source appropriations derived from federal fund revenues in (US$M)

Notes. All fiscal variables, and CO2Em, were log transformed using the natural log (ln) to address extreme values
and obtain normal distributions. For climate policies, the value for each state was set to 0—pre-adoption—and to
1—post-adoption per Martin & Saikawa (2017) for 2010 - 2014. Climate policy data for 2015 was obtained through
the National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL, 2019). All financial data (e.g. EABFO, EABGF, FISCAP,
and EABF) were converted to constant (base-year 2012) dollars.

There are many ways to contemplate, and empirically investigate budgetary determinants
on appropriations. The challenge is to develop conceptual and empirical models that are realistic
while having a feasible scope—models that are not either overly simplistic, or too complex so as
to challenge estimation methods and impede understanding. I have developed these four models
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as that “middle path, one that is comprehensible yet sophisticated enough to add value” (FisherOwens et al., 2007, p. 516).
4.4.1. Model 1. Criteria air pollution & fees and other sources.
Prior to running diagnostics to determine whether a fixed-effects (FE) or random-effects
(RE) model is the preferred technique for estimation of the linear model, two tests were
performed to test for the existence of serial correlation and heteroscedasticity, respectively. To
examine whether the structure of the dataset would lead to biased results due to less efficient
parameter estimates, the Wooldridge test for serial correlation was run wherein the null
hypothesis is no serial correlation (Drukker, 2001). The null hypothesis of no serial correlation
is rejected suggesting there is correlation between the values of the variables over time;
therefore, further attention is given to ensure the preferred model is used to produce consistent
estimates. More specifically, this finding—which is not surprising given the longitudinal nature
of the dataset—suggests the use of a regression model to fit panel data with either a random or
fixed-effects model (i.e. a panel technique).
Another assumption of the regression modeling is the distribution of variable values
predicted by the model (i.e. predicted values) is relatively constant across the range of residuals
(Stock & Watson, 2003). The null hypothesis of the Breusch-Pagan test is the residuals are
homoscedastic (i.e. no heteroscedasticity) (Breusch-Pagan, 1980). Upon running the test, the
null hypothesis of constant variance is rejected suggesting there is evidence of heteroscedasticity
in Model 1. Along with the serial correlation, this heteroscedasticity will be accommodated
using heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors (Stock & Watson, 2003).
Per Wooldridge (2002), based on the panel structure of the dataset, it is possible to
control for heterogeneity through the use of a state FE estimator to control for unobserved
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characteristics that could vary over time. To determine whether a FE or RE model was
preferred, a Hausman test is run where, under the null hypothesis, individual effects are random
(i.e. the RE model is preferred). Though use of the Hausman test to decide on whether a FE or
RE model provides the preferred specification of data is not without its criticism (Bell et al.,
2019), it is applied in this study given currency in the econometrics literature (Greene, 2012;
Wooldridge, 2002). More on these two estimation techniques is discussed in section 4.4.3.
In all four models, there are eight continuous independent variables and one
categorical—binary—independent variable which is time invariant (i.e. it stays constant
throughout all five years). The results of the Hausman test for fixed effects for Model 1 suggests
the linear model should be estimated with fixed (within model) effects regression (i.e. prob>chi2
was significant (i.e. p < 0.05) to improve the goodness-of-fit. The FE estimation method for
Model 1 recognizes the panel structure of the dataset by not considering all observations
independent from one another. Per Cameron & Trivedi (2009), given that the within standard
deviation of climate policies is zero (i.e. it is time invariant), this variable is not carried forward
as one of the regressors in the FE model. That is, since this FE model will fix, or control-out, the
average effects of the states, these results of Model 1 do not provide an indication as to the
influence climate policies has, or not, on environmental appropriations.
Given the inclusion of climate policies among my research hypotheses, however,
standard ordinary least squares (OLS), with robust standard errors, was also used to estimate
Model 1. Given that standard (i.e. pooled) OLS treats all observations as independent, this
estimation method fails to account for the panel structure of the dataset. Further, this estimation
method leads to regression coefficient estimates that are a weighted average of the within and
between effects and underestimates standard errors making it more likely that statistical
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significance will be detected (i.e. it increasing Type I error) (Arceneaux & Nickerson, 2009).
Given these limitations, while the results from the OLS estimation method are provided in Table
17, a brief discussion of only the climate policy variable accompanies the empirical results
following the results of the FE model provided in Table 16. Summary statistics for
untransformed variables are now reported in Table 15.
Table 15. Summary Statistics
Variable

Count

Mean

Std. Dev.

Min

Max

Real Budget – Fees & Other
(millions $)

233

168.12

397.34

0

4137.26

Real Budget – General Fund
(millions $)

233

27.10

38.90

0

270.78

Criteria Air Pollution Index

250

0.04

4.86

-5.60

20.63

CO2 Emissions

250

1.43e+11

1.51e+11

2.43e+09

1.00e+12

Real Fiscal Capacity (millions $)

250

350,997

421,533

31,267

2,437,219

Population (millions)

250

6.26

6.97

0.56

38.79

Partisan Ideology

250

0.45

0.20

0.12

0.85

Business Interests

250

0.17

0.07

0.01

0.41

Climate Policies

250

0.48

0.50

0

1

Civic Environmentalism

250

48.00

28.46

1

100

Legislative Professionalism

250

0.21

0.11

0.04

0.62

Real Budget – Federal Source
(millions $)

233

61.73

72.88

0

415.79

Notes. All independent variables except Ranney Index, Business Interests, and Population are logged in the models.
The descriptive statistics above pertain to the estimated parameters in all models.

Regarding the FE regression of Model 1 listed in Table 16—as predicted by technocracy
theory—absent any influence by business interests, there is evidence criteria air pollution has a
positive relationship with environmental budgets. In other words, pollution from criteria air
pollutants positively influences appropriations derived from fees and other sources when there is
an absence of business interests that would otherwise undermine fiscal responsiveness.
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However, this coefficient is not directly interpretable, since it is describing the influence of
pollution on appropriations at levels of business interests not within the range of the dataset (i.e.
business interests = 0) (Braumoeller, 2004). Therefore, to gain further insight into the interaction
effect, the conditional marginal effect of criteria air pollution on appropriations is provided in
Table 18.
Contrary to expectations, no other coefficients on the regression terms, in the FE model,
were statistically significant at either the 0.10, or the 0.05 significance level (p < 0.1, p < 0.05).
From this model, there is insufficient evidence that fiscal capacity, partisan ideology, civic
environmentalism, or legislative professionalization have a significant, direct, influence (i.e.
main effect) on appropriations from fees and other sources. In regards to the control variable,
federal-source appropriations to environmental agencies are not found to increase, or decrease,
budgets derived from fees and other sources. While the climate policies variable is dropped from
the FE results, the results estimated by the OLS regression model, as shown in Table 17, provide
evidence that climate policies positively influence environmental appropriations. This result
suggests that environmental budgets are higher in response to the quantity of mandatory climate
policies, as hypothesized. Also as expected, the standard errors estimated by the OLS model are
smaller than those of the FE model.
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Table 16. Fixed-effects Estimates for Appropriations from Fees & Other Sources (Criteria Air
Pollution) (Model 1)
Variable

t

P>|t|

0.20**

Robust Standard
Error
0.09

2.24

0.030

FISCAP

-0.50

0.56

-0.90

0.371

PARTID

0.28

0.41

0.68

0.499

BUSINT

-0.71

3.19

-0.22

0.825

CAPSIDX * BUSINT

-0.76*

0.39

-1.95

0.057

CIVENV

-0.08

0.09

-0.90

0.374

LEGISP

-0.58

1.10

-0.53

0.600

EABF

-0.01

0.03

-0.51

0.613

6.57

1.67

0.101

CAPSIDX

Coefficient

Constant
10.96
Observations = 183
Groups (States) = 49
R-squared (overall) = 0.37
R-squared (within) = 0.06
R-squared (between) = 0.37
F (8,48) = 1.81
Prob>F = 0.099
rho = 0.97
Fixed year effects; Independent variables are lagged
*
p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01
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Table 17. OLS Estimates for Appropriations from Fees & Other Sources (Criteria Air Pollution)
(Model 1)
Coefficient

Robust Standard
Error

t

P>|t|

CAPSIDX

0.11**

0.04

2.57

0.011

FISCAP

0.41***

0.12

3.51

0.001

PARTID

1.59***

0.40

4.03

<0.001

BUSINT

-1.12

0.95

-1.17

0.243

CAPSIDX * BUSINT

-0.16

0.16

-1.02

0.311

CLMTP

0.32**

0.16

2.01

0.046

CIVENV

-0.13

0.11

-1.19

0.235

LEGISP

-0.33

0.75

-0.43

0.664

0.44***

0.10

4.51

<0.001

-2.52

1.55

-1.62

0.107

Variable

EABF
Constant
Observations = 183
R-squared = 0.71
F (9, 173) = 61.52
Prob>F = 0.0000
*
p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01

Returning to the Model 1 results estimated from the FE model, these findings could be
explained by the duration it takes for budgetary determinants to diffuse through the budgeting
process. Put another way, the short panel analyzed in this study—five years for the lagged
independent variables—may not be sufficient time for any characteristic but the most impactful
forces (i.e. business interests from polluting sectors) to affect appropriations from fees and other
sources. Alternatively, it could be that environmental agency budgeting, similar to that of many
governmental agencies, is best characterized as incremental with either minimal increases, or
minimal decreases, over the years and throughout the states.
While the coefficient on the interaction term (CAPSIDX*BUSINT) provides evidence of
statistically significant—and negative—interaction of business interests and criteria air pollution
on agency appropriations from fees and other sources, caution must be used in directly
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interpreting this coefficient in isolation (Brambor et al., 2006). Since the coefficient on
(CAPSIDX*BUSINT) is negative, this suggests that the reductive effect increases as the
prevalence of business interests increases. To better visualize the impact of criteria air pollution
on appropriations along the business interests continuum, multiple marginal effects points were
calculated to create a graph using business interests values ranging between 0.01 and 0.41—the
minimum and maximum values—calculated in increments of 0.02. Figure 16 provides a graph
wherein the solid sloping line reflects how the marginal effect of criteria air pollution on
appropriations is impacted by business interest conditions. The confidence intervals depicted by
the bands around the sloping line allows visualization of when interaction of business interests
on criteria air pollution is statistically significant at the 0.05 significance level, or not.
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Figure 16.
Marginal Effects of Increased Business Interests on Criteria Air Pollution and Appropriations
from Fees & Other Sources (Model 1)

Note. A statistically significant effect is represented whenever the sloping line is within the confidence intervals
where both the upper and lower bounds of the confidence interval do not contain zero.

When the marginal effect of criteria air pollution on appropriations from fees and other
sources is viewed across a range of business interests found among the states, the negative
interaction effect of business interests becomes clearer. As shown in Figure 16, the results from
Model 1 provides evidence of increased environmental budgets from fees and other sources
when criteria air pollution increases in low-to-moderate business interests conditions. The
statistical significance, however, of this reductive effect on fees and other sources diminishes as
these interests increase. That is, at higher levels of business interests, the reductive effect of
business interests on appropriations in response to criteria air pollution still increases though
eventually is not within the confidence intervals. More specifically, when the level of business
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interests is greater than approximately 0.17, the moderation of business interests is no longer
statistically significant. When considered in the context of the business interest values across the
sample population, roughly 60% of business interests values throughout the states fell within this
region of significance.
Table 18 provides the marginal effects of the criteria air pollution on appropriations from
fees and other sources at varying percentiles of business interests.
Table 18. Marginal Effect of Criteria Air Pollution on Appropriations from Fees & Other
Sources (Model 1)
Percentiles of
BUSINT

BUSINT

F-value

Prob>F

Marginal
Effect of
CAPSIDX

1%

0.046918

5.03

0.029

0.016614

5%

0.073185

4.96

0.031

0.014623

10%

0.083878

4.90

0.032

0.013812

25%

0.123188

4.44

0.040

0.010832

50%

0.157073

3.52

0.067

0.008264

75%

0.208116

1.25

0.269

0.004395

90%

0.265409

0.00

0.991

0.000052

95%

0.311202

0.37

0.544

-0.003419

Note. The marginal effect = coefficient of CAPSIDX*unit change of CAPSIDX+coefficient of the interaction
term*unit change of CAPSIDX*BUSINT

Based on Table 18, the statistically significant marginal effect of criteria air pollution
severity on appropriations is evident as well as the limited magnitude of the positive effect. For
example, for a state that falls in the fiftieth percentile of BUSINT (0.157073), the marginal effect
of a one standard deviation increase of BUSINT on EABFO is 0.1*0.20170.7580*0.1*0.157073=0.008 million dollars, or roughly $10,000. What also comes across from
these results, though not statistically significant, is while there is a positive marginal effect, this
marginal effect declines as business interests increase eventually phasing-out completely.
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Though the magnitude of the conditional marginal effect is not substantial, the results
presented in Figure 16 and Tables 16 and 18 provide evidence in support of Hypothesis 1.
Criteria air pollution does appear to increase environmental agency budgets across the states, and
this positive marginal effect is evidenced not only at low levels of business interests but also at
the mid-range. Moreover, a reductive effect by business interests on states’ fiscal responsiveness
to criteria air pollution is observed at the high-end of the business interest spectrum though this
interaction effect eventually loses statistical significance.
4.4.2. Model 2. CO2 Emissions & fees and other sources.
Prior to running diagnostics to determine whether a FE or RE model is the preferred
technique for estimating the linear model, two tests were performed to test for the existence of
serial correlation and heteroscedasticity, respectively. Results from the Wooldridge test for
serial correlation supported rejecting the null hypothesis suggesting the variables are correlated
over time for the sample of states. The null hypothesis of the Breusch-Pagan test (i.e. no
heteroscedasticity) is also rejected suggesting that there is evidence of heteroscedasticity in
model one. Similar to Model 1, along with the serial correlation, this heteroscedasticity will be
accommodated using heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors (Stock & Watson, 2003). Finally,
results from the Hausman test suggests a FE model is preferred.
The results of the FE regression of Model 2 are listed in Table 19. Contrary to
expectations, none of the regression terms prove to approach statistical significance, and the
direction of many of the coefficients are inconsistent with the respective hypothesis. For
example, the coefficient on the focal independent variable in the model, CO 2 emissions, is
negative suggesting that as CO2 emissions increase, there is a negative influence on
appropriations. Given that there were several extreme values within this dataset, and considering
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the sensitivity of model results to outliers, the model was re-run by removing these values, and
this resulted in no noticeable impact on the estimates. Compared to the Model 1 results, which
suggest criteria air pollution problems tends to positively influence the appropriations derived
from fees and other sources in accommodative business interest conditions, no such influence
emerges with GHG pollution problems. Since the main effect of carbon emissions is not
specifically being tested, and it is describing the influence of carbon pollution on appropriations
at zero level of business interests, the conditional marginal effect of carbon pollution on
appropriations is separately examined.
No other coefficients on the regression terms are statistically significant at either the 0.10,
or the 0.05 significance level (p < 0.1, p < 0.05). From this model, there is insufficient evidence
that fiscal capacity, partisan ideology, civic environmentalism, or legislative professionalization
have a significant, direct, influence (i.e. main effect) on appropriations from fees and other
sources. In regards to the control variable—federal-source appropriations to environmental
agencies—similar to Model 1, this variable does not explain the variation in budgets.
Similar to Model 1, given the inclusion of the time invariant variable—climate policies—
among my research hypotheses and preference indicated for a FE model, estimation of Model 2
was completed using an OLS model with robust standard errors. The results from the OLS
estimation method are provided in Table 20, a brief discussion of only the climate policy variable
accompanies the empirical results following the results of the FE model provided in Table 19.
While the climate policies variable is dropped from the FE results, the results estimated by the
standard OLS regression model, as shown in Table 20, do not provide evidence that climate
policies positively influence environmental appropriations. This result suggests that
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environmental budgets derived from fees and other sources do not exhibit fiscal responsiveness
to the quantity of mandatory climate policies when the model is specified with CO 2 emissions.
Table 19. Fixed-effects Estimates for Appropriations from Fees & Other Sources (CO 2
Emissions) (Model 2)

CO2EM

-0.05

Robust Standard
Error
0.25

FISCAP

-0.29

0.67

-0.43

0.673

PARTID

-0.04

0.27

-0.14

0.885

BUSINT

-2.81

22.01

-0.13

0.899

CO2EM * BUSINT

0.10

0.85

0.12

0.903

CIVENV

-0.07

0.08

-0.83

0.413

LEGISP

-0.74

1.24

-0.59

0.555

EABF

-0.02

0.03

-0.65

0.516

9.80

0.97

0.335

Variable

Coefficient

Constant
9.56
Observations = 183
Groups (States) = 49
R-squared (overall) = 0.58
R-squared (within) = 0.01
R-squared (between) = 0.58
F (8,48) = 0.60
Prob>F = 0.78
rho = 0.97
Fixed year effects; Independent variables are lagged
*
p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01
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t

P>|t|

-0.21

0.836

Table 20. OLS Estimates for Appropriations from Fees & Other Sources (CO 2 Emissions)
(Model 2)
Coefficient

Robust Standard
Error

t

P>|t|

CO2EM

0.08

0.25

0.31

0.754

FISCAP

0.57***

0.17

3.30

0.001

PARTID

0.22

0.40

0.55

0.583

BUSINT

80.59***

28.24

2.85

0.005

CO2EM * BUSINT

-3.10***

1.14

-2.72

0.007

CLMTP

0.05

0.30

0.17

0.868

CIVENV

-0.04

0.18

-0.24

0.814

LEGISP

2.16**

0.92

2.34

0.020

0.13

0.09

1.51

0.134

-7.50

5.26

-1.42

0.156

Variable

EABF
Constant
Observations = 171
R-squared = 0.40
F (9, 161) = 13.38
Prob>F = 0.0000
*
p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01

Returning to the Model 2 results estimated from the FE model, while the coefficient on
business interests is in the expected, negative, direction, the coefficient on the interaction term
(CO2EM*BUSINT) is positive suggesting that business interests have an invigorating influence
on the marginal effect of pollution and appropriations. Since the coefficient on
(CO2EM*BUSINT) is positive, this suggests that there is no reductive effect by business
interests—unlike the findings from Model 1. To better visualize the impact of CO 2 emissions on
appropriations along the range of business interests, multiple marginal effects points were
calculated to create a graph using business interests values ranging between 0.01 and 0.41—the
minimum and maximum values—calculated in increments of 0.02. Figure 17 provides a graph
wherein the solid sloping line reflects how the marginal effect of CO 2 emissions on
appropriations is impacted by business interest conditions.
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Figure 17.
Marginal Effects of Increased Business Interests on CO 2 Pollution and Appropriations from Fees
& Other Sources (Model 2)
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The confidence intervals depicted by the bands illustrate the absence of an interaction of
business interests on CO2 emissions. The coefficient on the interaction term does not reach
statistical significance at the 0.05 significance level at any level of business interests within the
range of possible values. Contrasting with the evidence from Model 1—that criteria pollutant
emissions elicit positive fiscal responsiveness as long as business interests are sufficiently low—
it appears CO2 emissions have a dissimilar effect. Since inclusion of CO 2 emissions into the
conceptual model, while informed by ecological citizenship theory, was largely exploratory in
nature, these results are still intriguing. The results suggest that while states are appropriating
more funds to address criteria air pollution, GHG emissions are not yet producing a similar
marginal effect. Further, Model 2 results do not reinforce the evidence from Model 1 that
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business interests are having a reductive effect on the relationship between pollution and
appropriations. Similar to Model 1, these unexpected findings with respect to the Model 2
results could be explained by the duration of time it takes for budgetary determinants to diffuse
through the budgeting process especially for CO2 emissions which are still not regulated by
many states. While roughly half of the states do have mandatory emissions requirements for
CO2, based on the dataset used in this analysis, the other half of the country does not regulate
CO2 emissions. Arguably, it is when states have mandatory regulations that the budgetary
drivers exist to fund the necessary compliance, permitting, and enforcement apparatus to
implement the control and abatement policies. More on the implications of this finding is
offered in the final chapter.
4.4.3. Model 3. Criteria air pollution & general funds.
A foundational assumption of this study is that appropriations from fees and other
sources and appropriations drawn from general funds are independently determined. Models 3
and 4 are estimated to test the same hypotheses using appropriations from state general funds.
To review, general fund appropriations to state environmental agencies are a comparatively
minor component of overall environmental financial resources—representing roughly 20% of the
total available dollars for environmental protection. Estimating separate models using general
funds allows me to explore the differential influences, if any, of the regressors on these two
sources of appropriations.
Results from the Wooldridge test for serial correlation, and the results for the BreuschPagan test both indicated the presence of autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity in the model to
be accommodated using heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors. Unlike Models 1 and 2,
however, the Hausman test results suggests a RE model is preferred. To examine whether it
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would be preferred to run a RE model or a pooled-OLS regression, the Breusch-Pagan Lagrange
multiplier (LM test) is performed. The null hypothesis for the LM test is that variation across the
states is zero (i.e. there is no effect on appropriations due to differences across the states)
(Breusch & Pagan, 1980). The results of the LM test were statistically significant indicating
random effects in the panel data, thus a preference for selecting a RE model over pooled OLS as
the estimation method.
There are several essential differences between FE and RE models that merit a brief
discussion. First, where the FE model employs within-effects estimation as the method—and the
F-statistic for the hypothesis test—the RE model uses generalized least squares (GLS) and the
Chi-squared statistic to test model significance. Also, while the average random effects across
individual units (e.g. states in this study) are fixed (i.e. controlled out) in the FE model, a RE
model does not control out any time invariant heterogeneity across the groups. Per Greene
(2008), when there is a random effect within the dataset that is correlated with the regressors (i.e.
budgetary determinants), then the RE model can produce inconsistent results. Since the null of
the Hausman test was not rejected, however, it is assumed that any individual random effects
(i.e. from any unmeasured or omitted variables) are uncorrelated with the values of regressors in
the model, indicating the preference for a RE model (Kennedy, 2008).
The results of the RE regression of Model 3 are listed in Table 21. Overall, the model is
statistically significant (Wald chi-square < 0.001). With the exception of CIVENV, the signs on
all coefficients are in the expected direction. Hypothesis 6 predicting state fiscal capacity will
have a positive influence on environmental agency budgets is supported at the 0.05 significance
level (p = 0.04). This finding suggests that an increase in the revenue generating potential of
states (i.e. fiscal capacity) leads to an increase in appropriations from the general fund. When
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states have more revenue generating potential, it can be expected that they will appropriate more
for environmental protection compared to when they have less capacity to raise such revenues.
Notably, the influence of fiscal capacity on appropriations from fees and other sources was not
significant suggesting a differential influence of this fiscal factor on environmental agency
budgets.
The coefficient on the focal independent variable in the model, CAPSIDX, is positive—
and statistically significant—suggesting that as criteria pollutant emissions increase, there is a
positive influence on appropriations. These results are similar to the Model 1 results which
reaffirms criteria air pollution positively influence appropriations regardless of the source (i.e.
the effect is consistent across state own-source funding streams). Again, since the main effect of
criteria air pollution is not specifically being tested, and it is describing the influence of pollution
on appropriations in complete absence of business interests, the conditional marginal effect of
pollution on appropriations is separately examined.
No other coefficients on the regression terms are statistically significant at either the 0.10,
or the 0.05 significance level. From Model 3, there is insufficient evidence that partisan
ideology, civic environmentalism, climate policies—which were not dropped from the FE
models, or legislative professionalization have a significant, direct, influence (i.e. main effect) on
appropriations from general funds. In regards to the control variable—federal-source
appropriations to environmental agencies—similar to Models 1 and 2, this variable does not
explain variation in appropriations from general funds.
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Table 21. Random-effects Estimates for Appropriations from General Funds (Criteria Air
Pollution) (Model 3)

CAPSIDX

0.20*

Robust Standard
Error
0.11

FISCAP

0.42**

0.20

2.10

0.035

PARTID

1.00

0.62

1.60

0.110

BUSINT

-1.74

1.74

-1.00

0.315

-1.00**

0.44

-2.27

0.023

CLMTP

0.35

0.41

0.85

0.393

CIVENV

-0.08

0.078

-0.98

0.327

LEGISP

0.39

1.58

0.25

0.806

EABF

0.00

0.05

-0.01

0.993

2.41

-1.00

0.318

Variable

CAPSIDX * BUSINT

Coefficient

Constant
-2.40
Observations = 171
Groups (States) = 47
R-squared (overall) = 0.34
R-squared (within) = 0.04
R-squared (between) = 0.40
Wald χ2 (9) = 52.73
Prob> χ2 = <0.001
rho = 0.89
Fixed year effects; Independent variables are lagged
*
p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01

z

P>|z|

1.81

0.070

While the coefficient on the interaction term (CAPSIDX*BUSINT) provides evidence of
statistically significant—and negative—interaction of business interests and criteria air pollution
on agency appropriations from general funds, this coefficient is not directly interpretable—
similar to Model 1. Since the coefficient on (CAPSIDX*BUSINT) is negative, this suggests that
the reductive effect increases as the prevalence of business interests increases. To better
visualize the impact of criteria air pollution on appropriations along the business interests
continuum, multiple marginal effects points were calculated to create a graph using business
interests values ranging between 0.01 and 0.41—the minimum and maximum values—calculated
in increments of 0.02. Figure 18 provides a graph wherein the solid sloping line reflects how the
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marginal effect of criteria air pollution on appropriations is impacted by business interest
conditions.
Figure 18.
Marginal Effects of Increased Business Interests on Criteria Air Pollution and Appropriations
from General Funds (Model 3)

Similar to Model 1, when the marginal effect of criteria air pollution on appropriations
from general funds is viewed across a range of business interests found among the states, the
negative interaction effect of business interests becomes clear. As shown in Figure 18, the
results from Model 3; however, provide limited evidence of increased environmental budgets
from general funds compared to appropriations from fees and other sources. More specifically,
as Table 18 reveals, while Model 1 found significant interaction at the lowest possible level of
business interests through approximately 0.18, the points at which the interaction of business
interests and pollution on appropriations is statistically significant, and positive, in Model 3, are
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at only the 0.10 significance level. Moreover, at higher levels of business interests, the reductive
effect of business interests on appropriations in response to criteria air pollution eventually
vanishes in Model 1 while, in Model 3, the negative interaction effect remains within the
confidence intervals. When considered in the context of the business interest values across the
sample population, just under 10% of business interest values throughout the states fell within
this region of significance.
Unlike with appropriations derived from fees and other sources, the marginal effect of
pollution on appropriations from general funds is negative, and statistically significant, at high
levels of business interests (i.e. towards the right of Figure 18). That is, as criteria pollutants
become more severe, this is having a negative influence on general funds at high levels of
business interests. This finding suggests there is not only a lack of fiscal responsiveness, from
general funds, among states in response to increasing criteria air pollution but a negative fiscal
responsiveness when business interests are very high (i.e. states are spending less in response to
pollution).
To review, in Model 1 and Model 3, there is evidence of interaction between business
interests and criteria air pollution on appropriations from both sources. However, somewhat
inconsistent between appropriations from fees and other sources (Model 1) and general funds
(Model 3) is the relative lack of positive fiscal responsiveness to pollution across a large
continuum of business interests in the latter model (i.e. Model 3). Additionally, there is evidence
of a negative fiscal responsiveness to pollution at very high levels of business interests in Model
3. Unlike in Model 1 where the interaction effect of business interests and criteria air pollution is
statistically significant across a broad range of business interest values, fiscal responsiveness to

125

criteria air pollution is largely absent in Model 3 (the interaction is observable but only at the
very lowest level of business interests).
The results of Model 3 provide support for Hypothesis 1 regarding the role of high levels
of business interests in deterring funding from general funds in response to criteria air pollution.
However, the results are not fully consistent with expectations of greater fiscal responsiveness at
low business interest conditions such as those revealed in Model 1. Taken together, the
intriguing findings from Model 3 suggest that moderation by business interests on pollution and
appropriations does depend, to some degree, on the source of appropriations which will be
further discussed below.
Table 22 provides the marginal effects of the criteria air pollution on appropriations
from fees and other sources at varying levels (i.e. percentiles) of business interests and reveals
that the interaction of business interests and pollution is statistically significant at both the lowest
and highest values.
Table 22. Marginal Effect of Criteria Air Pollution on Appropriations from General Funds
(Model 3)
Percentiles of
BUSINT

BUSINT

Χ2-value

Prob> Χ2

Marginal
Effect of
CAPSIDX

1%

0.046918

2.83

0.093

0.015551

5%

0.073185

2.49

0.115

0.012925

10%

0.083878

2.32

0.128

0.011856

25%

0.123188

1.57

0.210

0.007927

50%

0.157073

0.76

0.382

0.004541

75%

0.208116

0.02

0.881

-0.000561

90%

0.265409

2.55

0.111

-0.006288

95%

0.311202

4.84

0.028

-0.010865

Note. The marginal effect = coefficient of CAPSIDX*unit change of CAPSIDX+coefficient of the interaction
term*unit change of CAPSIDX*BUSINT
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Based on Table 22, the statistically significant marginal effect of pollution on
appropriations is absent across the continuum of business interests with the exception of very
high levels where the marginal effect is negative—as indicated by the negative sign. For
example, for a state that falls in approximately the ninety-fifth percentile of BUSINT (0.311202),
the marginal effect of a one standard deviation increase of BUSINT on General Funds is
0.1*0.2024-0.9995*0.1*0.311202 = -0.011 million dollars, or just above $10,000. Further, while
there is a detectable positive marginal effect between pollution and general funds, this marginal
effect declines as business interests increase eventually phasing-out completely when business
interests are most prevalent. However, at the highest levels of business interests, there is
evidence of a negative fiscal responsiveness to criteria air pollution.
Though the magnitude of the conditional marginal effect is not particularly strong, the
results presented in Figure 18 and Tables 21 and 22 provide evidence in support of Hypothesis 1.
Criteria air pollution does tend to increase environmental agency budgets across the states but
this positive marginal effect is evidenced only at the very lowest levels of business interests (i.e.
only a few cases within the dataset). What is also revealed from these results, however, is the
reductive effect of business interests eventually leading to negative fiscal responsiveness to
criteria air pollution at very high levels of business interests.
4.4.4. Model 4. CO2 emissions & general funds.
The results from the Wooldridge test and the Breusch-Pagan test provided evidence of
serial correlation and heteroscedasticity, respectively and will be accommodated using
heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors (Stock & Watson, 2003). Similar to Model 3 which
also regresses general funds onto the budgetary predictors, the results from the Hausman test
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suggests a RE model is preferred. The results of the RE regression of Model 4 are provided in
Table 23.
Overall, the model is statistically significant (Wald chi-square < 0.001). With the
exception of CIVENV, the signs on all coefficients are in the expected direction which is
dissimilar to Model 2—which also included CO2 emissions as the focal predictor; in that model
several of the coefficients were not in there expected direction. Hypothesis 6 predicts state fiscal
capacity will have a positive influence on environmental agency budgets is supported at the 0.10
significance level (p = 0.08). This finding reinforces the finding from Model 3 and further
suggests that an increase in the revenue generating potential of states (i.e. fiscal capacity) leads
to an increase in appropriations from the general fund regardless of the other budgetary
predictors. Again, the influence of fiscal capacity on appropriations from fees and other sources
was not significant suggesting a differential influence of this fiscal factor on environmental
agency budgets. Compared to the Model 1 and Model 3 results, which suggest criteria air
pollution tends to positively influence the appropriations derived from fees and other sources in
accommodative business interests conditions, again, no such influence emerges with GHG
emissions. The conditional marginal effect of pollution on appropriations is separately
examined.
No other coefficients on the regression terms are statistically significant at either the 0.10,
or the 0.05 significance level (p < 0.1, p < 0.05). From this model, there is insufficient evidence
that partisan ideology, civic environmentalism, climate policies, or legislative professionalization
have a significant, direct, influence (i.e. main effect) on appropriations from general funds. In
regards to the control variable—federal-source appropriations to environmental agencies—
similar to all other models, this variable does not appear to explain variation in budgets.
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Table 23. Random-effects Estimates for Appropriations from General Funds (CO 2 Emissions)
(Model 4)
Coefficient

Robust Standard
Error

z

P>|z|

CO2EM

0.15

0.23

0.63

0.528

FISCAP

0.43*

0.24

1.76

0.078

PARTID

0.77

0.65

1.17

0.241

BUSINT

26.85

23.43

1.15

0.252

CO2EM * BUSINT

-1.11

0.95

-1.17

0.240

CLMTP

0.34

0.41

0.84

0.402

CIVENV

-0.10

0.09

-1.12

0.262

LEGISP

1.10

1.81

0.61

0.543

EABF

0.01

0.05

0.17

0.862

4.61

-1.38

0.168

Variable

Constant
-6.35
Observations = 171
Groups (States) = 47
R-squared (overall) = 0.31
R-squared (within) = 0.01
R-squared (between) = 0.34
Wald χ2 (9) = 35.30
Prob> χ2 = <0.001
rho = 0.87
Fixed year effects; Independent variables are lagged
*
p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01

To visualize the dynamics of the interaction effect of business interests on CO 2
emissions, multiple marginal effects points were calculated to create a graph using business
interests values ranging between 0.01 and 0.41—the minimum and maximum values—calculated
in increments of 0.02. Figure 19 provides a graph wherein the solid sloping line reflects how the
marginal effect of CO2 emissions on appropriations is not conditional upon business interest
conditions.
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Figure 19.
Marginal Effects of Increased Business Interests and CO 2 Pollution on Appropriations from
General Funds (Model 4)
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The confidence intervals depicted by the bands illustrate the absence of an interaction of
business interests on CO2 emissions. The coefficient on the interaction term does not reach
statistical significance at either the 0.05, or 0.1 significance levels at any level of business
interests within the range of possible values. Considered together with the evidence from Model
2, CO2 emissions do not elicit positive fiscal responsiveness from states at any level of business
interests regardless of the source of appropriations. The results from Model 4 regarding the lack
of support for Hypothesis 1 (i.e. an interaction effect) reinforce the notion that while states are
appropriating more funds to address so-called criteria air pollution problems, GHG emissions are
not yet producing a similar marginal effect on environmental budgets. Further, also consistent
with Model 2 results, I do not see evidence business interests are having a reductive effect on the
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relationship between pollution and appropriations. Similar to the lack of significance for
budgetary predictors among the other models, these findings could be explained by a longer lag
than included in the current analysis which was only one year given the rather short panel of the
five-year dataset.
It is generally accepted in public policy that there is a duration of time it takes for
budgetary determinants to diffuse through the budgeting process which may be especially true
for CO2 emissions which are still not regulated by many states. While roughly half of the states
do have mandatory emissions requirements for CO 2, based on the dataset used in this analysis,
the other half of the country does not regulate CO2 emissions through a regime of mandatory
state-level requirements. Arguably, it is when states have mandatory regulations that the
budgetary drivers exist to fund the necessary compliance, permitting, and enforcement apparatus
to implement the control and abatement policies.
The results presented here provide a portrait of contemporary environmental governance
consistent with expectations in certain respects (i.e. political, legal, and fiscal factors do
influence appropriations) and contrary in other respects. When the empirical results are taken
together, this dissertation adds to this strand of the public budgeting and environmental policy
scholarship telling a story that aligns with the previous scholarship while offering theoretical and
methodological contributions that hold promise for future avenues of research. Further
interpretation of the findings revealed in the empirical results, including a comparison to findings
from earlier academic literature, are summarized and discussed in Chapter 5.
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Chapter 5: Conclusion
As the arc of fiscal federalism in US environmental governance curves increasingly
towards budgetary decentralization, states appear to be filling an ever-expanding budgetary void.
A key purpose of this dissertation is to build knowledge and further understand the extent to
which state own-source funding of environmental agency budgets is influenced by the political,
institutional, legal, and fiscal factors informed by theory and previous scholarship.
The first section of this concluding chapter summarizes and reviews the empirical results
regarding the effects of the political, institutional, legal, and fiscal factors on state own-source
funding to environmental agencies with particular focus on the important interaction by business
interests. The second and third sections provide the main conclusions followed by practical
implications while the fourth section provides the research contributions of the dissertation
before concluding with several avenues for future research.
Air pollution—a focal variable in this dissertation—represents an environmental problem
which continues to “put pressure on state policymakers to generate policy responses” (Kim and
Verweij, 2016, p. 509), and perhaps nowhere more is this evident than at the state-level (Mikos,
2007; Shaw & Reinhart, 2001). In addition to the political importance of air quality as a primary
issue on the environmental agenda in the US (Rosenbaum, 2017), business interests are
influential by “securing differential gains by political means” (Buchanan & Tullock, 1999, p.
206). Moreover, research from across the disciplines, including political science and
environmental policy, reveals other factors to consider when examining variation in
environmental budget policy (Aidt, 1998; Bacot & Dawes, 1996; Basu & Devaraj, 2014; Coan &
Holman, 2008; Healey, 1994; O’Hare, 2006). Building knowledge of these empirical linkages is
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crucial given the results that occur when state environmental agencies encounter downward
fiscal pressures.
Without adequate financial resources, agency capacity to perform delegated duties is
hollowed-out; there are lapses that then occur due to inadequate compliance and enforcement
oversight with consequent impacts on public health (ECOS, 2017a; 2018; Environmental
Integrity Project, 2019; National Association of Clean Air Agencies, 2017; Steinzor, 2006;
Woods et al., 2008). Setting environmental budget policy commensurate with environmental
challenges might not prove sufficient to guarantee robust environmental governance; however,
inadequate appropriations appear sufficient to preclude it as a reasonable possibility.
The analysis offered by this dissertation is driven by a perspective that does not view
budget policy formulation as the end result of a linear progression of stages such as those offered
by policy heuristics (Easton, 1965; Lasswell, 1956; Ripley, 1985). Instead, public budgeting
plays-out against a backdrop of conditions that must be considered in determining when policies
are either implemented, or not, and why governmental institutions take certain policy approaches
rather than others. It is through this public budgeting lens that the following research questions
are asked:
Research Question 1: Does the influence of air pollution on state environmental appropriations
vary according to the magnitude of polluting business interests?
Research Question 2: What are the effects of political, institutional, fiscal, and legal factors on
state own-source appropriations to state environmental agencies and do the effects vary based on
the funding source or air pollutant type?
To address the research questions, a theoretical framework and conceptual model is
applied that integrates the communicative rationality, pluralism, and collective affairs that
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arguably ought to characterize environmental policy in the US (Bingham et al., 2005; Fischer &
Forester, 1993). The integrated theory of state policymaking framework is applied to summarize
the crucial factors that explain state environmental policy from a broad perspective, and
technocracy, rational self-interest, and ecological citizenship theories are drawn upon to
establish the logical associations between budgetary determinants and agency appropriations in
the empirical models. Related to the empirical features of the study, econometric models are
used with an unbalanced panel design, and independent variable data from 2010 to 2014 was
matched to data on state environmental agency appropriations from 2011 to 2015.
This study helps address the empirical gaps and answers the call for a theoretical-based
analysis of state environmental agency funding to enhance knowledge for policy makers
involved with state environmental agency budget policy. Appropriating environmental agency
funds amid multiple political and policy factors that influence the decision-making process is a
reality for public policymakers. Of practical importance is which of these factors help explain
varying levels of general fund and fee appropriations among the states given the myriad
characteristics revealed by previous research.
5.1. Summary & Review of Key Findings
While a limited number of the factors examined proved to be influential determinants of
environmental appropriations, several meaningful findings do emerge. Table 24 offers a
summary of whether the empirical evidence did, or did not, provide support for each of the six
hypotheses.
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Table 24. Summary of Findings by Pollution Type and Revenue Source
Hypothesis & Key Variable

Pollution Type

Fees & Other
Sources
Y

General Funds

Hypothesis 1
Business Interests Interaction

Criteria Air Pollution
CO2 Emissions

N

N

Hypothesis 2
Civic Environmentalism

Criteria Air Pollution

N

N

CO2 Emissions

N

N

Hypothesis 3
Mandatory Climate Policies

Criteria Air Pollution

Y

N

CO2 Emissions

N

N

Hypothesis 4
Legislative Professionalization

Criteria Air Pollution

N

N

CO2 Emissions

N

N

Hypothesis 5
Partisan Ideology

Criteria Air Pollution

N

N

CO2 Emissions

N

N

Hypothesis 6
State Fiscal Capacity

Criteria Air Pollution

N

Y

CO2 Emissions

N

Y

Y

The empirical results provide support for three of the six hypotheses. There are six
findings. First, criteria air pollution has a positive marginal effect on state environmental agency
appropriations when business interest conditions range from low to slightly above the mid-range
values. This finding suggests states do increase appropriations in response to air pollution
problems when business interest conditions are sufficiently accommodative. Second, this pattern
of fiscal responsiveness to criteria air pollution is evidenced for appropriations from fees and
other sources and general funds reinforcing support for Hypothesis 1, albeit the influence on
general funds is characterized by a less pronounced conditional marginal effect. Further, in the
case of general funds, the reductive effect of business interests is such that appropriations
towards addressing criteria air pollution turn negative (i.e. funding decreases) at very high levels
of business interests. The conclusions to be drawn from the interaction effects by business
interests are somewhat complex and will be further discussed in the sections that follow.
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Third, when standard regression was used to estimate Model 1, there was support for
Hypothesis 3 (i.e. that mandatory climate policies have a positive influence on environmental
appropriations). Fourth, fiscal responsiveness to air pollutants is limited to criteria air pollution
and does not extend to addressing CO2 emissions, and this finding holds for both revenue sources
of appropriations. Fifth, the capacity among states to raise revenue does matter in relation to
budgetary responsiveness to pollution, and this direct effect of fiscal capacity holds across both
measures of pollution but only for general funds (i.e. Models 3 and 4) providing support for
Hypothesis 6. In other words, the ability for states to raise revenue does not extend to having an
influence on appropriations from fees and other sources. Lastly, as modeled in this dissertation,
civic environmentalism, legislative professionalization, and partisan ideology do not appear to
influence, positively or negatively, appropriations derived from either source of state own-source
funding. In summary, while the empirical results demonstrate support for Hypothesis 1
(interaction of business interests and pollution); Hypothesis 3 (climate policies); and Hypothesis
6 (fiscal capacity), there was a lack of empirical support for the remaining hypotheses.
5.2. Conclusions
There are several conclusions to draw from the empirical results. First, my findings
support prior studies that find environmental pollution influences appropriations (Bacot &
Dawes, 1996; Konisky & Woods, 2012), albeit in a relationship that is perhaps more complex
than ordinarily presented, thus contributing a different way of thinking about the influence air
quality has on environmental budgets. Only one study examined the interaction of business
interests and pollution on environmental funding (Newmark and Witko, 2007). Contrary to the
findings of that study, which relied upon a different dataset and methodologies, I conclude the
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increase in state environmental budgets in response to pollution diminishes and eventually
vanishes at high values of business interests.
Viewed through the lens of rational self-interest theory, business and industrial
communities appear to exert influence over the budgeting process. The costs businesses seek to
reduce include regulatory compliance costs estimated at over $200 billion per year—60 percent
of which “are borne by corporations seeking to meet their statutory obligations” (Kraft, 2017, p.
78). Thus, in support of technocracy theory—and Hypothesis 1—when business interests are
low, the relationship between criteria air pollution and state budgets is positive. Moreover, the
presence of the reductive effect of business interests on criteria air pollution and appropriations
from general funds was consistent with Hypothesis 1 suggesting an affirmative answer to the
first research question.
In the case of general funds, the reductive effects seem to be so strong as to elicit a
negative fiscal responsiveness to criteria air pollution at very high levels of business interests as
shown in Model 3. These findings suggests that when business interests are very high, there is
an inflection point in the fiscal responsiveness to environmental pollution. Business interests
appear to be having a more impactful influence on general funds versus fees and other sources,
and this conclusion is compatible with previous literature. For example, in a survey of
environmental and natural resource agencies, O’Hare (2006) found that general fund
appropriations are particularly vulnerable to changes based on gubernatorial and legislative
concerns rather than directly influenced by unelected environmental managers.
Second, with regard to Hypothesis 2, despite currency in the academic literature and
theoretical support drawing from ecological citizenship theory, civic environmentalism did not
have an influence on appropriations in any of the models. Despite the deep tradition of civil
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society participation in US policymaking, one conclusion that could be drawn is there is a
democracy and legitimacy deficit in current environmental governance with citizen involvement
residing at the nexus (Durant et al., 2017; Glucker et al., 2013). A far less sweeping conclusion
could relate to the operationalization of civic environmentalism. More specifically, LCV scores
are based upon the voting records of the states’ delegations to the federal legislature not to the
state legislatures themselves. Accordingly, it could be the lack of significance is attributable to
the fiscal influence of this variable being limited to federal-source funding rather than being
operant at the state-level.
Third, inconsistent with Hypothesis 3, climate policies failed to demonstrate a positive
relationship with agency budgets derived from general funds in Models 3 and 4. However, when
Model 1—which included criteria air pollution—was estimated using standard OLS, climate
policies were found to have a positive influence on appropriations from fees and other sources.
Somewhat surprisingly, a similar result was not observed when Model 2—which included CO 2
emissions—was estimated using standard OLS. Taken together, the results regarding climate
policies were inconsistent with expectations and somewhat contradictory making it difficult to
draw any meaningful conclusions for this variable.
Designing, implementing, and enforcing climate regulations will involve building robust
programs to include attracting and retaining high-level professional staff all of which will require
sufficient financial resources, but can state environmental agencies step up to appropriate funds
for these expanded and more technically complex rolls to address CO 2 emissions? “A frequent
question that emerges during these periods is whether states are up to the task, and it will come
as little surprise to scholars of state politics that the answer is that “it depends” (Konisky &
Woods, 2012, p. 544). Hypothesis 3 was established on the logic that increased regulations will
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cost the government more to implement, thus will drive appropriations in the positive direction.
Due to the time it can take for implemented policies to diffuse and potentially account for
variance in fiscal policy outputs, it could be that more time is necessary for the fiscal
requirements—that will be necessitated to stand-up programs to address climate change at the
state-agency level—to be detectable using a panel design.
Fourth, regarding Hypothesis 4, again, there was no evidence that legislative
professionalization had any influence on appropriations. Similar to civic environmentalism, the
available literature on this variable is limited and somewhat contradictory. For example,
Konisky & Woods (2012) found that greater legislative professionalism led to less environmental
stringency and had no significant influence on environmental expenditures—a finding consistent
with Agthe et al. (1996) who found only a linkage between this variable and environmental
program quality.
One conclusion regarding the lack of influence of legislative professionalization is state
legislatures could be unaware of how reliant US environmental governance has become on state
own-source revenues. While the devolution of authorities to state governments for
environmental protection has transpired over several decades, there could be an institutional
recalcitrance in planning and budgeting additional fiscal resources even as legislative
professionalization increases across states. To the extent this holds true, it could be concluded
this variable, like many of the others, is value-laden and researchers should be careful in
assuming which precise values this characteristic captures. That is, it may be unjustified to
assume professionalism of elected state officials provides a surrogate indication of a granular
understanding of pollution, or appreciation of the reliance on state own-source funding structures
to environmental agencies.
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Fifth, the finding that Democrat-control versus Republican-control of state political
institutions (i.e. partisan ideology) did not have an influence on appropriations—inconsistent
with Hypothesis 5—provides an interesting contradiction to the academic literature that merits
further discussion. One alternative explanation rests in party platform considerations. In their
study of USEPA budgets, Balint & Conant (2013) explicated the connection between partisan
ideology and environmental budget policy using a partisan political model. Applying that
model, environmental appropriations are positively influenced when the consensus within the
party (i.e. party platform) is pro-environment. Conversely, if the priorities of the majority party
are misaligned with the priorities of the environmental agency, then budget policy is stifled.
Thus, the relationship between partisan ideology and appropriations could incorporate platform
considerations rather than only the proportion of state legislature controlled by one or the other
major political parties. However, this alternative explanation is weakened by the academic
scholarship that finds a consistent positive influence of liberal ideology on governmental
spending, in general (e.g. Dolan, 2002; Ryu et al., 2008) and environmental funding, in particular
(e.g. Clark & Whitford, 2011; Konisky & Woods, 2012). Thus, I will now explore two
additional alternatives that could further explain the lack of a partisan influence.
Partisan control of state government is a function of control over the executive (i.e.
governorship) and the legislature. Additionally, akin to the national government, control over
state government can be either divided, or unified. With the measure applied in this dissertation
(i.e. the Ranney Index) the effects that a unified versus divided government power dynamic
might have on environmental appropriations were not estimated by the models. For example,
Fowler and Breen (2013) observed that unified government can stifle legislative passage. To the
extent a unified government would have had the effect of countervailing an increase in
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appropriations despite greater Democrat-control, this influence was left unexamined. Lastly, the
academic literature finds that a Governor’s budget recommendations are particularly influential
on state agency budgets as explained by the chief executive office’s influence on agency budget
requests (Sharkansky, 1968; Ryu et al., 2008). Again, with the political variables specified in the
conceptual and empirical models of this dissertation, such an influence went unincorporated.
Taken together, the contradictory finding regarding partisan ideology underscores the need to
exercise caution in specifying empirical models, with numerous political variables, in order to
capture the wide spectrum of political influences on the budgeting process.
Sixth, Willoughby and Finn (1996) observed spending preferences of state policy analysts
were often predicated on the long-term fiscal health which was translated to their budgetary
recommendations relative to other factors. That is, public budgets are reflective of decisions
made by state-level public managers based on their understanding of the financial soundness of
public sector institutions and the government as-a-whole. Consistent with this, and other,
academic literature, there was partial-support for Hypothesis 6. That is, findings suggested that
where states had greater revenue-generating potential, general fund appropriations were higher.
One conclusion is that while budget officials may be considering revenue generating capacity
when setting appropriations from the general fund, the same focus does not extend to revenues
from fees and other sources. It might be concluded that the fee and other source revenues are
being set internally by the agency public managers versus by elected officials; this remains a
speculative assertion, however, and would require further research to reveal whether such
dynamics are at play. As it relates to the background literature, the positive influence of fiscal
capacity on environmental funding was consistent with the majority of studies; however, it
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should be noted many of those studies did not detect statistically significant results (Bacot &
Dawes, 1996; Konisky & Woods, 2012; Newmark & Witko, 2007).
Lastly, federal-source funding to state environmental agencies was retained in all models
to control for its effects given the anticipated influence federal funding was thought to have on
state own-source appropriations. Given previous research revealing a fly-paper effect between
intergovernmental revenue sources (Clark & Whitford, 2011), federal-source funds were
expected to be associated positively with both sources of state-source funding. Contrary to
expectations, this influence was not supported by the empirical results suggesting a fiscal
disconnect between these intergovernmental budgetary sources to environmental agencies.
While federal-source appropriations are included as a control, it could also be concluded the lack
of significant results from across all four models simply reflects the minute share federal-source
appropriations contribute to state environmental budgets.
5.3. Practical Implications
Three policy implications are informed from the above findings and conclusions. First,
previous academic research over several decades finds that business interests in the US are not
idle by-standers in the public policy process (Davies & Davies, 1975; Dell, 2009; Hays et al.,
1996; Moore & Giovinazzo, 2011). Normatively, environmental governance is financially
responsive to pollution problems; however, evidence is herein offered that business interests are
neutralizing the effects of air pollutants on environmental agency budgets given the negative
interaction effect of business interests.
That is, when business interests are low, and in response to criteria air pollution, states
appear to internalize the governance costs related to environmental protection functions through
increased revenues derived from fees and other sources. This finding suggests states are growing
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increasingly reliant on these revenue structures to promote environmental governance at the state
level. The practical implication here is that business interests negatively moderate the
relationship between air quality and appropriations signaling an opportunity for public managers
and elected officials to promote civic engagement and cultivate a plurality of interests in the
budgeting process.
Second—and related to the first implication—business interests have a differential
conditional marginal effect on the budgeting process as it relates to fees and other sources
compared to general funds. More specifically, a negative conditional marginal effect was
observed for general funds but not for fees and other sources. The practical implication of this
finding is that resourcing state environmental agencies through fees and other sources may be
more politically-insulated than the appropriations derived from general funds. For public
budgeters involved in analyzing and setting budget policy for environmental agencies, this
suggests focusing on raising revenues from these fees may be a more viable alternative compared
to making policy recommendations aimed at securing increasing appropriations from general
funds.
Third, while appropriations bills are ultimately voted-on by elected officials, the content
of budget proposals is a function of a host of stakeholders, many of whom are unelected, who per
technocracy theory do understand air pollutants. In other words, line agency managers must vie
for limited resources by making arguments to public budgeters—including elected officials—
supported by empirical data. These arguments and lines-of-evidence in the budget proposals are
reviewed by budget office analysts and by executive and legislative branch officials. As the
public budgeting scholar Irene Rubin (2010) pointed-out, to be successful, these proposals must
appeal to all these stakeholders.
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The lack of statistical significance across the models in this study for the majority of the
political, institutional, and legal factors could reflect a state of environmental governance
whereby the fiscal needs are being conveyed but are simply getting lost in the milieu of
competing needs facing state governments across the US. To the extent a knowledge deficit does
exist, the environmental agency officials might examine how their knowledge of air quality
conditions is, or is not, being brokered with elected officials including the differences between
criteria pollutant and carbon emissions, and the immediacy with which appropriations should
increase.
5.4. Research Contributions
As noted in Chapter 1, a review of the literature reveals an opportunity for improving
theoretical coherence, applying distinctive methodological strategies including various measures
of air pollution to advance this branch of public budgeting and environmental policy research. It
is with these considerations and perspectives that his dissertation offers four contributions.
First, the integrated theory of state policymaking presents a policymaking framework that
state policy responsiveness can be accounted for by influences from interests groups; political
ideological dispositions; ambient environmental conditions; and economic conditions. Despite
the explanatory role this framework has lent to state environmental administration scholarship, it
has not been used to explain state environmental agency budget policy to-date. This dissertation
suggests its utility for future similar studies.
Second, despite prior research suggesting federal and state policy, within the same
functional areas of governance, have notable differences in terms of their antecedents (Clark &
Whitford, 2011), the environmental budgets are often represented by total fiscal resources, or
with the budgets of natural resource agencies combined with environmental protection agencies
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(Bacot & Dawes, 1996; Konisky & Woods, 2012). As Figure 15 reveals, however, state
governments have increasingly relied upon general funds and user charges drawn from the
regulated community—the two sources of state own-source funding. This dissertation
contributes to the scholarly conversation by examining general fund appropriations separate from
fees and other sources to assess the differential influence of budgetary determinants on a revenue
structure upon which states are growing increasingly reliant—fees and other sources. The results
suggest the two behave similarly, but not identically—(e.g. climate policies and fiscal
capacity)—which holds implications for researchers, and public budgeters alike.
Third, while this dissertation seeks to explain budgeting of state environmental agencies
through empirical modeling, it is generally understood that not all variables “operate in the same
fashion” (Howell, et al., 1986, p. 88). The design of the study attends to the concerns of state
environmental policy scholars to move beyond analyzing bivariate relationships and regression
coefficients interpreted by focusing only on direct effects (Lester & Lombard, 1990). This
dissertation contributes to the research by emphasizing the interaction effect of business interests
on environmental pollution and appropriations.
Fourth, while pollutant emissions from criteria pollutants and CO 2 are formed from
similar processes (e.g. fuel combustion, industrial operations), the empirical analysis of the fiscal
responsiveness to their mitigation should take into account the differential influence that criteria
air pollution and GHG emissions have on appropriations. The results reveal a lack of fiscal
responsiveness to what is arguably the cause of the most pressing environmental challenge of our
day—global climate change due to anthropogenic GHG emissions, particularly CO 2. While
environmental agencies are fiscally responsive to criteria pollutants, the pivot has perhaps yet to
be made in addressing CO2 emissions.
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5.5. Areas for Future Research
This study is built upon a framework that considers the interdependencies between
pollution and budget policy at the state level to help advance research agendas in this strand of
public budgeting scholarship. This dissertation concludes with four areas for future research.
First, a future study could involve interviewing environmental agency managers using a
deductive coding scheme drawing from the theoretical framework and additional theories of this
dissertation to identify key themes related to knowledge brokering by environmental agencies in
the context of appropriations requests. This thematic analysis would be combined with content
analysis of state budget documents to identify any systematic approaches used to convey an
empirical understanding of air pollutant emissions to budget analysts, legislative staff,
legislators, and other stakeholders. Such a study could provide added context to the findings by
exploring the relationships implicit in the focal relationship of this article--the linkage public
managers putatively make between pollution problems and agency budgets.
Second, while included in this dissertation to control for its effects on state own-source
funding, federal-source funding is declining. Future studies could focus on the unique budgetary
predictors of federal-source revenues to state environmental agencies building on previous
research and extending into interviews with public budgeters at the USEPA regions and their
counterparts at the state-level. Such studies could yield insights into what factors have
constrained federal-source funding over the years and how, perhaps, offer paths to stem this
fiscal decline.
Third, with respect to partisan ideology, a future study could examine the interaction of
partisan ideology and pollution on budgets at partisan ideological levels including Republicancontrol; Democrat-control; and two-party control. This study would involve a multiplicative
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interaction model with two moderators—business interests and partisan ideology. In such a
study, the models would depict the marginal effects of increasing air pollutants on environmental
across the entire span of partisan ideology levels and varying levels of business interests ranging
from very low to very high. For example, the marginal effects of increased Democratic control
in state government would be calculated across values of increasing pollutant severity to assess,
if environmental appropriations—from either general funds, or fees and other sources—decrease,
or increase, based upon partisan control of state legislatures. Such a study could provide
evidence as to what marginal effect partisan ideology has when business interests levels are
accommodative (i.e. low) versus in high business interests conditions.
Lastly, resource dependence theory holds that organizations have dependencies with their
external environments and that institutions will develop linkages to external elements so as to
stabilize, or even gain resources, and reduce environmental uncertainty (Hillman, Shropshire,
Cannella, 2007; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). This theory helps explain why state environmental
agencies obtain increased autonomy and control of environmental programs by requesting
authorization and programmatic delegation from the USEPA (Crotty, 1987). A line of future
research could, thus, involve examining the declining reliance on federal-source revenues viewed
through the lens of resource dependence theory from the state environmental agency perspective.
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